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Abstract 
Raed Diab Moh’d Hendawi 
Assessment of Corporate Governance Practices in Jordan: An Empirical 
Investigation 
Keywords: Corporate Governance (CG), Critical Factors (CF), Best Practice 
(BP), Shareholders, Board of Directors (BOD), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Principles. 
Corporate Governance (CG) nowadays is on the agenda of most 
developed and developing countries, including Jordan, and is receiving 
considerable attention in the business world as well as in the area of academic 
research, which is an indication of its importance for business development and 
society as a whole.  
The knowledge base about CG in developing countries appears to be 
limited, but it is growing in size and importance. This study therefore aims to 
investigate current CG practices and barriers to the development of good CG 
practices in firms. In order to accomplish the research objectives, a mixed 
research methodology was adopted.  
The findings of the study contribute to knowledge by providing empirical 
data to test and extend the theory of CG. The results suggest that most big and 
old firms are applying best practice of good CG. Regarding factors inhibiting the 
practice of effective CG, the results indicate that weakness of the legal 
environment for firms and lack of knowledge of BODs about CG principles are 
the most important factors. 
The empirical results find that constitution, compliance and conscience 
will affect firm’s performance positively. Separation between the position of 
   
ii 
CEO and Chairman, the existence of independent NEDs, the use of board 
subcommittees and a strong disclosure regime also help firms to improve 
performance. On the basis of the empirical results, the study recommends that 
the government needs to reform the relevant legislation. These suggestions 
may strengthen the internal governance of firms, thereby increasing 
performance and maximise shareholders’ wealth. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
1 THESIS INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction 
 Corporate governance (CG) is an important issue in many countries, and 
is attracting huge interest in the fields of academic study of finance as well as 
business studies. It is argued that good CG can help economies and firms to 
attract investors and support competitiveness by many means. Furthermore, 
recent study has revealed that economies with more liquid capital markets have 
good CG protections for minority shareholders. On the other hand, in a weak 
CG environment most firms tend to be controlled by main shareholders. A 
series of financial collapses have acutely harmed existing shareholders’ and 
potential investors’ confidence in the financial markets. Research in finance has 
concentrated on various ways to promote good CG systems in firms (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al.,1999; La Porta et al., 2000; Monks and 
Minow, 2001; Black et al., 2006; Lee, 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2007; Bhagat et 
al., 2008; Monks and Minow, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Solomon and 
Solomon, 2010; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Fan et al., 2011; Ammann et al., 
2011). Therefore, CG is now on the agenda of most developing countries 
including Jordan. For this reason, this study contributes to the body of 
knowledge by recognising a series of critical factors that must be carefully 
considered to ensure successful best practice in the corporate governance 




In short, corporate governance is as essential for public sector 
organisations as for private sector organisations (Mallin, 2004). Corporate 
governance has become an international phenomenon and on the agenda of 
most countries, including Jordan. The importance of corporate governance has 
received increased attention  following a number of corporate scandals such as 
the South East Asia financial crisis in mid-1997, the Enron and WorldCom 
cases in the United States of America (Vinten, 2002; Dalton and Dalton, 2011), 
the Yukos case in Russia and the Parmalat case in Italy. All have illustrated 
shortcomings of the corporate governance systems in the related countries. 
Thus, currently, global business is concerned about what occurred, not only in 
the US but also the rest of the world.   
There is no single accepted definition of what corporate governance is 
(Solomon and Solomon, 2010). The definition differs to some extent depending 
on the area under discussion, where the definition is used, and in which country 
it is being considered (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Generally, corporate 
governance is interested with how the board of directors (BOD) and other 
stakeholders participate in managing a firm wisely (Cadbury, 1992; Monks and 
Minow, 2001). The functions of the BOD and the tasks of shareholders have 
been of most interest in the literature on corporate governance.  
The report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, 2004) recommended factors to improve the corporate 
governance system, to make firms operate more effectively and efficiently and, 
simultaneously, to maintain confidence between internal and external 
stakeholders. In line with this framework, corporate governance systems should 
encourage transparent and effective markets, be in line with the regulation and, 




Furthermore, corporate governance systems should protect shareholders’ rights 
in addition to guaranteeing that all shareholders understand and practise their 
rights such as participating in a verdict on amendments or the sale of firm 
assets, similarly, issuing new shares and mergers, using voting rights and 
information disclosure.  
Additionally, CG should guarantee that all shareholders, including those 
that are minority or foreign, are treated equitably. Moreover, corporate 
governance systems ought to protect the rights of other stakeholders such as 
employees, banks and bondholders. It should also support active partnership 
amongst stakeholders and firms. Corporate governance systems should offer 
key terms and conditions for disclosure and communication of key facts about a 
firm, from financial information to governance structure, as well as guarantee 
that the annual reports are submitted by independent auditors. Corporate 
governance systems should ensure that the strategic guidance of the firm offers 
a huge amount of information about the responsibilities of the board in 
protecting the firm and stakeholders. Finally, non-executive directors (NEDs) 
should be independent from executive members of the BODs and have no 
business involvement or relationship with the firm that may influence their 
independent verdict in particular with regard to firm’s performance and selection 
of management.   
In spite of there being a number of published studies and reports 
addressing corporate governance  in developed countries, like the UK and USA, 
and developing countries, like  Indonesia and Taiwan, no significant research 
has been carried out concentrating on the implications of corporate governance 
in Jordan. To fill this gap in the literature, this study investigates the current 




methodology in the form of a postal questionnaire. The study utilises a 
qualitative research method, specifically, semi-structured interviews, carried out 
in the second stage of the study to provide further insights into the survey 
results. The data should allow the researcher to analyse the current state of 
corporate governance in Jordanian firms. 
 The remainder of this introductory chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 1.2 provides background information on the Jordanian economy; 
Section 1.3 will discuss the privatisation programme that took place in the 
country; Section 1.4 presents the corporate governance code of Jordan; Section 
1.5 provides a clear explanation of the reasons behind the selection of the 
context of Jordan to conduct this study;  Section 1.6 explains the rationale of the 
study; Section 1.7 examines the background and motivation of the study; 
Section 1.8 lists the research objectives; and finally, Section 1.9 presents the 
structure of the study.   
1.2 Jordanian Economy 
Jordan is a developing country in the Middle East, with a population of 6.3 
million and a population growth rate of 2.2% (DOS, 2011). Jordan’s natural 
resources are restricted to agricultural products and phosphates. The economy 
depends mainly on foreign support, tourism, services and the Jordanian labour 
force (Youngblood-Coleman, 2008).  
One of the most important aspects which has characterised the Jordanian 
economy over the past decades is its reliance on outside income streams in the 
form of donations from other Arab countries in the region, in addition to 
remittances from Jordanian labour, particularly in wealthy Arab oil countries 
(CBJ, 2009). Since 1989, Jordan has been carrying out structural adjustment 




International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).  The goal of these 
programmes is to integrate Jordan with the global economy (Al-hindawi, 2007). 
The first structural adjustment programme (SAP) was a five-year structural 
readjustment package, signed on April 1989. The most important objective of 
the first SAP was to bring back macroeconomic stability by developing the 
efficiency and competitiveness of the economy. One of the most important 
objectives was also to set the starting point for constant long-term economic 
growth (Export and Finance Bank, 2002). 
In October 1991, a seven-year SAP was signed with the IMF to adjust the 
structural imbalance in the economy. The programme was designed to execute 
policies to improve economic growth through decreasing the government 
contribution to GDP, to improve the balance of payments and reduce the 
inflation rate. In spite of the fact that the national economy faced a lot of 
problems as a result of the international financial and economic crisis and the 
political and economic conditions of the region, the economy achieved a 
number of positive indicators, as expected. To shed some light on the 
performance of the Jordanian economy, Appendix B illustrates the most 
important economic indicators for the period 1990-2012. As mentioned, the 
Jordanian economy showed positive results for several indicators in spite of the 
influence of the global financial crisis which happened in 2008.   
The above-mentioned positive aspects are evidence of the ability of the 
economy to cope with international shocks and bypass their negative 
influences. This could not have been achieved without the Jordanian 
government’s continued efforts to develop the economic environment for 
investment in Jordan through approving a set of reform programmes to attract 




joined the WTO in 1999 as part of its plan to integrate into the international 
economy. Moreover, it signed several free trade agreements as illustrated in 
Table1.1. In addition, Jordan signed a number of trade and economic co-
operation agreements with several countries (MIT, 2009). The Jordanian trade 
regulatory system has been changed to be similar to the WTO legislative 
framework (JIB, 2009). Therefore, new regulations have been created and 
many existing laws have been modified.   
Table 1-1: Summary of the agreements signed by Jordan. Source: MIT, 2008. 
The Agreement Signing Date Annotations 






Free trade with 17 Arab countries during a 
transitional period of ten years, to be 
completed on October 1, 2007. 




Free trade with the European Union within 
a transitional period of 12 years. 





Allowing custom duties of a maximum of 
20% during the transitional period of ten 
years. 




Free trade with the USA, during a 
transitional period of ten years, to be 
completed on January 1, 2010. 





Free trade agreement for 12 years with 
Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein. 




Free trade agreement with Egypt, Tunisia 
and Morocco. 
Jordan - Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement  
May 
2004 
Free trade agreement for 10 years. 
 
Put simply, the government of Jordan has paid most attention to economic 
problems. The most important priorities were given to economic development 
and reform, integration with the international economy and building a 
constructive investment climate.  The government continues its effort to reform, 
since it is expected to support economic improvement in Jordan by pointing out 
the steps which should be followed in approving and developing a code of 
corporate governance in Jordan. The establishment of such a code would 




improvement of Jordan’s economy. Thus, the government’s efforts continue to 
release and raise the openness of the economy in addition to revising the 
financial regulations in order to meet international standards. Additionally, 
Jordan has finished a huge privatisation process. This process was successful 
in confirming the efficiency of privatised firms (WB, 2008) and is discussed in 
the following section. 
1.3 Privatisation in Jordan 
It is important to state that one of the main goals behind the economic 
improvements in Jordan is to enhance the contribution of the private sector to 
developing the country (JIB, 2009). Jordan’s privatisation agenda was initiated 
in 1996 by decreasing the Jordanian government’s share in sectors directed by 
government-controlled projects. Thus, the government has focused on 
decreasing its intervention in the economy. 
Jordan’s privatisation agenda is mainly concentrated on transportation, 
telecommunications, water mining activities, and electricity sectors, in addition 
to various government shares in various companies (JSC, 2009). The 
recommended targets are attracting more foreign and local investors, 
deepening and improving the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and, most 
essentially, restricting the responsibility of the government to acting as 
regulator, instead of creator, of goods and services (El-Said, 2008). 
The privatisation law, Law no.25, was disseminated in the year 2000 to 
offer a suitable legislative structure for privatisation in Jordan. The law places 
clear requirements to organise privatisation, facilitate its execution and supply 
an essential solid system, with transparency and clarity of operation, for the 
privatisation process, under mechanisms that keep it under government control 




In short, privatisation was part of an economic programme that the 
government of Jordan adopted - self-reliance after the financial crisis that 
affected the country. In addition, new economic improvements were going on at 
a global level in terms of an increase of competitiveness and globalisation. 
Therefore, a crucial motivation for employing a corporate governance system in 
Jordan is that a good corporate governance system should be in place to give 
external and internal investors the confidence and assurance that such a 
system is protecting their rights. 
1.4 Corporate Governance Code of Jordan 
The regulations mainly derive from the growing the number of codes 
created by regulators; they present a key factor that strengthens the success of 
economies. Many developed countries have set guidelines and procedures 
which are in the mature phase, and all listed firms adhere to such code of CG 
(Gill, 2008; Mazen, 2014; ASE, 2014; Al-shurfa’a, 2008). However, importantly, 
and of interest to this thesis, in Jordan the code of corporate governance for 
listed firms has only been introduced in recent years. In fact, applying the code 
has become evidence of protecting the rights of all stakeholders. All 
stakeholders would encourage their implementation in order to build confidence 
in companies through enhancing their management performance, which in turn 
increases the performance of the economy, and enhances confidence in the 
investment climate (El-Said, 2008; Ali, 2013). It is also an indication of the stage 
of commitment attained by the firm’s managements to good governance (ASE, 
2014).  
The Jordanian Corporate Governance Code for Shareholding Companies 
Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange’ (ASE) was prepared in light of the 




Commission’s attempts to improve the capital market (Al-mobaydeen, 2009). 
The code contains rules of CG for firms listed at Amman Stock Exchange for 
the purpose of creating a framework that organises their management and 
identifies their duties and responsibilities to understand their objectives and 
protect the rights of all stakeholders. These rules depend mainly on legislation, 
precisely the Law of Securities and other regulations, the Firms Law, and the 
OECD principles. It should be noted that the application of the code is through 
the "compliance or explain" principle, which means that firms must comply with 
the rules of the code, and in case of non compliance with any of these rules, 
would be required to justify the reason for non compliance in the firm’s annual 
report. This method is aimed at giving firms flexibility in implementing the code 
and enough time to get used to it, to improve awareness and to attain full 
compliance with the code gradually (ASE, 2014; Mazen, 2014; Ali, 2103; Al-
mobaydeen, 2009).  
The following sections of this chapter will discuss the reasons behind the 
selection of the context of Jordan to conduct this study. 
1.5  Why Jordan? 
In the present day, the business environment is characterised by 
evolutionary development and changes, such as international competition and 
globalisation (Jordan, 2014; Al-hindawi, 2007). These developments offer 
opportunities for economic growth and generate challenges for developing 
countries in how to deal with these developments for their best interest (El-Said, 
2008). In light of the constantly changing business environment, many countries 
have opened their economies and have adopted international standards in 
every field so as to deal with the various challenges to economies. Jordan is 




changing business environment (Zurigat and Al-Gharaibeh, 2011; Youngblood-
Coleman, 2008; Al-hindawi, 2007). Furthermore, corporate governance is a key 
area where Jordan has to make a major and important regulatory development 
to bring it in line with international standards (Zurigat and Al-Gharaibeh, 2011; 
JIB, 2009). Thus, in the belief that an efficient regulatory framework encourages 
the task of the private sector, Jordan has identified the need to establish 
business-friendly structures with strong emphasis on supporting entrepreneurial 
initiative (Jordan, 2014; Al-shareef, 2008).  
Jordan has recognised national goals designed to enhance the investment 
environment. With the establishment of the Investment Promotion Law in 1995, 
and with other subsequent actions, Jordan has opened its economy to the 
wealth and prosperity of business to attract more domestic and foreign 
investment (Al-shareef, 2008; Black et al., 2006). The Investment Promotion 
Law of gives Jordan an advantage over some other Arab countries. The law 
affirms that both Jordanian and non-Jordanian investors are treated equally 
which attracts investment (Mazen, 2014; Jordan, 2014; ASE, 2014; Al-shareef, 
2008; Black et al., 2006). Jordan particularly has advantages over some other 
countries, an attractive investment climate, a stable political environment, 
qualified human resources and access to major international markets; in 
addition to effective practice of good CG in Jordanian firms, this will attract 
investors.  
Jordan is located at the junction of three continents, Asia, Europe and 
Africa. For many years, Jordan has been the heart of many countries around 
the world because of the social and economic growth being observed among 
the Arab countries. In addition, the experience of growth and legal reform 




example among the countries of the region (Ciborra and Navarra, 2005; ASE, 
2014; Al-shareef, 2008; Jordan, 2014; CBJ, 2014; Mazen, 2014; JIB, 2013).   
  Jordan has an advantage over other developing countries in general and 
the Arab countries especially in terms of its economic policies, financial 
liberalisation programmes, and openness to the outside world. This is clearly 
shown by Jordan joining the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and 
signing a number of bilateral trade agreements (Al-hindawi 2007). However, 
these agreements (see Table1-1) have helped Jordan to impose itself as a hub 
in the area and driven it to create more success and a helpful business 
environment, making it the ideal target for investors. Furthermore, Jordan has a 
set of advantages in terms of the following: 1) advanced education system in 
terms of level and content; 2) the widespread use of bilingual Arabic/English in 
daily life; 3) the spread of universities in remote areas; and 4) the availability of 
a qualified workforce in all areas. These have made the international institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) describe 
Jordan as a model for a developing country (Jordan, 2014; Al-shareef, 2008; 
Westrup and Al-Jaghoub, 2007).      
Generally, Jordan suffers a lack of natural resources, but human skill is 
the wealth of Jordan, as well as strong and solid leadership, political stability, 
firm commitment to the private sector, and openness to the outside world (Al-
mobaydeen, 2009; Al-hindawi, 2007). It is worth noting that the social and 
political stability of Jordan identifies it as one of the trading partners for many 
foreign investors (MIT, 2015). Clearly, the stability of the Jordanian environment 
has been positive and steady due to clear initiatives undertaken by both the 





Jordan has a combination of the characteristics of developing communities 
in general, and Arab communities in particular. This means that Jordan shares 
several characteristics with developing communities, most remarkably the lack 
of resources required to reach better levels of social and economic 
development, while it shares several characteristics with Arab communities, 
most remarkably political attitudes and social life as well as beliefs and cultural 
values (Al-mobaydeen, 2009). Hence, the results of this research will contribute 
to filling the gap in existing knowledge of the determinants of critical factors for 
implementing best practice in corporate governance, not only in the context of 
Jordan, but exceeding that to include developing communities as well. Despite 
Jordan being a developing country, this should not prevent it from adopting an 
effective CG system and gaining many advantages from applying the system in 
its firms. 
It is believed that the above justification combined with the experience, 
networking and knowledge of the researcher in the Jordanian context (see 
Section 5.6) will provide a clear explanation of the reasons behind the selection 
of the context of Jordan in which to conduct this study.     
1.6 The Rationale of the Study 
Like many emerging market economies, Jordan faces a large gap in 
corporate governance. This gap exists due to amendment to the corporate 
governance codes to make them suitable to the context of each country (Saidi, 
2004). The state of accounting in Jordan is still not well developed; actions need 
to be taken over a period of time to support its improvement. For instance, the 
issuance of Jordanian Accounting Standards has not been finished yet. 
Therefore, Jordanian firms or international firms that would like to invest in 




ambiguity has created some faults within the accounting climate, and led to 
some misstatements appearing from error or fraud. Furthermore, this research 
is extremely important since it is expected to support economic improvement in 
Jordan by pointing out the steps which should be followed in improving a code 
of corporate governance in Jordan. Establishment of such a code will attract 
more foreign and local investors which, in turn, will help in the improvement of 
Jordan’s economy. 
In fact, the researcher expects to identify variables which may assist 
firms to employ a good corporate governance system, by demonstrating the key 
barriers that may prevent good practice in corporate governance in Jordanian 
firms and suggesting a number of steps which could be considered to improve 
the corporate governance code in Jordan. 
To the extent of the knowledge of the researcher, this research is the first 
of its kind in Jordan. Hence, this study intends to draw the attention of the 
Jordanian government, business employers, professional organisations, stock 
enlisted firms and investors to the need and importance of implementing good 
corporate governance systems in Jordanian firms. 
1.7 The Motivation and Importance of the Study 
La Porta (1997; 2000), Black et al. (2006), Abdelsalam et al. (2008) and  
Kaymak et al. (2008) highlighted the importance of corporate governance in 
emerging markets for attracting more local and international investors.  Kay 
(1995) argues that corporate governance acts as a safeguard to prevent 
bankruptcy and collapse in firms. The importance of this study stems from the 
fact that the economy in Jordan is at the dawn of a new era and there is no in-
depth study of corporate governance.  There is a need to understand corporate 




governance is important for economic performance and the welfare of investors, 
the results of this study will recommend some suggestions to improve the 
current Jordanian corporate governance code. This study will be useful to 
decision makers as well as researchers seeking to further understand corporate 
governance practices and the issues surrounding MENA countries, including 
Jordan. The findings of this study will have an impact in Jordan by building 
awareness of the corporate governance concept and promoting the culture of 
corporate governance in Jordan. Further, the findings of the current study will 
be disseminated at international conferences as well as providing training 
programmes to policy makers and directors of firms in MENA countries 
including Jordan. 
In addition, the study adds to the effort by the Jordanian government to 
bring Jordan into the worldwide corporate governance reform group and give 
new opportunities for firms to apply international corporate governance best 
practice. It will further help develop a framework that highlights corporate 
governance practice in Jordan and how it may strengthen firm performance 
(Ammann et al., 2011).  
Another important contribution of the current study is to fill the gap in the 
literature by investigating and providing a comprehensive view of the status quo 
of CG in Jordan. Such a comprehensive view should serve as a basis to identify 
weaknesses and problems of CG in Jordan. In turn, this will help the main 
regulatory bodies to overcome problems and improve upon weaknesses in their 
current practices to ensure the success of their corporate governance 
improvement initiatives. It also provides support for related parties to cooperate 
in improving the corporate governance code in Jordan to meet international 




and improving the current corporate governance system in Jordanian 
companies.  
Moreover, this study will provide greater opportunities for researchers to 
conduct future work related to corporate governance in Jordan, a new 
environment (where legal, cultural, religious and political aspects are totally 
different from those in western countries) that has not been examined before. 
Unfortunately, corporate governance practice in Jordan is less well developed 
due to the lack of research in this area. Many steps need to be taken over a 
period of time to facilitate its development. This, combined with the previous 
discussion, motivated the researcher to carry out the current study. This will 
enrich the existing literature and contribute to the ongoing dialogue surrounding 
corporate governance in emerging markets. 
1.8 The Research Objectives 
The previous sections discussed the importance of a study of corporate 
governance in Jordanian firms, which is long due. In Jordan, the capital market 
is not perfect. Market frictions such as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), transaction costs, asymmetric information (Myers and Majluf, 1984)  and 
bankruptcy are relevant to the capital market and substantially influence a firm’s 
investment and financial decisions (Zurigat and Al-Gharaibeh, 2011a). 
Moreover, the Jordanian market is small and thin with a low level of liquidity, 
monitoring, competition and investor protection which makes the cost of 
financing through primary markets high (Zurigat and Al-Gharaibeh, 2011b). 
This, along with the previous features of capital markets, increases the impetus 
of Jordanian firms for monitoring and controlling managerial behaviour through 
setting comprehensive corporate governance plans to enhance their 




Government has been implementing a comprehensive financial liberalisation 
programme to integrate its capital market with international ones, firms still face 
severe obstacles restricting their ability to generate external funds at a more 
attractive rate (Zurigat and Al-Gharaibeh, 2011a). This raises a key question, of 
the extent to which corporate governance in Jordan would enhance the 
performance of listed firms. In light of the above analysis regarding the nature of 
the Jordanian capital market, it seems that the performance factors are 
somehow different from those of developed markets. This may be attributed to 
institutional and tax regime differences. However, it does not necessarily mean 
that market frictions are a problem only for developing markets not for 
developed ones (Zurigat et al., 2013). Empirical studies that have been 
conducted in the context of developed countries provide evidence suggesting 
that these frictions still restrict the accessibility of firms to the capital market 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Charlton et al., 2002). Therefore, the current study aims to 
provide a comprehensive study of the nature and current practice of corporate 
governance in Jordanian firms. To achieve this objective, the study will 
investigate the current practice of corporate governance principles in Jordanian 
firms.  Participants in this study, namely regulators and managers of Jordanian 
firms, will be elicited regarding the current practice of corporate governance in 
their firms. In particular, the research objectives and specific research questions 








 To identify the determinants of critical factors for implementing best 
practice of corporate governance in Jordan. 
 To explore the current practice of corporate governance systems in 
Jordan and identify the factors that inhibits best practice. 
 To identify the factors that inhibit best practice of corporate governance 
in Jordan. 
 To empirically investigate the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance (financial measures) in Jordan. 
 To explore the respondents' perceptions regarding the effect of corporate 
governance on firms’ performance in Jordan. 
 To investigate the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age and sector) in Jordan. 
1.9 Thesis Layout 
The remainder of the thesis is divided as follows: Chapter Two focuses on 
the literature relating to the historical development of corporate governance 
reform and the main reports and principles of corporate governance. In addition, 
this chapter reviews previous studies on corporate governance conducted in 
both developed and developing countries. Chapter Three discusses the critical 
factor of corporate governance and presents the agency theory as the frame 
work of the study, in order to set the scene for discussing corporate governance 
in Jordan. Chapter Four discusses methods used in this study to explore the 
use of corporate governance in Jordanian firms as well as including a 
presentation of the research objectives, research questions, data collection 
methods, the population, sample and design, the pilot study, questionnaire 




discusses one of the key issues related to the primary data collection. Hence, 
this chapter covers the techniques and steps used to prepare the data for 
analysis. 
Chapter Five presents the results of the questionnaire survey and a 
descriptive analysis of the main findings regarding the implementation of 
corporate governance in Jordanian firms. Chapter Six presents the second part 
of the analysis of data collected from interviews with regulators and managers 
in Jordanian firms.   Chapter Seven presents a brief summary and discussion of 
the overall study, and highlights its findings. A number of recommendations and 









2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance (CG) has been receiving a lot of attention after the 
prominent financial scandals that resulted in the rapid collapse of high profile 
firms such as Barings Bank in the UK, WorldCom and Enron in the USA and the 
economic crisis that wiped out a number of Asian countries in 1997 in which 
stakeholders were severely affected (Mallin, 2010; Shleifer & Vishny 1997; Neal 
& Cochran 2008). In addition, failures and collapses have led general public, 
investors, regulators and international bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and World Bank (WB) to concentrate on improving 
corporate governance around the world (Mallin , 2010). Therefore, CG now is 
on the agenda of most developing countries including Jordan.  
The main purpose of this chapter is to present a review of the literature on 
corporate governance so to provide a general picture of current practices. Also 
this chapter will present the legislative reforms that have taken place in Jordan. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows:  Section 2.2 presents an 
overview of the definitions of corporate governance. Section 2.3 discusses 
corporate governance models. Section 2.4 investigates corporate governance in 
developing countries. Section 2.5 presents the Companies Act 1997 and its 
CH-2 LITRATURE REVIEW 
 
20 
major legislative requirements on public firms. Section 2.6 presents an overview 
of the restructuring of capital market that has occurred in Jordan in recent 
years. Section 2.7 examines the legislative reforms that have been taken to 
encourage foreign investment in the Jordanian financial market. The chapter 
ends with a summary in Section 2.8.    
2.2 Corporate Governance Definitions 
Corporate governance has been approached from a variety of disciplines 
such as economics, management, law, politics, culture, and sociology, 
contributing to different definitions from different angles, resulting in no one 
agreed upon definition of corporate governance ( Mallin, 2007). Also, Solomon 
(2007) added that corporate governance has gained a lot of attention in the last 
decade from different interested parties such as regulators, professional bodies 
and academics. However, despite this fact, no specific definition has won 
general agreement among these parties. 
In most cases, the concept of corporate governance can be discussed in 
terms of two issues: who controls the firm, and for what purposes?  (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Actually, the classic problem of corporate governance is 
indicated by Berle and Means (1932) is due to the separation between the 
owners and managers. Zingales (1997), however, argued that corporate 
governance is a system by which directors and managers (or insiders) act in the 
best interest of outside investors (creditors and shareholders’). 
Furthermore, one of the most popular and earliest definitions of corporate 
governance was that presented by Sir Adrian Cadbury, head of the Committee 
on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in the UK. In his report, he 
defined corporate governance  
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“..as the system by which companies are directed and controlled and through 
which boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies” (Cadbury, 2000 ).  
 
This report was later designated the ‘Cadbury Report’, which became famous 
for setting out requirements for corporate governance to be adhered by UK 
listed corporations. Apparently, this definition was accepted at the time, but 
much has changed since, and the nature of corporate governance has taken on 
additional perspectives. Sir Adrian Cadbury’s definition was extended, and he 
stated that:  
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between 
economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals...the 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations 
and society.” 
 
More precisely, corporate governance refers to the set of relationships between 
shareholders, board of directors, corporate management and other 
stakeholders (Monks and Minow, 2001). 
  A review of the corporate governance literature presents various 
narrow/broad definition and agency perception of corporate governance. For 
instance, in its agency sense, corporate governance can be defined as 
 
 "the set of rules and incentives by which the management of a company is 
directed and controlled in order to maximize the profitability and long term value 
of the firm for shareholders" (Shahid, 2001, p. 3).  
 
This definition tends to accord with the agency theory, in which companies 
should act in favour of shareholders by maximising their profits (Shahid, 2001).  
 In its finance sense, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.737), presented the 
following definition: 
“... Ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves 
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Further, MacAvoy and Millstein (2003) stated that: 
 
“Corporate governance is a set of structure relationships that determines 
authority and responsibility for the conduct of an organisation and its 
management.”  
 
Also, Larcker et al., (2007, p. 1) defined corporate governance as:   
  
“The set of mechanisms that influence the decisions made by managers 
when there is a separation of ownership and control”. 
 
A common theme in these definitions is that they are narrow because they    
ignore stakeholders and focus on the actions of managers.  
On the other hand, other definitions have adopted a wider perspective 
that takes into account other stakeholders rather than only shareholders. For 
instance, Letza et al. (2004) offer a stakeholder’s perspective on corporate 
governance, stating:  
“Corporate governance is about the understanding and institutional 
arrangements for relationships among various economic actors and corporate 
participants who may have direct or indirect interests in a corporation, such as 
shareholders, directors/managers, employees, creditors, suppliers, customers, 
local communities, government, and the general public .’’(p. 242). 
 
Also, Tricker (1984) argues that: 
 
"The governance role is not concerned with the running of the business 
of the company per se, but with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with 
overseeing and controlling the executive actions of management ... beyond the 
corporate boundaries". 
 
Kaplan and Norton (2000) assume the political approach focusing on the 
stakeholder interest, and defining corporate governance as the relationship 
between managers, shareholders, directors, customers, suppliers, employees 
and creditors and to one another to the firm.  In the same context, the OECD 
(2004) principles of corporate governance also acknowledge a wide view of 
corporate governance, with a stakeholder emphasis, by stating that: 
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 “Corporate governance is the rules and practices that govern the 
relationship between the managers and shareholders of corporations, as well as 
stakeholders like employees and creditors”. 
 
This is a broader definition of corporate governance since it takes into 
consideration the rights of stakeholders. However, using a stakeholder 
perspective, a good corporate governance system should determine the 
relationships between a company and a wide set of stakeholders. As Bain and 
Bland (1996) stated, it is: “To add value to as many organisational stakeholders 
as possible”. Furthermore, based on a broad perspective to all stakeholders and 
the whole of the society, and in line with this definition, Solomon and Solomon 
(2007, p.14) defined corporate governance as: 
“.....the system of checks and balance, both internal and external to 
companies, which ensure that companies discharge their accountability to all 
their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their 
business activity”. 
 
Thus, there are a set of definitions which refer to corporate governance 
based on various perspectives and there is no generally agreed definition of 
what the term corporate governance means (Anandarajah, 2004). Following the 
previous discussion, it seems that the range of definition of corporate 
governance can be addressed from narrow or broad perspective.  Classifying 
these definitions does not reduce the differences from one definition to another. 
An assessment of the above definitions appears to suggest that not all of them 
limit the responsibility of companies to shareholders. These are based on a 
narrow agency perception of corporate governance as an internal task of a 
company. Instead, the definitions tend to argue that a good corporate 
governance system should determine the responsibility of companies to a range 
of stakeholders beyond only their investors.  
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2.3 Corporate Governance Models 
In the early 1990s, research on corporate governance in countries other 
than the USA began to appear. At first, the research focused on other major 
world economies, primarily the UK, Germany, and Japan (Denis and 
McConnell, 2002). 
The literature indicates two broad models of corporate governance at the 
extremes: the outsider model, which is used in Anglo-American countries (e. g. 
US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), and the insider model, which applies 
more in countries such as Germany, Japan and France. The outsider model 
places a great reliance on: equity finance; dispersed ownership; strong legal 
protection of shareholders; strong bankruptcy regulations and the courts; less 
role for creditors, employees and other stakeholders in company management; 
strong requirements for disclosure; and considerable freedom to merge with or 
acquire other organisations (Rosser, 2003). The insider model is characterised 
by: a high reliance on bank finance; concentrated ownership; weak legal 
protection of minority shareholders; a central role for stakeholders in the 
ownership and management of companies; weak disclosure; and limited 
freedom to merge or acquire (Rosser, 2003). It’s worth noting that the major 
players in the outsider model are shareholders, board of directors and 
management, known as the CG (corporate governance) triangle. On the other 
hand, the major players in the insider model are government, main bank, 
management   and affiliated firm. Table 2.1 (from Solomon, 2007) summarises 
characteristics of both models of corporate governance. 
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Table2-1: Characteristics of Insider and Outsider Models of Corporate 
Governance 
Aspect Insider Outsider 
Owners Insider shareholders Outsider shareholders 
Ownership structure Concentrated Dispersed 
Separation of ownership and 
control 
Little Spread 
Control over management Insider shareholders Manager 
Agency problems Rare Exist 
Hostile takeover activity Rare Frequent Frequent 
Protection of investors Weak Strong 
Shareholders’ rights Potential for shareholder 
by majority shareholders 
Potential for   shareholder 
democracy 
Shareholders voting Majority of shareholders tend 
to have to have more ‘voice’ in 
their investee companies 
Shareholders characterized 
more by ‘exit’ than by ‘voice’ 
Source: Solomon (2007) 
 As mentioned earlier, the number of significant events that have 
occurred over the past ten years or so, has led to heightened concern about the 
standard of corporate governance around the world (Pickett, 2007). These 
cases led to a pressing need for improvement and development in this system 
of checks and balances. However, the history of concern over corporate 
governance dates back to the start of business (Vinten, 2003). In the UK, for 
instance, the first corporate governance failure was in the 1700s, which known 
as the ‘South Sea Bubble’ (Dragomir, 2008).  While in the United States of 
America (USA) there was the stock market collapse in 1929 (Clarke, 2004). In 
addition to crises, the history of corporate governance has also been concerned 
by a series of well-known firms collapsing: the Maxwell Group of newspapers; 
the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International; and Barings 
Bank. Thus, regulators have moved to improve the elements of corporate 
governance (Iskander and Chamlou, 2000).  
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2.3.1  United Kingdom 
In the UK, there is a well-developed market with different shareholders 
types among others institutional investors, financial institutions and foreign 
investors. However, the development of corporate governance in the UK was 
originally driven by corporate failures and scandals of some big companies 
(Mallin, 2007). As mentioned earlier, in 1720, the earliest corporate collapse in 
UK history became known as the ‘South Sea Bubble’, which significantly 
changed business habits and regulations in the UK. For instance, the laws and 
regulations governing UK business were changed to protect investors trading 
on the stock exchange from corporate collapses such as this (Dragomir, 2008). 
In the late 1980s, financial scandals leading to the collapse of several prominent 
companies came to light in the UK. There was a strong private response 
alongside the public regulatory response. The corporate sector responded to 
the loss of confidence in financial reporting by setting up the Cadbury 
Committee in 1990 to develop a code of best corporate governance practice 
(Iskander and Chamlou, 2000).  
In the early 1991, several large UK corporations collapsed (e. g. Coloroll 
and Polly Peck), As a result, one of the greatest supporters of active corporate 
governance, Sir Adrian Cadbury, chaired a commission and the Cadbury Report 
published by the British government and regulators (Arcot & Brun, 2006). The 
Cadbury committee took the name of its chairman and its report became known 
as the `The Cadbury Report'. This report was issued in 1992 with special focus 
on the importance of institutional investors as the largest and most influential 
group of shareholders has had a lasting impact (Dragomir, 2008). According to 
Solomon (2007), the Cadbury Report covered three main aspects of corporate 
governance, namely, the board of directors, shareholders and auditing. First, 
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they stated that the most important corporate governance mechanism, which 
required constant monitoring and assessment, was the board of directors. 
Secondly, corporate transparency was also shown to play an important role for 
their shareholders and other stakeholders. Finally, the essential role in good 
corporate governance was the function of both financial accounting and internal 
auditing.  
The Cadbury report had a major influence, not only on the UK corporate 
governance system, but also on an international level, with many countries 
around the world adopting a similar code of best practices to Cadbury (Clarke, 
2004). In 1995, the Greenbury Report was issued in response to shareholders' 
concerns about the structure of boards' and directors' remuneration. The 
committee investigated directors' remuneration in large UK quoted companies. 
The main recommendation was for remuneration committees and the disclosure 
of directors' remuneration in annual reports to their shareholders. Mallin (2007) 
states that strengthening accountability and enhancing the performance of 
directors were essential recommendations of the Greenbury Report, and this 
could be done by disclosing the directors' remuneration to their shareholders 
annually, linked to performance measures of individual directors. 
In 1998, the Report of the Hampel Committee was issued, reviewing the 
implementation of the recommendations of the Cadbury and the Greenbury 
committees. The Combined Code was published in the same year. The Hampel 
Report also emphasised similar issues considered by Cadbury. The Combined 
Code consisted of 18 principles and 48 code provisions related to the Cadbury, 
Greenbury and Hampel recommendations published by the London Stock 
Exchange (Keasey, Thompson et al., 2005). 
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The Enron collapse in the USA spurred the UK and the rest of the world 
into re-evaluating issues related to corporate governance, particularly the role of 
NEDS. In the UK, the Higgs Committee report was published in 2003 with 
special focus on the effectiveness of non-executive directors. In 2003, the UK 
reviewed the Combined Code, which was originally published in 1998, to cover 
a number of key Higgs recommendations (Solomon, 2007). Thus, UK reforms of 
corporate governance followed the Cadbury Code (1992). The Greenbury 
Report (1995) proposed guidelines for director remuneration, the Hampel 
Report (1998) focused on disclosure and best practice, the Combined Code 
(1998) outlined a mandatory disclosure framework, While the combined code 
(2010) has concentrated on the importance of the general principles which 
should direct board behaviours. 
2.3.2 United States of America 
In the USA, economic prosperity in the 1920s ended with the Wall Street 
stock market crash of 1929 (Clarke, 2004). This market collapse revealed 
manipulation in the market, internal trafficking, mismanagement and reckless 
violation of the rights of shareholders that led to a long recession between 1929 
and 1933. As a consequence of these problems, the Securities Act 1933, as 
well as the Securities and Exchange Act 1934, were put in place by the US 
government (Clarke, 2004). 
In 2001, the massive bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom, and the 
relatively smaller corporate debacles of companies like Tyco, Aldephia 
Communication and Global Crossing, served as catalysts for change 
(Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2005). This corporate governance crisis reflected a need 
to reform US corporate governance and increase regulation, because 
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shareholders no longer had confidence in corporate reports. Therefore, the US 
Congress, in 2002, responded to these corporate governance failures by 
enacting the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which is considered as the most 
sweeping reform of American business law since the 1930s (Litvak, 2007). 
Cornelius and Kogut (2003) argue that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was a 
compromise bill, which gained support among both Republicans and 
Democrats. It was intended to highlight and strengthen criminal penalties 
against top management who falsified financial statements, and engaged in 
other unethical behaviours. While the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 required the 
chief executive to carefully consider and thereafter sign-off the audited company 
reports, it also played a major influence on strengthening the powers of the 
audit committees and highlighting the regulatory oversight of audit firms. 
2.4 Corporate Governance in Developing Countries 
Previous studies have used many perspectives to determine suitable 
measures by which to appraise the effectiveness of CG. A review of previous 
empirical studies on CG reveals huge debate in recent times over the need for 
effective CG (Bujaki and Mcconomy , 2002). Regarding the corporate 
governance literature deals with the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). The studies suggest several mechanisms that may help to mitigate the 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, and hence have an 
impact on firm performance. Simply, prior studies always shows that firms with 
effective CG experience a lower cost of financing (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFond 2006), higher credit ratings and hence a lower cost of debt financing 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond 2007).This will increase firms 
performance, and thereby maximise shareholders value. Moreover, The CG 
mechanisms, have not worked as well in other parts of the world, particularly in 
CH-2 LITRATURE REVIEW 
 
30 
developing countries (Black & Khanna, 2007). Developing countries have a 
poor market for corporate control (Gibson. 2003); stronger political contacts 
(Johnson & Mitton. 2003; GUL. 2006); more concentrated ownership ((Shleifer 
& Vishny. 1997) and more government intervention (Young, Peng , 2008). 
One of the contributions to the CG literature investigates the relationship 
between CG and performance. For instance, Ararat et al. (2015) found positive 
relationships between firms’ performance and board's demographic diversity in 
Turkish firms.  Furthermore, Chang et al., (2015) empirical results also provide 
evidence that listed companies in Taiwan with higher levels of corporate 
governance report high firm performance and low firm risk.  The CG debate has 
a quite short history and the literature is limited especially in Arabic countries, 
including, Jordan.  Actually, there have been fewer studies on CG in developing 
countries, especially Arab countries, including Jordan, as most developing 
countries face wide gaps in CG compared to developed countries. Additionally, 
most Arab countries’ firms are recognised by the fact that the existing legal 
system needs reform. Furthermore, the findings indicated the urgent need for 
an independent body to supervise the application of CG in Lebanon (Saidi, 
2004).Further, Hussain and Mallin (2002) examined the status quo of CG in 
Bahrain, Their findings showed that: 
“Bahraini companies have in placed some of the features of international 
CG “best practice”. For example, boards are dominated by non-executive 
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Furthermore, Hussain and Mallin (2003) investigated the dynamics of CG 
in Bahrain, by examining the board structures of firms. They found that NEDs 
dominated the board composition, and main factors affecting the appointment of 
these NEDs were ‘relevant skills’ and ‘business experience and reputation’. 
Thus, none of the firms had a Nominations Committee; hence NEDs were 
normally appointed by the BODs. They stated: 
“Whilst Bahrain does not have a CG code per se, the firm law reforms 
contain some interesting provisions that will contribute to the CG framework in 
Bahrain.” 
In Egypt, Fawzy (2003) indicated that Egypt's CG standards improved 
significantly, as reflected in the overall assessment of all five OECD principles 
.In addition, Dahawy (2008 found  that the level of disclosure in Egypt was low. 
He also indicated that this problem may be due to lack of knowledge about the 
benefits of good CG. Abd-Rahman (2008) stated that there is a need for greater 
developments in the concept of CG to become more effective. This assured that 
Egyptian firm tried to apply best practices, but they did not reached the level of 
international standard of good corporate governance. Furthermore, Samaha 
(2010) indicated that there was no significant association between the existence 
of audit committees and the different CG disclosure kinds. Thus, training and 
education are possible policy recommendations in Egypt.     
In Saudia Arabia, Al-Ajlan (2005) invistigated the roles and 
responsibilities of the BODs in the Saudi banking sector.  The findings indicated 
the board BODs in Saudi firms seemed to fulfil the role of setting plans and 
guiding top management. Further, Sourial (2004) investigated the governance 
models of MENA countries; he found that the Arab countries in the last decade 
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adopted a number of reforms in terms of legislation. But, the main problem was 
the gap between enforcement and legislative framework.     
Several studies highlight the importance of CG in developing countries. 
La Porta et al., (2000); La Porta et al., (1998); La Porta et al., (1997) have 
confirmed that CG is a critical factor in firm value and stock exchange 
development. East Asian CG is generally recognized by Miller et al., (1998) to 
have initiated when Japan faced a long recession in 1990s. By the end of 1997, 
this collapse had spread to a number of South East Asian countries. Kim (1998) 
pointed that weak CG in these countries was a critical factor to the crisis. It is 
worth to note that most developing markets are not active markets for corporate 
control; Developing countries are different from developed one in areas such as 
corruption, transparency, liquidity and   governance (Singh, 2003;, Bruner et al., 
2002). Many studies confirmed that the weakness of CG is one of the most 
main reasons behind most of economic crisis suffered by developing countries. 
For instance, Singh and Zammit (2006) stated that poor CG and close 
relationship between banks and government which leads to such a problem. 
Singh (2003) recommends that developing countries are doubtful to 
provide suitable solutions to CG problems. Therefore, it is essential for 
developing countries to develop their own standards of CG, as good CG will 
help firms in those countries to avoid any potential crises. Therefore it is   
important for these countries to encourage firms to implement good corporate 
governance (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
For instance, in Taiwan, Solomon et al., (2003) offered empirical 
evidence on the manner of Taiwanese firm managers and the role of the BODs. 
Their results showed a clear idea about the status quo of CG in the country. 
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The findings indicated that the BODs constitute the most important instrument in 
Taiwanese CG, and the results confirmed the importance of the non-executive 
directors in the CG system. Moreover, their findings supported the agency 
theory perspective on CG as they believed the existence of non-executive 
directors’ improved corporate accountability to stockholders.   
In India, Reed (2002) assessed the Anglo-American model of CG in India 
He concentrate on: growth, shareholders and employment. The findings 
recommended that the Anglo-American mode is not suitable. He stated as 
follows: 
“India, like many developing countries, has been moving towards the 
adoption of an Anglo-American model of CG in recent years. The impetus for 
this shift has been a combination of global political-economy pressures and 
problems arising out of the previous Business House model of governance” 
(Reed, 2002, p.266). 
Furthermore, Gupta (2008) examined the practices of CG in India. He 
found that the Indian CG was at early stage compared to developed countries. 
Therefore, it needs more transparency mechanism. 
 Flavio and Flavio (2002) examined the status quo of CG 
implementations in Brazil. They stated that: 
“...ownership concentration is a fundamental characteristic of Brazilian 
CG structures” (Rabelo and Vasconcelos, 2002, p.332). 
In South Korea, Solomon et al., (2002) examined the CG system in the 
country. They also examined the views of directors in the country. Their findings 
stated that: 
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“Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s 
CG system”. 
Demirag and Serter, (2003) examined ownership structure in Turkish 
firms. The finding showed that ownership of Turkish firms is highly concentrated 
in which families are the dominant shareholders. In Nigeria, Apreda (2001)   
explained the system of CG in Argentina and its process of reform in recent 
years. Rossouw et al (2002) examined CG in South Africa and made a 
distinction between narrow and broad CG concept. .Bryan and Carlos (2002) 
briefly analysed the CG model in Mexico. Carlos and Victor (2004) examined 
CG policy and firm performance in Portugal. They found a positive relationship 
between CG and firm returns. In the Philippines, Wong (2009) carried out 
investigation on the various reforms of CG in the Philippines after the 
application of the 2002 Code of CG issued by the Philippine Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Finaly, in Uganda, Musaali (2005) evaluated the current 
state of affairs after the various efforts to enhance corporate governance were 
made by many organisations. His study revealed that the majority of the firms 
did not adhere to corporate governance standards. 
Further studies mainly focus on a single aspect of governance, namely, 
the relationship between ownership types and firm performance (Tam and Tan, 
2007), role of auditors in corporate governance (Samanta and Das, 2009) , 
Board Structure and Firm Performance (Beverley and Shireenjit, 2009) , the 
impact of auditor business risk evaluation on auditor-auditee negotiation 
outcomes ( Sahnoun and Zarai,2009) and the impact of corporate governance 
structures on the corporate investment performance (Orbay and Yurtoglu 
,2006). 
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From the above discussion, it can be concluded that many developing 
countries have been paying increasing attention to the issues of corporate 
governance, especially in the Arab countries, and trying to establish CG codes. 
This is due to the importance of corporate governance in these countries. It is 
clear from reviewing the CG literature in these countries, a good number of 
studies have been conducted in each country. Unfortunately, there have been 
no studies conducted in Jordan concerning the issue of critical factor of 
corporate governance. 
Thus, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a 
general understanding how CG is considered in an emerging market and, 
particular, in Arab countries, that of Jordan. The current study has contributed to 
academic researchers in recognising a series of critical factors that must be 
carefully considered to ensure successful best practice of corporate governance 
system. The result of this study should enhance the current practices of critical 
factors for implementing best practice of corporate governance in Jordan; In 
essence, the results of this research will help management in identifying it. 
 As mentioned before, there is no research published on critical factors 
for implementing best practice of corporate governance, particularly in Jordan. 
Therefore, without taking into account these critical factors, corporate 
governance system definitely will be failed. Another significant contribution is 
that this study is the first effort to identify the obstacles that inhabit the 
application of good corporate governance. Above all, there are not many 
researches done on corporate governance in Jordan. To the extent of the 
knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first of its kind in Jordan. The next 
section will discuss formation of a public shareholding firm. 
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2.4.1  The Legal System in Jordan 
A country's legal system generally influences corporate governance, not 
only laws related to corporate governance but also other laws that may impact 
on corporate governance practices (Luo, 2007). It has been argued that 
countries with a civil law system usually have ineffective stakeholders' 
protection (Mallin, 2004). Klapper and Love (2004) use data from 14 emerging 
markets to explore the differences in firm-level governance mechanisms and 
their relationship with a country's legal environment. They found that: 1) firms in 
countries with weak overall legal systems have on average lower governance 
rankings; 2) firm-level governance is correlated with measures such as firm 
size, sales growth and intangibility of assets; 3) firms that trade shares in the 
United States have higher governance rankings, especially those based in 
countries with weak legal systems; and 4) good governance is positively 
correlated with performance. Klapper and Love (2004) suggest that companies 
could improve the stakeholders’ protection by increasing disclosure, selecting 
well-functioning and independent boards, and imposing disciplinary 
mechanisms to prevent management malpractice. Doidge et al., (2007) claim 
that country characteristics are expected to play an overwhelming role as a 
determinant of governance in poorly developed countries. Furthermore, they 
state that it is costly to improve stakeholders' protection in countries with weak 
development, because the institutional infrastructure is lacking and good 
governance has political costs. Consequently, in such countries the benefits of 
improving governance may be weaker because their capital markets lack depth.   
In terms of Jordan , the first part of Jordanian legislations concerning firms 
was the Companies Act 1964, prior to that act legal issues pertaining to the 
establishment and registration of firms were concentrated on the civil law and 
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Ottoman Commercial Law which was changed and revised by the Registration 
of Jordanian Firms Law 1927 (Abdullah, 1980). Two kinds of firms were 
recognized by the Act: partnership and limited shareholding firms, in addition, 
the act differentiate private from public limited shareholding firms. The 
introduction of the Firms Act 1964 was the first legislative effort to put emphasis 
on the transparency of information by public and private firms.  
The Companies Act 1997 is the major legislative obligation on firms, in 
particular public firms. The acts succeeded the 1987 Act and take into 
consideration the establishment of the Amman Stock Exchange. On the other 
hand, the Companies Act 1997 is general in coverage and content. Similar to 
the 1989 Act, the 1997 Act include variety of firms that can be established. 
These are Joint Venture, general partnership, public firms, Limited Liability and 
limited partnership firm. The shareholding firm registered with one condition that 
it must offer its stocks to the public. Furthermore, information on public 
shareholding firms is publicly accessible. As a result, the following parts will 
discuss specific conditions of the Companies Act 1997 since all public 
shareholding firms are subject to this act. 
2.4.2 Formation of a Public Shareholding Firm 
A public shareholding firms must include a number of promoters at least two 
who must subscribe for stocks that can be listed on Amman exchange and may 
be traded in line with the provisions of the Act (Article 90, para.a). The firm 
promoters must submit the application for the establishment of the firm to the 
Controller of Firms on the form selected for these issues.   
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2.4.3 Capital Requirements 
It is important for a public shareholding firms to declare in its articles of 
association the amount of share capital. Article 95 of the Act stated that the 
capital of a shareholding firm must not be less than JD500, 000 about (£ 442, 
000). Furthermore, the capital has to be divided equally into shares and a 
nominal value of JD1 per share. The Act explains that the firm must have equal 
rights for all its issued shares .Simply this means that the Jordanian public 
shareholding firms are authorized to issue common stocks only. 
According to the article 99 of the Act, the ownership of the promoters of 
the public firm at establishment must not exceed 75% of the subscribed capital. 
The maximum ownership of promoters of the public shareholding firm is 50% of 
the subscribed capital in the case of financial institutions. The promoters 
committee should present the residual shares for subscription. Also the 
promoters are forbidden from subscribing in the shares presented for 
subscription at the formation period but they can underwrite the remaining 
shares after three days from finishing the subscription. It is significant to say 
that according to the Companies Act 1997 article 137 the existing stockholders 
have priority for underwriting new shares. 
2.4.4 Reporting Requirements 
The 1997 Act obligates the firm to arrange and circulate certain papers.  
The Act explains that certain documents have to be offered to the stockholders 
in the general meeting and a copy of the annual report must be sent to each 
shareholder (Article 144). In addition, the Board must disseminate the firm profit 
and loss account, cash flow statement, balance sheet, the auditors’ report and 
summary of annual report of the Board of directors in detailed in a daily news 
paper (The Company Act, 1997: article 141). 
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While Article 142 offers that the board of directors must attend the 
shareholders annual general meeting negotiating the firm results in the last 
year, it is noticed that there is not a word in the Act about the content of the 
report. Really, the information included in the report is a matter of the desires of 
the firm director to give stockholders and external investors their opinion about 
the performance of the firm. So the report offers flexibility for the management 
to talk about a particular side of the firm to present a comprehensive review of 
the operation of the firm through the last year provided by tabular data and to 
mention on the things that affected the performance of the firm (Brigham and 
Houston, 2009). Moreover, the report may explain the main capital actions of 
the firm in the last year such as purchasing assets and the future plan of the 
firm. 
Regarding the auditors’ report, it is the final result of the auditing process. 
The report represents the auditor attitude toward the financial statements of the 
firm and reflects precisely the financial position of the firm (Article 192). Also the 
auditors’ report must be presented and discussed at the annual general meeting 
of the stockholders (Article 171). The auditor must be careful when writing his 
report if the firm has kept accurate accounting records.  Concerning article 193 
it offers that the key responsibility of the auditor is to report to shareholders on 
the firm operations.  Furthermore, article 197 explains that the auditor must not 
be entitled to participate in the formation of a firm so the auditor must be 
independent. As a result, Auditor should not be appointed if he /she has any 
business relation with the firm.  In a few words, the auditor must prepare 
audited comparative financial statements according to the General Accepting 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Undoubtedly, the statements must reflect the 
financial position of the firm.  
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Before proceeding, it is important to say that the corporate income tax 
rates fluctuate but not more than 35 percent. Mainly the corporate income tax 
rate is 25 percent or 15 percent tax rate if the scheme is a construction, mining, 
hospital, industrial, hotel, or transportation enterprise with a paid-up capital 
more than US$ 1.4 million .Precisely, financial institutions are subject to 35 
percent income tax rate (Income Tax Law, 1995). 
2.5 Jordanian Capital Market 
Securities Law Number 23 of 1997 was the main action in restructuring the 
Jordan Capital Market (JCM) (JSC, 2012). In May 1997 a securities Law 
responsibility of operator and regulator were separated (AFM, 1999). According 
to the securities Law the following three financial entities have been established 
in Jordan capital market:  
1. The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC). 
2. The Securities Depository Centre (SDC).  
3. The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). 
The Amman Financial Market (AFM) was officially replaced by these institutions 
on May 15, 1999. It is all started in1930 since the creation of public 
shareholding firms in Jordan (JSC, 2012). In the beginning, capital market 
transactions was in individual brokerage offices. Jordan seeks to create a stock 
exchange as a result of the rising economic value of stock markets and a lot of 
economic goals these markets can achieve. Establishing a bourse remained an 
idea in the mind of many Jordanian economists since early 1960s until it 
became a reality under law No. 31 of 1976. The market started with the 
establishment of Amman Financial Market (AFM) in order to meet the 
increasing demand for saving and investment in the country.  
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Amman Financial Market was established in 1976 and launched its first 
day of dealing on January 1, 1978 as a legally, administratively and financially 
independent public financial institution under the patronage of the Minister of 
Finance. The Amman Financial Market (AFM) performed a dual task; the role of 
a stock exchange and the role of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
It acted as a government vehicle for regulating and operating the securities 
market. According to the Law, the objectives of Amman Financial Market (AFM) 
are to mobilize savings by encouraging investment , serve the interests of the 
national economy, regulate and control the issuing of and dealing in securities 
to ensure the security and speed of transactions to protect the interest of small 
investors(JSC.2009) .  
The Amman Financial Market is a thin market. Thin securities market is a 
market in which there are a small number of offers to sell, a small number of 
bids to buy, large spreads, high price volatility and low liquidity (Huber, 1997). 
Drake (1977) stated that thin market is a market with a limited number of 
volume and variety of stock trade, it is a market in which there are a low number 
of buyers and sellers. In general, prices in thin markets are more volatile than 
other markets with high liquidity because of limited number of transactions 
taking place for that the securities prices affected significantly (Gandhi et al. 
1980). The trading volume is quite small in thin markets and when it is traded it 
is often traded on low volume (Roux and Gilbertson, 1978; Solibakke, 2000).   
The circumstances in developing capital markets such as Amman 
Financial Market (AFM) might represent a barrier to use it as a main alternative 
to finance (El-Khouri and Hmedat, 1992).  These barriers might be categorized 
into two groups. The first one consists of general variables such as the political 
and economic fluctuation. The second one consists of social practice such as 
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financial training and the general level of education Therefore, there is too much 
risk because there is not a lot of information available for the investors, as a 
result of this the cost of getting external finance will be very high. In practice, 
Jordanian firms prefer internal source of finance to finance their investment 
rather than seeking external source of finance. 
Finally, as a result of the global financial crisis, nearly all of the Arab 
stock exchanges went down. The international crash affect on the international 
exchanges as well. The of large financial institutions attribute to the huge losses 
resulted from mortgage and the financial products related to those mortgages. 
Thus, the mortgage collapse worsened beyond its source in the United States 
of America. This produces credit crises and signs of recession emerged in the 
economies of developed countries. Arab exchanges were also exposed to the 
international crash. Generally, the majority of the Arab stock exchanges 
declined. Clearly, during 2008, The Arab Monetary Fund composite index went 
down by 55% (AFM, 2009). 
Table 2.2 shows the performance of Arab Stock Exchanges during the 
period 2008. It appears that nearly all Arab stock exchanges have a bad 
performance by the end of year 2008. It showed that the prices declined sharply 
in Dubai Market compared to other markets marking a decline of 72.4%. Next, 
the Saudi Stock Market dropped by 57.0% followed by the Egyptian Market with 
a 56.4% decline; Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange with a decline of 47.5%; 
followed by Muscat Exchange Market with 39.8% decline . Stock prices dropped 
in Casablanca Stock Market, Kuwait, Bahrain, Palestine, Doha, Amman, and 
Bahrain Stock Exchange Market by13.5%, 38.0%, 24.9%, 16.2% 28.1%, and 
34.5%, respectively. It is worth to note that Tunis Stock Exchange Market is the 
only Arab stock exchange Market that did not show a decline in prices, 
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experienced an increase of 10.6 and Dubai Financial Market performance was 
the worst among Arab stock markets. 
Table 2-2: Performance of Arab Stock Exchanges (2008 -2009) 
Market 
Performance in 2008 Performance in 2009 




Qatar Exchange -28.12 1.06 
Muscat Securities Market  39.78 17.05 
Amman Stock Exchange  24.94 -8.15 
Abu Dhabi Securities 
Exchange  
-47.49 14.79 
The Egyptian Exchange  56.43 35.08 
Kuwait Stock Exchange  -38.03 -9.99 
Saudi Stock Exchange  57.02 27.46 
Bahrain Stock Exchange   -34.52 -19.17 
Muscat Securities Market   -39.78 17.05 
Amman Stock Exchange   -24.94 -8.15 






2.5.1 Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) 
The Jordan Securities Commission (JSC) is a government agency joined 
with the Office of the Prime Minister but it has administrative and financial 
autonomy in order to improve its independence and efficiency in achieving its 
goals (JSC, 2009).  The JSC started its duties in September 1997.  The JSC is 
managed by a Board of Commissioners which consists of five members 
including the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. The member should be 
Jordanian natural person experts and professionals in securities (The Securities 
Law, 1997: article 8).The Securities Law forces each member of the board to 
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declare in writing to the commission directly upon assuming his duties any 
securities owned by him or those at his disposal or at the disposal of any 
relatives, as well as any shares in financial services firms owned by him (The 
Securities Law, 1997: article 10).  Furthermore, the Law forbids a board 
member from practicing any other job, including occupying a position in any 
public entity. Also Board members shall not affect decisions in public 
institutions, or acts in a counselling capacity to them (The Securities Law, 1997: 
article 11). These limitations are intended to keep in mind the sensitivity and 
value of the commission’s role in order to let the commissioners accomplish 
their tasks to avoid personal profit and to stay free from any external control.  
The Jordan Securities Commission, in cooperation with capital market 
institution, prepared corporate governance code for firms listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange.  The code has been offered to a number of referees for 
review, and their comments and suggestion have been taken into account. The 
Jordanian corporate governance code was approved by the JSC and was 
implemented in 2009. This is regarded as a qualitative efforts for Jordan in the 
field of improving transparency over public firms, and one that protect the rights 
of all participants in these firms. This code, which includes the principles of 
corporate governance of shareholding firms listed in the ASE, has been 
prepared in light of the improvements in the country in all fields and depended 
on the role of the JSC to develop the capital market. 
 In terms of the implementation process of the Code, it was decided that the 
suitable manner would be that of “comply or explain”. This means that firms will 
be dedicated to follow the Code; nevertheless, in case any of the principles of 
the Code is not implemented, the firm must give the reasons for not doing so 
obviously in its annual report. This approach has the benefit of offering flexibility 
CH-2 LITRATURE REVIEW 
 
45 
in the implementation of the Code. Moreover, it gives enough time for the firms 
to adapt to the requirements of the Code. Thus, it will be possible to apply them 
completely but gradually. 
2.5.2 The Securities Depository Centre (SDC) 
The Securities Depository Centre (SDC) of Jordan is one of the most 
important institutions in Jordan’s Capital Market as it holds the ownership 
register of all issued shares. It was formulated under the Securities Temporary 
Law Number (23) of 1997. The Securities Law of 1997 separated the functions 
of the Amman Financial Market (AFM) and created the Jordan Securities 
Commission (JSC), the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) and the Securities 
Depository Centre (SDC). SDC started operation in May 1999 as a private non-
profit organization independent financially and administratively and run by a 
board of director from private sector.  SDC seeks to build a good environment 
for investment and increase the settlement system efficiency in the kingdom. It 
has employed automated registry and settlement systems that are in 
accordance with international standards and best practices as well as with G-30 
recommendations .Execution of these important systems will offer additional 
security to local and foreign investors regarding ownership. Furthermore, the 
system is efficient, and clear which will increase investor confidence in the 
Jordanian CM (SDC, 2009). 
2.5.3 The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) 
The Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) was created in March 1999 as a 
private non-profit organization with administrative and financial independence 
and it is not subject to the Firms Law. By law it shall not engage in commercial 
activities, have a stake in any scheme or obtain or possess any securities. ASE 
is the only entity entitled to work as a formal market for trading securities in 
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Jordan. The securities listed on the Stock Exchange have to be traded through 
transactions between financial brokers on behalf of customers (The Securities 
Law, 1997: article 24, para.a). ASE membership consists of financial brokers 
and its General Assembly consists of members who have paid their subscription 
and annual membership fees. Each financial broker has one vote in the General 
Assembly’s meeting (The Securities Law, 1997: article 24, para.a). Board of 
Directors manages the Stock Exchange and the Executive Manager. Manager 
is appointed by the Board of Directors (The Securities Law, 1997: article 25). 
The Amman Stock Exchange launched the electronic trading system. The 
electronic system improves and accelerates trading in securities while supplying 
clearness and security for traders and investors. The system follows all selling 
and buying orders and matches the supply and demand for securities. The 
application of the electronic trading system offers great flexibility and different 
information to the broker. This action will facilitate the carrying out of 
transactions with fairness, speed and without any kind of difficulty (ASE, 2009).  
The ASE has always been updating and improving its technical infrastructure to 
confirm its systems’ capacity to be in line with the increase in trading volumes. 
Accordingly, the ASE completed most of the tests required for employing the 
new version of its trading system namely NSC900. 
Having discussed the structure of the Jordan capital market and main 
activities of each of three entities, other significant point of interest is foreign 
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2.6 Foreign Investment 
Jordan launched the investment promotion law in 1995, modified in 2000. 
In line with this law, foreign investors are allowed ownership in most sectors 
(Youngblood-Coleman, 2008). Consequently, Jordan succeeded bringing JD 
1.8 billion of foreign direct investment in 2006, which means an increase of 
143% over 2005 (JIB, 2008). Continuing its efforts in developing the investment 
environment, Jordan created the first Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) in 1998. 
The Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) is an area that offers duty-free entrance to 
the US market for the products manufactured in the zone. In 2006 the exports 
from QIZs revealed US$ 940 million which means an increase of 17% over 
2005 (DOS, 2007). At present there are 13 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) in 
Jordan including more than 50 factories (JECB, 2008). Also, the government 
launched the Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) in 2001. The ASEZ offers 
high class support services and facilities and is one of the biggest free zones in 
the region (JIB, 2007).   The ASEZ at the end of 2006 was able to bring 
investments of about JD 4.3 billion (Benson, 2008). 
Simply, government of Jordan keeps on trying to attract foreign 
investment. The launch of improvements in economic laws and regulations in 
recent years had important influence on the level of foreign investments in the 
capital market. In 1996 the government approved legislation intended to build 
an investment environment to attract foreign and local investments. These 
legislations are the by-law of non-Jordanian investments and the Investment 
Promotion Law, in addition to the Income Tax Law. The Investment Promotion 
Law requires that the non-Jordanian investors to be treated in the same way as 
the Jordanian investors in Jordanian schemes whether through shareholding, 
ownership or partnership. By-law of the non-Jordanian investments is the most 
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important legislation regarding investment by non-Jordanian investors. This 
allows any non-Jordanian investor to own 100% of any scheme or to share in 
any other economic actions in the Kingdom except some sectors which not 
allowed for them to own more than 50% of any scheme in the sectors such as 
construction contracting, land and air transport, trading and trade services, 
mining, banking and insurance, agricultural products and telecommunications 
(ASE, 2009). 
The Regulation of Promotion of Non-Jordanian Investments was issued 
in 1997, which eliminate the ceiling of 50% of the non-Jordanian ownership and 
allowed them to own up to 100% of any scheme in any sector except sectors of 
trading and trade services, mining and construction contracting (ASE, 2009). 
The most significant progress about foreign investments in Jordan was the 
Regulating Non-Jordanian Investments Regulation number 54 for the year 2000 
which eliminated the ex-regulation for the year 1997 regarding restrictions . 
According to this regulation any non-Jordanian investor is allowed to own any 
project wholly or partially or may participate in any percentage, except in some 
sector which the non-Jordanian investors ownership shall not exceed 50% of 
the capital of any project (Regulation no.54, 2000: article 3). 
In the light of these developments, the level of non-Jordanian 
investments reached the highest level of 49.0% of the total market capitalisation 
of these companies in 2008. Table 2.3 represents the total percentage of the 
total market value of ownership of non-Jordanian investors for the firms listed in 
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The non-Jordanian ownership in firms listed in the Amman Stock 
Exchange by the end of 2011 represented 47% of total market value. At the 
sector level, the non-Jordanian ownership of the industry sector in 2008, 2009 
recorded the highest level 53% and 53% respectively. On the other hand, table 
2.4 shows the total value of shares bought by non-Jordanian investors of  listed 
firms during 2008 JD 4219 million, while the value of shares sold by them was 
about to JD 3910 million (CBJ, 2009). 
Table 2-3: % of Non-Jordanian Ownership of Listed Companies by Sector (1999-
2011) 
Year Financial Services Industry General 
1999  56.647  13.977  30.483  43.099  
2000  55.181  21.257  30.213  41.672  
2001  47.426  19.676  27.872  38.507  
2002  47.564  26.792  26.093  37.430  
2003  46.275  24.285  30.098  38.844  
2004 47.441  25.593  36.791  41.264  
2005 49.770  26.185  38.088  45.043  
2006 47.733  36.553 43.709 45.531 
2007 50.733  36.152  51.881  48.947  
2008 52.102 33.811 53.347 49.247 
2009 51.883 32.337 53.137 48.883 
2010 57.4 14.2 55.2 46.1 
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Table 2-4: Shares Traded By Non-Jordanians on the ASE (1996-2011) (In JD 
Million) 
Period  Total Buying  Total Selling  Net Investment  
1996 26,445,212 17,923,594 8,521,618 
1997 100,499,724 43,735,612 56,764,112 
1998 204,989,118 82,382,672 122,606,446 
1999 94,277,777 78,806,529 15,471,248 
2000 53,015,845 64,848,920 (11,833,075) 
2001 104,486,389 211,990,826 (107,504,437) 
2002 233,384,182 232,501,490 882,692 
2003 281,085,270 199,195,647  81,889,623 
2004 380,336,550 311,379,947 68,956,603 
2005 2,152,280,127  1,739,246,534 413,033,593  
2006 1,995,091,126 1,814,482,149 180,608,977 
2007 2,825,297,394  2,359,041,344  466,256,050  
2008 4,219,835,535  3,910,020,357  3.09,815,179  
2009 2,135,432,525 2,139,209,490 3,776,965 
2010 1036 1051.2 14.6 
2011 555.8 477.2 78.6 
  
2.7 Summary 
The literature related to corporate governance has been reviewed in this 
chapter. Many aspects of corporate governance have been discussed such as 
corporate governance concepts and models.  The survey of the literature has 
shown that there is no research published on critical factors for implementing 
best practice of corporate governance, particularly in Jordan. A large number of 
studies have examined the subject of corporate governance in more than one 
country, while others have focused on a particular mechanism of corporate 
governance. In addition, the majority of previous studies, focused on examining 
corporate governance practices by using single methodological approaches as 
the qualitative approach or the quantitative approach. 
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 The country’s legal and organisational structures have been revised, and 
significant measures have been taken to restructure, liberalise and increase the 
openness of the national economy. The capital market has made a significant, 
qualitative transition to operating according to international standards. In regard 
to the legislative reforms, the Amman Stock Exchange formed a committee to 
follow up the corporate governance issues. The committee prepared Corporate 










3 CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWROK 
Chapter two emphasized that in recent years, both practitioners and 
academics have devoted huge efforts towards improving CG practices 
(Gompers et al., 2003; Ammann et al., 2011; La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). Therefore, CG now is on the agenda of most developing 
countries including Jordan.  Scandals that resulted in the collapse of high profile 
firms such as  Enron in the USA, Barings Brothers and Polly Peck in the UK 
(Pickett, 2007)  and the economic financial crisis that wiped out a number of 
Asian markets in 1997 have led International bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and World Bank (WB) to focus on improving CG around 
the world ( Solomon and Solomon, 2010; Dalton and Dalton, 2011;Fan, et al., 
2011).  
 Many economies have been encouraged to employ steps to improve 
standards for CG. Moreover, firms have to learn how to identify the critical 
factors (CF) of corporate governance implementation to recognize the benefits 
and to avoid failure. For these reasons, there is an urgent need to identify the 
critical factors (CFs) in CG implementation to avoid any disaster. Clearly, firms 
should be aware that without taking into account these critical factors, corporate 
governance system definitely will be failed. Thus, this chapter investigates the 
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most important CFs of CG. It draws on the work of the European Centre for 
Best Practice Management (ECBPM) which aims to obtain best practice in the 
management and supervision of firms. 
Corporate governance has been examined from a range of perspectives 
and therefore it is vital to review the theories that have been adopted. This 
chapter provides a summary of theories used in the most previous studies on 
CG, such as agency theory and economic theory. It will also discuss the agency 
theory and how this provides insights into the origins of agency conflicts and the 
ways in which CG systems may be employed to resolve such conflicts. 
Therefore, this chapter outlines the main theories of CG but first of all, it set the 
framework for the current study that is adopted to interpret the study findings. 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows:  Section 3.2 
presents an overview of the key CG theories Section 3.2. Present CFs of CG, 
then the chapter ends with a summary in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Theoretical background  
Contemporary listed firms follow a pattern which has separation of 
ownership from control. Because of the large size of the firms, shareholders 
cannot manage them directly (Berle and Means, 1968). As an alternative, the 
control of firms is devoted to a managerial team, recognized as an agent. Thus, 
there will be conflicts of interest between the shareholders and managers; these 
conflicts of interest may affect on performance of the firm. Managers should 
work to increase shareholders value, by adopting decisions which are 
consistent with the shareholders ‘interest. However, the separation of ownership 
from control may lead to divergence between mangers and shareholders 
interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  To align managerial decisions with 
shareholders interest, shareholders may watch managers’ actions. At the same 
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time, to encourage managers to align their decisions with their interest, 
shareholders can offer incentives For instance, shareholders will grant stock to 
managers (Kim et al., 2010). Thus, their benefits will be directly associated with 
performance of the firm. Hence, managers have a motivation to increase firm 
performance. The problem arise from the conflict of interest between mangers 
and shareholders, are agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus, CG 
is a mechanism that may align interest of managers and shareholders (Clarke, 
2007).   
3.2 Theories of Corporate Governance 
The development of corporate governance, as seen earlier, is a worldwide 
issue, concerning law, culture and capital structure (ownership), as well as 
relations between firms. Corporate governance may, therefore, be applied 
differently from one region of the world to the next. Indeed, certain practices 
may be more vital to some countries than to others. And in an individual 
country, they may be more appropriate at different times depending on the 
stages of development (Mallin, 2007).  
However, the main corporate governance problems are based upon the 
conflicts of interest between various parties, the shareholders and management 
of company on one hand and with other stakeholders on the other hand. 
Therefore, the conceptualisation of corporate governance has been driven by 
two theories. First, the agency theory addresses the relation between the 
shareholders and the management of a company based on Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). Secondly, the stakeholder theory, building on Freeman (1984), 
examines the relation between multi-parties inside and outside the company. 
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The seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed a theory of the 
firm based upon conflicts of interest between different contracting parties 
namely, debt holders, corporate managers and shareholders. A huge literature 
has developed to clarify both the nature of these conflicts and the ways by 
which they may be resolved. Furthermore, there are various challenging 
analyses on the nature of the corporate governance problem with 
recommended solutions to deal with it. These analyses have quite a lot of views 
on what is wrong or seemed to be wrong with the system. Blair (1995) 
recognized some key perspectives for the corporate governance problem 
namely, agency theory, stakeholder theory and market myopia theory. Later, 
Keasey et al., (1997) added the abuse of power theory. Others including the 
resource dependence theory, property rights approach and stewardship theory 
will be considered in this section. The make-up of the different perspectives can 
be likened to benchmarking (Zairi, 1992). 
3.2.1 Agency Theory: The frame work of the study 
At the present time, as a result of the complexities of the world of business 
with its ties relationships, as well as the common trend of separation of control 
and ownership, agency theory has been developed to clarify the relationship 
whereby the principal or the owner, one party, gives power to another party, the 
agent or management (Williamson, 1985; Gray and Jenkins, 1993;). In such 
cases, the agent should run the firm’s assets and liabilities in a way that 
achieves the owner’s goals.  
The extraordinary economic growth after the Second World War, 
especially in developed countries, led to the formation of multi-national 
companies and joint ventures. The emergence of such companies has shaped 
economies and businesses as well as our corporate environment. In every 
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company, the shareholders are the owners of the company, whereas the 
directors and managers are to control all business activities and to ensure that 
the company is operating in the interest of its shareholders (owners). Indeed, 
directors and managers have high influence on company operations as well as 
on the decision regarding the projects to be undertaken. On the other hand, 
shareholders, who are the owners of the company, delegate the authority to the 
managers to exercise all relevant duties on their behalf. In this respect, the 
owners (shareholders) of the company are the principal and the directors and 
managers are the agent (Mallin, 2007). Shailer (2004) argues that apart from 
attending the annual general meetings, shareholders do not normally participate 
in company management or in the control of the company's activities. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 5) define "an agency relationship as a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent”. They discuss and 
clarify the impact of the separation of ownership from company management, 
which, in turn, leads to the development of ‘agency theory’ and the agency 
problem. Agency theory creates a relationship between two parties, whereby 
the owners are known as principals, who contract specialists (agents) to 
manage the business on their behalf. In other words, the shareholders are the 
owners of the company, whereas the directors and managers are there to 
ensure that the business is operating in the interest of its shareholders (owners) 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this regard, company directors and managers 
have high influence on company operations as well as the decision on the 
projects to be undertaken (Staikouras & Staikouras et al., 2008). 
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In some cases, the agent (management) does not necessarily act in the 
best interests of the principal (shareholders) and, as a result of this relationship, 
there arises what is known as the ‘agency problem’ (Solomon & Solomon, 
2007). The agency theory suggests that most of the times, the manager's 
decisions are not necessarily directed toward the single aim of maximising the 
value of the firm. Instead, they have many other goals which align with their own 
interests. In addition, the principals do not have access to all types of 
information. This causes information asymmetry between the agent and the 
principal because they will have different levels of information access (Mallin, 
2007). For instance, the shareholders' ability to control all managers' decisions 
and the activities taking place in the company may be limited by the rights or 
interests of other stakeholder groups, which also need to be considered. This 
control may also be limited to a decision-making level. Thus, shareholders may 
not have, for example, the right to monitor the methods employed and the 
reasons why these were used in recording transactions. Hence, agency 
problems arise (Brenna, 1995) because of the impossibility of the agent to track 
all the decisions and actions that are likely to affect both his own interest and 
the interest of the principal. 
The conflicts of interest between the principals and agents lead to ‘agency 
costs’. Jensen and Meckling (1976) classified the agency costs into three main 
types: first, monitoring costs, which are incurred by shareholders in controlling 
and ensuring managers’ activities and behaviours are in line with their interests; 
secondly, bonding costs, which are incurred by managers to indicate that 
shareholders’ interests are being protected and fulfilled; and thirdly, residual 
agency costs, which are incurred in case bonding and monitoring does not 
eliminate the conflict of interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the 
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corporate governance concept came about as a result of the agency problem, 
which arose when the company owners were separated from the decision-
making process (Solomon, 2007). 
Hart (1995) points out two reasons why corporate governance issues must 
arise in an organisation. The first reason is the presence of conflict of interest or 
agency problem between the owners (shareholders) and company 
management (managers or directors). The second reason is that conflict of 
interest or an agency problem cannot be solved through the use of contract. 
Hart (1995) gives several reasons why solving an agency problem through the 
use of contract might not always be possible. In particular, all business events 
and transactions may not be done through the use of contract. In addition, there 
are costs associated with negotiating contracts and enforcing them known as 
agency costs. Agency costs would be extreme if shareholders tried to ensure 
that all managers' decisions and actions are aligned with the shareholders' 
interests. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the adoption of corporate 
governance practices push directors and managers to plan and make decisions 
which will align their interest with those of the shareholders and help increase 
share value. Moreover, Walsh and Seward (1990) state that there are available 
governance mechanisms that might be used to assimilate the interests of 
shareholders with those of management. One of the mechanisms would be 
associated with individual performance; managers’ rewards reflect performance 
level. Another mechanism is to reward managers by giving them the opportunity 
to subscribe shares at a lower price. In this way, they encourage them to go for 
projects that will increase the shareholders' value. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
conclude that an effective corporate governance system may be driven by the 
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legal consideration of all types of investors as well as the presence of 
concentrated ownership. Firms need a proper governance to protect the 
interests of their shareholders. In addition, small investors (minority interest) 
need to be legally protected against the unethical practices of large investors. 
As result, strong legal protection of especially minority shareholders' 
interests may reduce the agency problem, while poor legal protection of 
shareholders' rights may increase the agency problem, which leads to an 
increase in agency costs (Claessens, 2003). However, Mallin (2007) pointed 
that in many countries there is no strong law protecting minority shareholders, 
especially those which use a code of civil law as opposed to the common law. 
 In short, to reduce agency problem, agency theory provides a system 
where the board of directors will be more involved in formulating the form’s 
policy and assuring that the top management is acting in possible efforts to 
serve the shareholders’ interest. Thus, agency theory provides the board of 
directors with a mechanism to protect the shareholders’ wealth and eliminate 
the conflict between the firm’s owners and its management. Also, agency theory 
is used to explore association between ownership and management of family 
business (Westhead and Howorth, 2006). Actually, in Jordan, reformers began 
trying to mitigate the power of family-owned business groups. For instance, in 
Jordan, and indeed in most Arab economies, there is no separation between 
ownership and control. Owners control their firms even when they are listed 
(Saidi, 2004). Since ownership in emerging economies including Jordan is 
typically heavily concentrated in family businesses (Al-gharaibeh et al., 1997; 
Zeitun and Tian, 2007) the only way to stop majority shareholder opportunism is 
by introducing minority shareholder protection laws.  
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3.2.2 Economic Theory 
Economic theory suggests that a firm is a tie of contracts between the 
many parties. Thus, the need for CG framework appears as a result of the 
presence of incomplete contracts in the markets. The market failure increased 
this need. Incomplete contracts among many parties in the firm as shareholders 
and managers influence the value of a firm in a negative way. Effective contract 
maintain the interest of shareholders by offering the ways to negotiate 
contingencies in the contract (Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Nam and Nam, 2004). 
Hence, the right procedure of contracting between different shareholders and 
managers can mitigate the agency problem, then increasing shareholders 
value.  
3.2.3 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory is interested with allocation of power over 
the firm (Zahra and Pearce, 1989.  The theory sates that the ability of external 
groups to control resources of the firm gives those groups power over it. This 
implies that if a strategic external partner posses resources critical for the firm's 
success the foreign partner will attain more power with regard to the internal 
partner. Thus, this theory guide to the result that partners’ ability to control a 
firm depends on the size of their equity holdings and the importance of the   
resources they bring to the firm (Child and Yan, 1997).For example, Jordan is 
one of the MENA countries where Jordanian partners and Jordan markets 
cannot provide highly sophisticated resources required by the firms. Hence, this 
will bring them to become highly dependent on their foreign partners for such 
items especially like technology.   
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3.2.4 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory explored by Freeman in his 1984 work, "Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach". Freeman is known as having built a 
very strong base for the improvement of this theory (Solomon, 2007). According 
to Freeman, stakeholders can be defined as “all people who have interest in 
entity and, therefore, can be affected by its performance and decisions 
(Freeman & Vea, 2001). In other words, stakeholder theory seems to include a 
broader group rather than shareholders, as employees, customers, community, 
government, suppliers, and others (Letza, et al., 2004). In the traditional 
principle of CG, the responsibility of director’s is primarily concentrated on 
shareholders’ interests which is maximising shareholders' value. Hence, in the 
modern principle of CG, a set of legal market mechanisms are create engaging 
firms to consider all other interest groups connected with ethical ,environmental 
and social aspect of the firm (Pease & Macmillan, 1993). Collier (2008) confirms 
that stakeholders have important influence on the firm and, for that they require 
appreciation from the managers and executives.  Actually, stakeholder theory 
helps the firm to protect interests by extending the firm responsibility to a 
broader range of stakeholders (Simmons, 2004). This means that a firm's aim 
should be comprehensive to all people involved in its operations and who can 
influence or be influenced by its failure or success. This includes shareholders, 
suppliers, government, investors, community, employees, creditors and 
customers. These may have financial, social, economical, environmental and 
technological effects (Clement, 2005). 
Collier (2008) classified stakeholders into two categories, primary and 
secondary. While primary have a direct relationship in the form of a contract 
with the firm such as creditors, secondary do not have a direct connection with 
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the firm. On the other hand, the secondary may still be influenced by the firm’s 
operations. Gillan (2006) gives a wider view of the firm and its governance 
contrary to the narrow view of the firm as compromise of the firm board, firm 
managers, and shareholders, as shown in Figure (1). 











Source: Gillian (2006, p.20) 
According to Clement (2005) firms are under continuous pressure to 
review their CG practice by including all stakeholders. It is worth to note that 
many firms thinking to include on their BOD people chosen from stakeholders 
such as suppliers, employees, customers, and community (Luoma and 
Goodstein, 1999). Moreover, the OECD principles confirm that "The CG 
framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law" 
(OECD, 2004, p. 12). 
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In short, agency theory is interested with the rights of shareholder and the 
separation of ownership from control. On the other hand, stakeholder theory 
further extends the goal of the firm from maximising shareholders’ value to 
wider outcomes to a scope of stakeholders and emphasises firm efficiency in a 
social perspective (Letza et al., 2004).    
3.2.5 Market Myopia Theory 
Market myopia theory does not confirm that the purposeof the firm should 
be to maximize shareholders’ Value. Keasey et al., (1997) show that followers 
of this theory absolutely call to incorporate other stakeholders. The market 
myopia theory recognize short-term as the main problem in the Anglo-American 
CG system (Charkham, 1994, Skys, 1994). They argue that the market creates 
too much pressure on managers to concentrate on short-term stock price profit 
at the expense of long-term growth such as R&D. According to them, stock 
price are not a dependable guide to the expected value of the firm. 
Furthermore, this theory suggests that accounting should act as regular 
pressure on firms to increase both the quantity and quality of disclosure 
(Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992).  
Cook (1989) mentioned myopia theory proposes that the force for 
disclosure is to mitigate the required rate of return (rrr) and uncertainty risk. A 
lower rate of return   means a lower cost of capital and the higher the stock 
price and this will enhance the   image and reputation of the firm (Gray and 
Roberts, 1989).   
3.2.6 Abuse of Power Theory 
The abuse of power theory, like the agency theory approaches is based 
on the idea that the objective of the firm is to increase shareholders’ value. The 
followers of this viewpoint argue that the dilemma with the CG is that it gives 
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excessive power to the management team (Hutton, 1995). Followers propose 
that BODs are   controlled by executives that have too much autonomy to apply 
their own agenda. This approach considers conservative control systems as 
inappropriate to stop self-interested manners. Followers of this view build their 
discussion on managers pay where there have been discussions and many 
facts, however unsure on its need of sensitivity to shareholders' value. They 
propose legislative intervention to weaken the position of managers as the 
solution to this dilemma (Kay and Silberston, 1995). 
3.2.7 Stewardship Theory 
Davis et al.,( 1997) affirmed that according to this theory executives are 
excellent stewards of firm assets, the traditional thought of CG holds that the 
managers, on behalf of stakeholders , really want to do a excellent work by 
being excellent stewards of the firm assets, not to have a conflict of interest or 
make gain without regard for stakeholders (Clarke, 2004).Interestingly, while 
stewardship theory propose that shareholders’ Value are increased by sharing 
the roles of board chair,  agency theory  propose that interest of shareholders 
increased  by the separation of ownership from the board chair,  
3.2.8 The Property Rights Approach 
In its exclusive meaning, property “refers solely to the title, interest or right, 
and resources could not be recognized as property any more than they could be 
known as title, interest or right,”). In contemporary corporations, it is repeatedly 
believed that the distribution of stockholding combined with executives rewards 
in a proxy strive have led to a increase in the power of executives and have 
decreased their dependence on the shareholders (Furubotn and Pejovich, 
1972).Therefore, executives are able to achieve their own objectives within 
assured limits rather than the interest of shareholders, specifically, maximisation 
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of profit. The property right identifies the nature of the rights, which a person 
may hold, to apply of resources, to the profit created, and to the mobility of 
those to the other people (De Alessi, 1983:3)).   
With regard to CG, the theory clarifies how shareholders attain the right to 
select and gain from the best firms governed. If their some interests are not met 
by the directors, the theory gives them the right to transfer their capital to more 
suitable firms where they are governed in proper way. Particularly, the theory 
gives a motivation to the BODs to   monitor of the firm’s executives to retain the 
existing shareholders rather than transferring their capital to other firm. Thus, 
the theory is complementary to agency theory and helps to clarify how chiefs 
can apply sanctions. 
3.2.9 Accountability Theory 
CG code of practice is critical to the efficient financial market in any 
country. It sets the guidelines how to run the listed firms in the market. Clearly, 
CG plays as an accountability instrument for firms in respect of its relationship 
with stakeholders. Particularly, managers are accountable to shareholders and 
other stakeholders (Solomon, 2010). Thus, the firm must report to both 
shareholders and other stakeholders about the firm (Solomon, 2010). Certainly, 
reports give assurance to different parties regarding issues of concern to them. 
For example, the BODs need to ensure that the performance of the firm 
has improved and to what extent the goals have been accomplished. While, it is 
very important for the shareholders to ensure the efficient use of assets; owners 
may want to find signs in the firm indicating to an increase in price of the share, 
the financial situation and its ability to repay the loans, which may concern 
suppliers and creditors. In contrast, employees interested with ability of the firm 
to offer financial security and a safe working condition to them, while the 
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community will interested with the services offered by the firm and how far 
concerns with the concise and environmental aspects of its activities.    
  Regarding relationship with stakeholders in a firm it is not a firm option; it 
is compulsory by a firm to meet its responsibility towards the community in 
which it operates. Thus, CG can be seen as a legal contract between interested 
parties and the firm, imposed by constitution.  For that reason, CG code of best 
practices aims to ensure that there is no misuse of the asset of the firm 
(Stewart, 1984). To attract international investor and keep existing 
shareholders, it is important for both governments and firms to meet the 
requirements of accountability and transparency (Monks and Minow, 2004; 
Colley, 2003). Furthermore, this will satisfy all interested groups to avoid 
external intervention (Gray and Bebbington, 2000).   
Gray and Bebbington (2000) declare that firms’ major concern with respect 
to CG is with issues related to financial affairs; there are some stakeholders 
who have rights to information on many other issues, like environmental and 
social aspects. The thoughts to increasing accountability are dependent on 
agency relationship. Therefore, shareholders would be with increasing 
accountability in ways that could make managers more accountable to them, 
while managers’ would prefer less accountability, as accountability aim to 
increase their responsibility to stakeholders including shareholders  and restrict 
their independence (Perks, 1993).   
In short, majority of the MENA countries including Jordan have set 
guidelines   which are in the mature phase and all firms required to comply with 
such code of CG. Nevertheless, in Jordan, it is worth to note that there is code 
of CG for listed firms that are recently introduced. This code of CG have not yet 
tested and benchmarked against the code of CG in the developed world. 
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3.3 Critical Factors of Corporate Governance 
After Enron’s and WorldCom scandal, some writers criticized the auditing 
profession. It is identified that many parties involved in their financial collapse. 
Thus, many shareholders have lost confidence in business, and they have 
investigated the efficiency and the effectiveness of CG systems. It is worth 
noting that the primary goal of CG is to create a balance of power-sharing 
among shareholders, directors, and management to enhance shareholder value 
and protect the interests of other stakeholders. Hence, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of CG can be measured by its influence on the agency costs and 
thereby a firm’s performance. Therefore, the critical factors of corporate 
governance will theoretically be analyzed in term of their impact on the agency 
costs and then value. For that reason, firms need to adopt critical success 
factors if they are to achieve business excellence and sustainable best 
performance (Zairi, 2005). Jarrar and Zairi (2000) stated that best practice 
management is increasingly being recognised as a powerful performance 
improvement effort for processes, business units and for entire firms. Therefore, 
the following sections examine ten critical factors of corporate governance 
based on the work of the European Centre for Best Practice Management 
(ECBPM).   
3.3.1 Constitution 
Solomon et al., (2003) offered empirical evidence on the manner of 
Taiwanese firm managers and the role of the BODs. Their results showed a 
clear idea about the status quo of CG in the country. The findings indicated that 
the BODs constitutes the most important instrument in Taiwanese CG 
.Therefore, constitution factor as one of the CFs of CG suggests that the 
effective corporate constitution serve as a mechanism to align interests of 
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shareholders with those of managers, reducing the costs of agency conflict 
between them and accordingly, enhancing the firm performance and thereby its 
value. This may be attributed to view that corporate constitution reduces the 
monitoring costs that the firm spends to control management, restricting its 
ability to use available cash flows for their own interest and consequently 
increasing value.  
The effective corporate construction is concerning with the Board size, 
role duality, etc. The influence of Board size of firm's performance is vague. 
Dalton et al., (1999) argue that   BOD with too many members could be 
beneficial as it increases the number of the expertise. Inconsistent with 
argument, Eisenberg et al., (1998) and Fernandez et al., (1997) found that large 
Boards lead to difficulties in coordination and control which in turn harming the 
efficiency of firm’s activities and thereby their value. Yermack (1996) supports 
Eisenberg at al., (1998) and Fernandez et al., (1997). He founds that the 
smaller board size is better for performance than lager size. The reason behind 
that is mainly attributed to the fact that smaller boards mitigate the possibility of 
free riding and therefore has the tendency of increase firm performance, 
additionally, small Board can help enhance their performance and   control 
(Jensen, 1993). While, the larger size will be accompanied with an increase in 
managerial expenses which minimise the cash flows available to shareholders 
and consequently reducing value.   
With respect to duality, it has been argued that the lack of independent 
directors makes it hard for board members to respond a failure in top 
management team (Jensen, 1993) where firms facing a higher costs or  agency 
problem when the same person occupies the two positions. This supports Fama 
and Jensen (1983) who argue that the concentration of decision control in one 
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person reduces board’s effectiveness in monitoring executive directors. Carpeto 
at al. (2005), give evidence supporting Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen, 
(1993) that the decision to separate two positions connected with positive 
returns. Furthermore, the duality between them is a key indicator of weak CG. It 
is clarifies that the separation of CEO/Chairman could create a better 
performance and mitigate the agency problem between shareholder and 
managers which in turn maximizing share value.  
In details, the constitutional system of governance grants shareholders 
the power to control their firm. The main idea of corporate constitution is that the 
interests of shareholders should be the main concern of BODs. The BODs are a 
link between the shareholders and managers. Jensen (1993) clarifies that the 
role of the board is to set the rules of the game for the CEO. However, the 
literature has classified three sets of interrelated roles played by the boards in 
modern firms: control strategy and service. (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Judge 
and Zeithaml, 1992; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Stiles and Taylor, 
2001). The literature articulates the main roles of the boards, namely, the   
monitoring role and the strategic role of the board.    
The board’s involvement in strategic role has been the primary concern 
of many studies (Demb and Neubaura, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994; McNulty 
and Pettigrew, 1996; Combined Code, 2010).  Presently, following pressure 
forced by different parties in different economies have urged boards to give 
more attention to their role regarding strategy formulation and involvement.     
Research on the BODs recommends that the emergent strategy and its 
implications for board involvement have received little interest in the debate on 
the strategic roles of the board (McNulty and Pettigrew 1999; Stiles and Taylor 
2001).   From the literature, the degree of involvement of boards is vague. For 
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example,   Stiles and Taylor (2001) identify that the two questions, “what 
constitutes involvement in strategy” and “what does strategy-making mean” 
often remain unaddressed.   
Based on the above discussion, the strategic of the board is just one side 
of the important roles of the board especially the chairman. The chairman has a 
basic role on the board. Any collapse in governance system will be attributed to 
the chairman (Renton and Watkinson, 2001). Regarding the relationship 
between chairman and the management team, Roberts and Stiles (1999) 
explain that the relationship between the CEO and the chairman is very critical 
as these two persons offer direction for the firm as  the chairman run the board, 
while the CEO run the firm (Roberts and Stiles, 1999). In some firm’s chairman 
is the CEO of the board and this is role duality (Dalton et al., 2008; Dahya et al., 
2009; Dey, Engel, & Liu, 2010). 
In theory, the separation of the two positions will mitigate agency problem 
and improve performance in firms. Hence, supporters of the separation raise 
the concern of how BODs can be effective monitors when the chairman is the 
CEO of the board (Lorsch and MacIver 1989; Jensen 1993). So, this dual role 
proposes a firm conflict of interest between the management and the board. 
The literature shows some differences whether the separation of the two 
positions will increase firm performance or not. For instance, Fama and Jensen 
(1983) found that dual role will harm firm performance. On the other hand 
Ibrahim et al., (2011) and Donaldson and Davis (1991) found that role duality 
was significantly associated with performance. While, Rechner and Dalton 
(1989), found no differences between firms with a dual CEO and those with 
separate positions.   
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 Another element that the literature articulated is the board’s composition. 
The assumption is about the most favourable number of outsider to insider 
directors serving on the board. This assumption is discussed by the agency 
theory (Dey, 2008) where the board should have the optimum composition to 
work effectively to supervise and advice the management to accomplish the 
shareholders’ main goal, namely, shareholders wealth maximisation (Dey et al., 
2010). The balance of both executive and NEDs are the most significant factors 
that should be considered by the BODs to enhance efficiency since both parties 
bring different skills to the board (Solomon, 2007).  
The literature on board composition has been differentiating between two 
types of director, namely, an executive director who is fully employed by the firm 
and NED who has no relation or interest in the firm (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998) have identified grey director who has a degree of 
relationship to the firm.  Followers of each group have justified the presence of 
this type on the board according to different viewpoint.  
For instance, Fama and Jensen, (1983) show that insider directors are an 
important source of information and their existence on the board can lead to a 
more effective decision-making process. Furthermore, Weir et al., (2001) state 
that their main advantages   are that they bring professional into the firm. While, 
Jensen (1993) argues that, since the primary goal is to monitor the CEO, it is 
almost not possible for those who report directly to the CEO to monitor and 
critically evaluate them. Therefore, he recommends that the only one who 
should serve on the board as an insider director is the CEO.   
The empirical evidence between the relationship of the board’s structure 
and firm’s performance appears mixed (Dalton et al., 2007; Faleye, 2007; 
Iyengar & Zampelli, 2009; Dey et al., 2010).For instance, Bhagat and Bolton 
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(2007) found positive relationship between board independence and 
performance. Moreover, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) found no relationship 
between outside directors and   performance. On the other hand, Bhagat and 
Black (1998) found a negative relationship between the outside directors and 
performance.     
Nowadays, independent directors are not acting to serve the best interest 
of shareholders in a proper way. Therefore, to reduce agency problem, 
independence is not enough; they should be accountable to shareholders. The 
Jordanian corporate governance code (2009) recommended that one third of 
the board should be independent non-executive directors. While, the Higgs 
Report (2003) recommended that at least half of a public firm’ BODs should be 
independent NEDs.   
 Furthermore, independent NEDs are able to reduce managerial 
consumption of privileges (Brickle and James, 1987) which implies to reduce 
agency problem between managers and shareholders (Pearce and Zahra, 
1992). Also, the presence of NEDs on boards provides “additional windows on 
the world” (Tricker, 1984, p.171). According to resource dependence theory, 
NEDs provide firms with links to the external environment due to their external 
contacts.   
 Another aspect is board committees. The motivation for establishing 
board committees is to divide the work between board members (Carter and 
Lorsch, 2004). Nowadays, most firms have different kinds of committees 
including, audit committees, executive committees, corporate governance 
committees, nomination committees and compensation committees. Many of 
the board’s jobs in the firms are achieved by the committees. Regulators in the 
USA, the UK, and many other countries including Jordan have recommended 
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an audit committee, remuneration committee and nomination committee for 
their listed firms (Monks and Minow, 2001).  
Some committees have become mandatory in many economies. For 
example, the UK Combined code (2006) and the Jordanian corporate 
governance code (2009) recommend three types of committees, audit; 
remuneration; and nomination committees.  Currently, audit committees have 
become a famous mechanism of CG (Turley and Zaman, 2004). However, the 
failure of many firms in the US, the UK, and the rest of the world have made 
many bodies such as academics and regulator concentrate on the importance 
of the audit committees as an effective tool for CG improvement. Other 
committee that appears in some firms nowadays is the nomination committee.  
It is very crucial for any firm to have skilled directors on its board. Mallin 
(2004) affirms that in the past, directors were commonly elected on the board 
on the basis of personal relations. Barbara (2000) shows that directors should 
not be elected randomly; hence, establishing a nominations committee can 
facilitate this process. The basic role of the nomination committee is to 
accomplish a systematic procedure to evaluate the existing balance of 
knowledge, skills, experience and employing this when training a candidate 
profile for new appointments (Mallin 2004).   
In Jordan, the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange (2009) stated that member of the board of directors should be 
qualified and enjoys adequate knowledge and experience in administrative 
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 The fourth committee that plays an important role in most firms is the 
remuneration (compensation) committee. The compensation committee can be 
seen as an administrative tool that guarantees a suitable level of reliability in the 
setting of executive remuneration (Main et al., 2008). The BODs is mainly 
considered to be the main body responsible for top management remuneration 
(Jensen, 1993; Zajac and Westphal, 1994). The remuneration committee has 
long been employed in the US, although such a committee is somehow new in 
the UK (Conyon and Mallin, 1997).  The Cadbury Report (1992) in the UK  
suggested that boards should appoint compensation committees, composed of  
mainly of NEDs and chaired by a NED .While in Jordan the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (2009) 
recommended that boards should appoint remuneration committees, composed 
of not less than three non-executive members of the board of directors, at least 
two of whom must be independent members and one of the two independent 
members must preside over the committee. OECD Principles (2004) ensured 
that compensation policy should be handled by a special committee separate 
from the board comprising of wholly or a majority of independent directors.  
Other committee that appears in some firms nowadays is the corporate 
governance committee.  
After the failure of famous firms in different economies, some researches 
called for a distinguish improvement in CG mechanisms. William George (2002) 
suggested   that every board should establish a CG committee. George 
(2002:22) explains that the most important responsibility of the CG committee is 
“to draft the governance principles”. In addition, Neubauer and Krapf (2004) 
argued that the CG committee is a mechanism in helping the firms to have 
appropriate expertise and educated directors. In addition it motivated the BODs 
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to be more involved and active in the board’s agenda as there is an 
independent body that evaluates their performance and contributions 
continuously. Another important committee is executive committee. 
The most popular name for such a body is a management committee (or 
executive committee in some firms). Management committees are normally 
recognized to make decisions in the board[s absence (Carver and Oliver, 2002). 
Their function varies and can consist of dealing with urgent problems arising 
between board meetings. They also can be used as a sounding board for 
general management issues (Charkham, 1994). In addition to the board’s 
committees, the literature identify control factor that is significant in board 
performance. The next subsection examines this feature in detail. 
3.3.2 Control  
Managers are employed to work for shareholders' objectives and 
interest, but separation of ownership and management may provides managers 
with motivations to work of their own interest while ignores those of 
shareholders. To mitigate the impact of this separation, responsibilities of both 
directors and auditors should be clearly recognise to shareholders to make sure 
that they will take actions that are highly consistence with the primary goal of 
shareholders wealth maximization. It was recommended that asymmetric 
information is one of the factors that magnify the conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders. Auditors with known responsibilities are expected 
to reduce the severity of asymmetric information, reducing agency costs and 
consequently maximising shareholders wealth. Bedard et al., (2004) argue that 
the audit committee must be independent of the firm's management to protect 
the interest of shareholders although there are different opinions concerning the 
influence of management compensations on performance, this compensation 
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should be linked and restricted to managers’ contribution in enhancing firm 
performance and meeting its goals. This may make them more efficient, 
enhancing the efficiency of a firm's operations and consequently increasing 
value.  According to Jensen and Meckling (1976) higher levels of financial 
incentives should ultimately lead to higher firm performance. However, Brennan 
(1995) argues that monetary incentives are not enough to ensure complete 
alignment between the goals of managers and shareholders. According to 
Baker et al. (1988), when making decisions, managers at certain points yield to 
behavioural notions of justice and loyalty rather than to financial incentives 
alone. Despite of these arguments, when monetary incentives are considered, 
managers should not involve in setting their own compensations. This will make 
shareholders more confidence that managers will not enlarge their 
compensations which will reduce cash flows to common shareholders. It is 
worth noting the agency costs is an increasing function of asymmetric 
information. The cost becomes more severe when outsiders feel that there are 
a hidden agreement between managers and auditors. In such case, auditors 
should be changed to avoid any misconduct. The possibility of existing hidden 
agreement increases when auditors have non executive services rather than 
auditing. This suggest that control as of the critical factor of CG may force 
mangers to be aligned with goals of shareholders in the sense that it reduces 
the asymmetric information and thereby costs of controlling and monitoring. 
In details, to carry out its supervision role and to protect the interest of 
shareholders, the audit committee must be independent of the firm's 
management (Bedard et al., 2004). The audit committee plays a significant role 
in terms of monitoring and controlling the firm’s performance (Spira, 2003). To 
assure its independence, the audit committee is linked directly to the BODs and 
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not to the top management. The audit committee works as a tool to enhance the 
external auditor’s independence and provides more reliable financial reporting 
to users of financial statements (Spira, 1998; Turley and Zaman, 2004; Collier 
and Zaman, 2005).   
In the UK and the US, decisions made by the board are determined 
primarily via a democratic system of voting (Johnson et al., 1993). In view of this 
democratic operational procedure, the board's composition has the ability to 
greatly influence its goal of monitoring managers and protecting the interests of 
shareholders (Johnson et al., 1993). In CG, board composition is central to 
board monitoring activities (Johnson et al., 1993). Monks and Minow (1995) 
stated that NEDs generally face a lower conflict of interests since their future 
career success does not depend on CEOs. It is argued that a larger outside 
directors’ presence will bring stronger supervision of managerial actions. The 
general trend in the Jordan is for firms to add more NEDs to the board (Mazen, 
2013). 
  After publication of the Cadbury Report, the number of NEDs on the 
boards of firms rose considerably (Barry, 1998). Mangel and Singh (1993) 
claimed that NEDs have more opportunity for control. Supporters of boards as a 
monitoring and control mechanism believe that NED is central to an effective 
resolution of agency problems between managers and shareholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Thus, the major assumption about the importance of the 
independent NEDson the board relies on their role in monitoring the 
management, and therefore will be the best one to protect the interest of 
shareholders is non-executive directors. According to Fama and Jensen (1983) 
show effective monitoring requires that NEDs are independent from the 
executive directors. In addition, they maintain that NEDs on the board of public 
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firms have more incentive than executive directors to more independent and to 
monitor the activities efficiently in order to protect the shareholder interests. 
Moreover, they argue that outsider directors have incentives to develop 
reputations as experts in decision control and the board is not an effective 
device for decision control unless it limits the judgment of individual top 
management. 
Furthermore, many studies also explored a number of determinants of the 
effectiveness of the board such board size. Board size is defined as the number 
of people who serve on the board as directors. Board size has a number of 
implications for the board’s functioning. The importance of size is derived from 
its capability to communicate with the top management to serve shareholders' 
interests. It also gains its impact in reducing the conflict of interests between the 
two parties: management and shareholders. However, the literature reveals 
different ideas about the optimum size of the board (Ibrahim et al., 2011). 
Supporters of small boards argue that a smaller board plays a controlling 
function, whereas a larger board may not be able to function effectively as a 
controlling body, thus leaving the management relatively free. Consequently, an 
agency model suggests that a large board eliminates the corporate value. 
Jensen, (1993) emphasised that a small board can help to improve the firm’s 
performance.   
Different empirical studies have support for the Jensen argument, such as, 
Singh and Davidson III (2003); Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Lipton and 
Lorsh (1992).  Furthermore, Eisenberg et al., (1998) investigated the effect of 
board size on mid-size and small companies, and found that smaller boards 
were best. Ahmed et al., (2006) also discovered the same result. On the other 
hand, Conyon and Peck, (1998) found that larger board is best.   




Corporate governance reforms and best practices require independent 
and competent board of directors and external auditor to deal with the perceived 
agency problems of asymmetric information between management and 
investors and to improve the quality of public financial information. What makes 
organizational structures and policies effective, in practice, are knowledgeable 
and competent individuals with a clear understanding of their role and a strong 
commitment to carrying out their respective responsibilities. This is because 
increasing management knowledge about a firm's short-run and long run 
objectives and about tools, techniques and strategies that are needed to 
accomplish these objectives will contribute effectively in reducing risks of failure 
and enhancing firm's performance. Moreover, qualified and knowledgably 
managers will increase outsiders trust that investment and financial decisions 
will optimally be made which will improve performance and then value. This, in 
fact, needs an efficient information technology to exchange financial information 
among all stakeholders, making them known what needs to be done to 
accomplish a firm' goals. Information technology reduces agency costs by 
providing information more easily so that managers can supervise a larger 
number of people with fewer resources. Moreover, it increases outsiders' trust, 
reducing asymmetric information and mitigate the cost of agency conflicts, 
reducing the impetus of potential investors to demand risk premium. This helps 
firms generate funds externally at low costs, and consequently increasing value 
and thereby shareholders' wealth. So, an effective corporate governance 
structure improves investor confidence; it ensures corporate accountability, 
enhances the reliability and quality of public financial information, and enhances 
the integrity and efficiency of the capital market which leads to high level of 
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transparency, low costs of asymmetric and agency conflicts and result in high 
performance and value. Moreover, it increases the effectiveness of internal 
controls over financial reporting and related risk management assessment 
In details, according to Solomon and Solomon (2004) the NEDs need all 
the support and help possible to ensure they perform their role effectively. 
Further, the Higgs Report called for more training for NEDs. In fact, good 
education, effective training and seminars are crucial to the application of CG 
practices and for the continuity of corporations. Corporate governance practices 
need to be strengthened, in particular by increasing board competence and 
responsibility. Board members should have up-to-date knowledge of financial 
issues and risk management training. Boards should conduct annual 
evaluations of their performance and report to shareholders. Corporate 
governance problems could be minimized by the appointment of competent 
director. On another hand a vital way to foster professionalism and competency 
is to provide training, education and support to directors and then to all human 
resources of the company (Solomon, 2010; OECD, 2009; Mallin, 2004 WBPR, 
2004; Hussain and Mallin, 2003). In addition, Jensen (1993) suggested a 
mechanism to keep the board knowledgeable about the insider's information 
and participation, and to give them an overview about insider managers in order 
to evaluate them: 
3.3.4 Compliance 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the 
board and management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the 
company and its shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring. This 
along with a strong commitment to carrying out the board of directors’ 
respective responsibilities mitigates the severity of asymmetric information. It 
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increases the trust that BOD will be in the line with shareholders goals and 
objective which reduce the agency conflicts and thereby agency costs. 
Moreover, compliance with applicable laws, regulations and guidelines will 
increase the level of investor protections and transparency where companies 
are required by law to disclose their financial reports and statement. Hence, 
Effective ethical compliance management tends employees to ask questions 
correctly and, in the end, do “the right thing”, to observe ethical principles of 
professional conduct in avoiding potential conflicts of interest, and to act in the 
best interests of the company and its shareholders. 
Furthermore, it influences employees to be willing to report violations to 
management, thus contributing to process transparency in the organization. 
Finally, it increases employees’ commitment, because a culture of compliance 
creates value equivalence that generates a sense of community and 
organizational commitment among employees (Trevino et al., 1999; McCabe et 
al., 1996). Hence, it is important for top management to lead in promoting 
awareness of compliance within their organization, as it sends messages to 
employees that inevitably shape the culture of their organizations (Beyer and 
Nino, 1999). Governance and compliance shows senior executives and board 
members how to ensure that their companies incorporate the necessary 
processes, organization, and technology to accomplish strategic goals. This 
might reduce information asymmetries by increasing the trust of outsiders that 
all people in the organization will work for shareholder interests.  Hence, the 
agency costs of asymmetric information will decline, reducing the cost of 
creating funds and consequently enhancing value.  
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In details, any discussion of the role and purpose of compliance should 
begin with a definition of a compliance committee.  A compliance committee is a 
group of people within a company or organization whose job is to make certain 
that all laws and rules relating to its activities are obeyed (Cambridge dictionary, 
2012), particularly, a group comprised primarily of members of the board of 
directors assigned the task of ensuring that a corporation and its employees are 
acting in accordance with any and all applicable, laws, regulations, ordinances, 
rules, etc. In many countries including Jordan the audit committee serves this 
role in addition to its normal responsibilities. If management owns 100% of the 
shares of the corporation, no agency conflict exists. In this case, a board of 
directors is unnecessary, and therefore a compliance committee could instead 
be comprised of members of top level management (Malendy, 2005; shabbier, 
2007) 
It is worth to note that the senior level chief compliance officer is appointed 
and is responsible for the compliance function. The compliance function may be 
combined with other appropriate functions, as long as it’s independent and no 
conflicts of interest arise. Also, the method of determining the remuneration of 
the compliance staff does not compromise their objectivity. Furthermore, the 
board may choose to establish a compliance committee. The responsibilities of 
the compliance committee are where the insurer establishes a compliance 
committee, that committee is objective and independent and has the necessary 
authority to access all relevant information (OECD, 2009). As mentioned in the 
definition of compliance committees, the committee is normally assigned the 
goal of ensuring that a corporation and its employees are acting in accordance 
with all applicable laws and regulations (Malendy, 2005; shabbier, 2007).   
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The committee’s role is not limited to prevention of company misconduct 
but also includes monitoring the corporate to track current noncompliance or 
that one has already occurred and enforcing training program to minimise 
compliance failure. Creating a compliance committee as part of a compliance 
program may enhances oversight of a company, which is an element of good of 
best practice as outlined by The European Centre for Best Practice 
Management (ECBPM). Additionally, it is expected that the implementation of a 
compliance committee can help a company’s performance in the long run by 
ensuring that the company complies with regulations that are in the best 
interests of its stakeholders(CG code of Jordan, 2009 ;shabbier, 2007) 
According to OECD (2004) firms should disclose its CG practices, and a 
number of countries such disclosure is now a part of the regular reporting. The 
purpose of a company report should be to convoy information which is useful to 
those who have an active stakeholder (Zairi and Letza 1994).  In many 
countries, firms should practice corporate governance principles set by the 
authorities with mandatory reporting on a “comply or explain” basis. Disclosure 
of the policies of the firm and governance structure is necessary to assess 
firm’s governance (CG code of Jordan, 2009).   
3.3.5 Competitiveness 
He et al (2000) conclude that the board of directors can affect both the 
motivation and the capability behind firm competitive behavior. Directors can 
supplement the firm with their own managerial and relational capitals, which 
enhance the firm’s ability to undertake competitive actions in effective and 
efficient ways to serve shareholders’ interests. This makes governance 
mechanisms efficient and leading to reduced agency costs, and thus improving 
firm financial performance (Eisenhardt, 1989). (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) 
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argue that the announcement of each competitive action event will determine 
the direction and magnitude of stock market reaction. This may be attributed to 
the fact that announcement of events will increase the level of transparency, 
reducing the severe of asymmetric information and consequently increasing 
value.  Hence, evaluating and disclosing the performance of both BOD and 
managements in annual reports will enhance outsiders’ trusts in accomplishing 
the firm's long run goals. Moreover, agency costs and asymmetric information 
can be mitigated in the presence of major shareholders within the firms. This is 
because major share holders have the power and cost less access to inside 
information, so the work as a mechanism of alignment between shareholders 
and managers, reducing the agency costs of shareholders-managers conflicts 
and thereby enhancing performance and value. This may also work as a 
mechanism of protection to minority shareholders who find it is too costly to 
control management behavior (Gillan and Starts 2003). Hence, the firm should 
frequently disclose about the major shareholders and how large they are in its 
ownership structure with focusing in the protection system of small individual 
investors. Disclosure of ownership structure and protection level send signals to 
outsiders, reducing the asymmetric information and adverse selection costs and 
increasing the firm's ability to generate external funds at a lowest cost.  
In details, to sustain competitive advantage, firms must go beyond the 
skillful use of tools and techniques to envelop a comprehensive set of values, 
beliefs and premises that guide organisational activities (Zairi, 2005). Evaluation 
of the board as a whole or individually is an important aspect in assuring a 
competitive and effective board. In 1994, the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) published a report on the performance evaluation of CEOs, 
boards, and directors (Ribbon, 2005). The report recommends that boards 
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develop a system for adopting a mechanism and setting goals for evaluating the 
performance of the board as whole, members individually, and the CEO. It also 
urged for a separate evaluation for the CEO as a chairman in case of 
CEO/chairman duality. Carter and Lorsch (2004) believe that boards need to 
assess their performance annually.  Neubauer and Krapf (2004) showed that 
the value of a formal board evaluation, from a corporate governance point of 
view, is to keep the board accountable. The Fortune 1000 survey carried out by 
Korn/Ferry International (2002) also showed that only 37 percent of the firms 
evaluated the entire boards compared to 26 percent in 1996, where only 21 
percent evaluated the individual directors, whereas 41 percent of those 
directors think that the individual directors' evaluation is effective.  
In the literature, two approaches are employed to assess the board 
members individually. The first process is peer review by the entire board in 
which each member is asked to assess the performance of every other 
member. The second process is a review by a special committee that is 
composed of external directors (Neubauer and Krapf 2004). In the majority of 
organisations, the corporate governance committee is the body that carries out 
this function. Garratt (2003) argues that the board’s chairman is the one who is 
responsible for assessing the capability of the board and the individual 
directors. 
On the other hand, evaluating directors has some disadvantages as well. 
Hoffamn (2003) listed some of the pros and cons. For instance, Hoffamn (2003) 
shows that: “it is difficult to establish effective standards for evaluation that 
accurately reflect the contributions of each director, since each member 
possesses a different set of competencies, and qualified candidates may not 
want to join a board and current directors may not wish to remain on a board 
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that has an evaluation process”. However, such a disadvantage can be 
overcome by imposing some semi- or fully-mandatory regulations to evaluate 
the board and the directors by the regulators in every country. Thus, it appears 
that the board evaluation becomes a part of the corporate governance systems 
in these countries 
Another competitive function of the board is the creation of corporate 
objectives, strategies, and a board policy Mace (1986). However, Mace (1986) 
showed also that “most boards do not perform the function, and the board may 
or may not be involved in approving policies, strategies, and objectives defined 
by management. For example, a management proposal for approval of an 
annual capital budget involving $10 million to $50 million or more will take 
roughly thirty minutes of a board meeting of one and half hours. And it would be 
rare that board members who would do anything except go along with 
management” (Mace 1986:68-69). Thus, Mace’s (1986) finding is similar to that 
of (Herman, 1981) who found boards are not involved in strategy formation 
.Lorsch and MacIver (1989) found that the main role of the boards in terms of 
strategy formation process was in advising and evaluating rather than initiating 
strategy. Norburn and Grinyer (1974) found a strong agreement that the CEO 
set the primary objectives of the firm in recent years most countries excluding 
Jordan have approved many regulations and recommendations that help 
boards in becoming more connected with top management in these countries 
(Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; OECD, 1999; Sarbanes-Oxley 2002; OECD, 
2004; Combined Code, 2010). 
An issue in CG competitiveness is ownership structure or control of 
companies. A study by La Porta et al., (1998) on publicly owned companies 
showed that among others, family control is more common in countries with 
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poor shareholder protection, while the widely owned firm is more common in 
countries with good shareholder protection. The constitutional system of 
governance grants shareholders the power to control the companies they own. 
Institutional shareholders own the majority of voting shares in most companies 
and must accept responsibility for ensuring they are controlled well.   
The central nature of the public limited firm in the United Kingdom is that 
its shareholders are separate from those who have effective control of the firm's 
managers. Berle and Means (1932) first observed this characteristic among US 
corporations. The separation of shareholders and decision control is therefore 
the main reason for CG in any country. Further, the Cadbury Report (1992) 
identifies shareholders in general meetings as senior corporate members, who 
will also determine the composition of boards in general meetings. Directors 
exercise the powers and responsibilities granted to them by shareholders at 
board meetings. The shareholders’ rights theory offers a useful framework for 
analyzing the nature of public corporations. According to Ricketts (1994), 
shareholders’ rights can be private, communal, collective, exchangeable and 
exclusive. The structure and form of shareholders’ rights influence their 
behaviour and the efficiency of the exchange process.    
3.3.6 Culture 
It is worth noting that mere compliance with applicable laws, rules, and 
regulations will not guarantee effective corporate governance, since those 
measures cannot change the culture within an organization.  Thus, companies 
should integrate the best practices suggested by investor activists and 
professional organizations into their corporate governance structure. Hence the 
company should be aware to the significance of changing the culture by 
increase the impetus of employees to report violations to management. This 
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may require the firm to make everything cleared to each one in the organization 
in terms of his roles, duties and responsibilities by setting an efficient evaluation 
and remuneration policies. This suggests that effective corporate governance 
can only be achieved when all participants add value to the company’s 
sustainable long-term performance which makes them more accountable and 
personally responsible for their performance. This will enhance the firms’ 
performance and thereby value. This could be accomplished when all staff   
effectively carries out their fiduciary duty and professional responsibilities which 
increases the possibility of avoiding potential conflicts of interest, and acting in 
the best interests of the company and its shareholders. 
 Nowadays, the business atmosphere is identified by a process of 
evolutionary development change including international competition, 
technological improvement and advances in the information revolution, 
globalization of financial markets and legislative changes. In order to meet 
these challenges it requires economic reform and structural and legislative 
modification. Jordan has realized the importance of making relevant changes to 
its capital markets policies to match the standard of corporate governance with 
the global standard. However, may be these standards will not enhance 
companies’ efficiency and may not be applicable to some of MENA countries 
which have relatively weak legal system, a small economy, non efficient stock 
market, Islamic society and tribal families etc, unlike UK and USA which have 
strong legal systems (Gray, 1988) and different culture. Culture is one of the 
environmental factors affecting, for instance, disclosure practices employed by 
firms (Radebaugh and Gray, 1993; Wallace and Gernon, 1991).   
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According to Wallace and Gernon, (1991), an issue that appears in 
research in the field of CG is inability to explore and identify the cultural aspect. 
In fact, there have been calls for studies to look at the specific cultural factor in 
a country to either deny or support the two opposing theories; convergence 
hypothesis versus cultural theory. Moreover, the traditions of a nation are 
appears in its people and as such may help justify why things are as they are.  
Also, Wallace and Gernon (1991) recommended the application of national 
character such as beliefs, attitudes and values to justify differences in the 
accounting practices. The concept of CG may include empirical research on 
disclosure as one of the explanatory variables because it is the board of 
directors that manages information disclosure in annual reports (Gibbins, 
Richardson and Waterhouse, 1992). Furthermore, code of ethics play a key role 
in connecting individual decision-making processes to the social context in 
which they operate (Dietrich and Roberts, 1997, p.26). In fact, best practice of 
good governance is far more than writing a code of ethics or creating an active 
board. Approximately, it is an integral part of the social responsibility of firms 
and their employees. 
Agency Theory provides theoretical underpinnings for many research 
efforts in the disciplines of economics, management, marketing, finance, and 
accounting. It is one of the most influential theories that underlie the bulk of the 
corporate governance and management control research in the Western world 
(Samson, 2004). Agency theory is applicable in relationships that mirror basic 
agency structure of a principal and an agent (Eisenhard, 1989). 
Gray and Jenkins (1993) distinguish between two types of codes of 
practices in CG: while internal codes are formulated to deal with a specific 
relationship, external codes have already been established for general 
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categories of relationship and are imported into specific relationships; therefore, 
external codes tend to appear as implicit, whereas internal codes are more 
explicit. In this context, it is worth emphasizing that the ability of an ethics code 
to resolve agency problems can also be quite limited, in particular, with the 
presence of external sanctions. Thus it is important, when applying the critical 
agency perspective, to keep in mind the limits and the instability of voluntary 
cooperative action (Heath, 2009). 
3.3.7 Commitment 
Greater commitment can improve efficiency and maximize firm 
performance by minimizing agency conflicts (Rhodes & Soobaroyen, 
2010). Agency Theory provides the proper theoretical framework to 
analyze interest alignment among shareholders and top managers. This work 
was developed by Berle and Means (1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
formalized the Agency Theory by analyzing the interactions between the firm 
and the market. People attribute commitment to themselves to maintain some 
coherence between their behaviour and their attitudes. Kline and Peters (1991) 
affirmed that shareholders have a greater commitment occurs because of the 
gap that exists between ownership and control. The control of companies is 
delegated to executive team. Executives should maximise the welfare of 
shareholders, by making decisions which are in the shareholders‟ interest. 
However, the separation of ownership and control may lead to divergence 
between managerial decisions and the interest of shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  To align managerial decisions with the shareholders‟ interest, 
shareholders can provide incentives to motivate executives to align managerial 
decision-making with the interest of shareholders. For instance, shareholders 
will award stock or stock options to executives and directors (Kim et al., 2010). 
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In this case, their wealth will be positively related to firm performance. Thus, 
executives have an incentive to increase firm performance. Also, several 
studies have documented that good CG and corporate commitment lower their 
cost of equity capital then increase shareholder value (Jinhan, 2011; Jamali et 
al., 2008).  Further, Fahi et al. (2005) has highlighted the positive impact of 
employees on firm performance. 
In details, no firm can be successful without executive support and 
commitment. Everything starts with a committed and passionate leader of the 
business organisation: a leader who is really committed to making fundamental 
changes (Thiagarajan & Zairi, 1997). It is crucial that the chairman and the 
board first define their ‘reserved power’ and then learn how to work together 
with the managing director in order to have a balance in the decision-making 
process and to avoid any conflict in the directorial dilemmas though using 
diverse ideas or information (Garratt, 2003). As Carver and Oliver (2002:35) 
point out, “no one in a firm or on a board has any authority or indeed any role at 
all, unless the board grants it”.   
Garratt (2003) argues that ensuring the proper procedures of the board 
are carried out in a timely manner is the duty of the chairman and the firm 
secretary. By having his office in the firm, the chairman can carry out such 
functions more easily and effectively. The chairman’s time commitment is 
significantly greater than that of other directors, whether or not he has an office 
within the firm; his connection is enormously strong with the CEO (Doug, 2003, 
Carter and Lorsch, 2004). 
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No firm can be successful without executive support and commitment. 
According to Zairi (2000): 
“The key drivers for adding optimum value to society and the communities 
in which specific business organisations operate are through having strong 
commitment to corporate and social governance, having an open dialogue with 
external stakeholders and having the determination to achieve environmental 
sustainability.” 
Sustainability is “The ability of an organisation to adapt to change in the 
business environment, to capture contemporary best practice methods and to 
achieve and maintain superior competitive performance” (Zairi and Whymark, 
2003). Thus, this factor focuses on the company’s commitment to stakeholder 
interests. Since stakeholders play an important part in the corporate 
governance system, because they have the power to influence the firm’s 
policies and systems. Alexander (1990) asserted that “companies’ best serve 
their shareholders by taking account of the interests of employees, customers 
and communities”. Charkham (1989b) also asserted that if shareholders are to 
succeed this surely “implies satisfied customers, competent suppliers, and well-
motivated employees”. However, the current literature on CG focuses on the 
interests and behaviour of shareholders and managers and gives little 
commitment and attention to stakeholders. There are two reasons for this 
neglect. The first is the “indeterminacy” argument which holds “confusion will 
reign” if managers are responsible to a large number of interest groups 
(Charkham, 1986b; Parkinson, 1993). The second reason for the neglect of 
stakeholders in the corporate governance debate could be that the concept of 
stakeholder participation has no appeal to shareholders or managers. 
Shareholders will not allow a challenge to their interests. Managers, who suffer 
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interference from shareholders, are unwilling to give other stakeholders the 
power to “impose on corporations binding obligations to workers, communities 
or other constitutions” (Grundfest, 1990). 
In addition, Mitchell and Sikka (1996) stressed that all corporate 
governance reforms need to take into account the fact that companies are 
communities. Wealth generation is the outcome of a cooperative effort involving 
many stakeholders, such as financial capital, human capital and social capital. 
The rights and obligations of all three are a cornerstone for any effective 
governance approach. For that the Companies Act needs to recognise this 
reality. Also, the OECD (2004) indicated that the rights of stakeholders should 
be protected by law. In all OECD countries, the rights of stakeholders are 
established by laws such as labour, business, and commercial and insolvency 
laws or by contractual relations. Even in areas where stakeholder interests are 
not legislated many firms make additional commitments to stakeholders, since 
concern over corporate reputation and corporate performance necessitates the 
recognition of broader interests ( Ammann, et al., 2011, Zurikat ,2013). 
 However, corporate boards and structure arrangements vary widely from 
country to country; they are a product of the local economic and social 
environment (Hampel, 1998). For instance, in the US, shareholders have a 
major influence in the running of the firm they own while workers have much 
less influence. On the other hand, in Germany, for example, the representatives 
of unions serve on supervisory boards; the companies’ principal bankers also 
have plenty of influence in the strategic decisions of management. Moreover, 
until a few years ago, shareholders in Japan played almost no role except that 
to provide capital; managers had been left alone to guide the firms as they saw 
fit, namely, for the benefit of employees of allied companies, as much as for 
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shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2001). It is important to note that no system 
can be understood without considering the features of the society because each 
country’s system is affected by its social, political, and economic history.   
In summary, the CG system committed to protects the rights of other 
stakeholders, such as bondholders, customers, suppliers, and employees. The 
CG system also encourages active cooperation between the corporation and 
stakeholders which will improve the performance of the corporate governance 
and the market (Ammann, et al., 2011). 
3.3.8 Communication 
The communication level is another critical factor for a sound governance 
system since corporate information that is available to outsiders alleviates 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. Previous literature 
documented that more disclosure reduces agency problems, and, in turn, 
increases firm value (Baek et al., 2009; Botosan and Harris, 2000; Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002). 
 High quality of disclosure will help companies achieve a better 
performance in the market (Koh et al., 2007; Jia0, 2011). Koh et al., (2007) 
emphasise that a high quality of disclosure will help companies achieve a better 
performance in the market. Corporate shareholders rely on corporate disclosure 
to evaluate the performance of corporate executives. Improving managerial 
transparency is one purpose of the corporate governance mechanism (Chen et 
al., 2007a). Nelson (2005) shows that a greater quality of corporate governance 
positively affects firm performance. A good corporate governance mechanism 
will motivate corporate executives to better fulfil their duty. An optimal corporate 
governance mechanism imposes appropriate performance pressure on 
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company managerial teams, to ensure that managerial activities are aligned 
with the interests of the corporate shareholders. If there is an appropriate 
alignment, executives of the companies will have more incentive to increase 
firm performance. Thus, a high quality of corporate disclosure will increase the 
confidence of market investors, since it reduces information asymmetry and 
market uncertainty. Effective corporate internal auditing will detect managerial 
wrongdoing and deter the executives from involving themselves in self-
interested activity. For instance, using an independent audit committee will 
enhance firm performance (Koh et al., 2007).A high quality of disclosure and an 
effective managerial team will help companies achieve a better performance in 
the market. The high accuracy and transparency of corporate disclosure is one 
objective of a good corporate governance mechanism, for it facilitates corporate 
shareholders to protect their rights (OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004). 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) also indicated: “Increased and improved 
disclosure is likely to reduce agency costs as better information flows from the 
firm to the shareholders, which in turn reduces information asymmetry” (2004, p 
120).  
Corporate governance mechanisms consist of stockholder rights, 
disclosure and transparency, responsibilities of BOD’s, board committees and 
conflict of interest, (OECD, 2004);Wong, 2009; Wanyama, Burton et al., 2009; 
McGee, 2008; Black, Carvalho et al., 2008; Gupta, 2008; Okike, 2007; Chong & 
Lopez-de-Si lanes The OECD (2004, p.49) stated: 
“A strong disclosure regime that promotes real transparency is a pivotal 
feature of market-based monitoring of companies and is central to shareholders' 
ability to exercise their ownership rights on an informed basis. Experience in 
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countries with large and active equity markets shows that disclosure can also 
be a powerful tool for influencing the behaviour of companies and for protecting 
investors.” 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Easley and O’Hara (2004) observe 
that private information is priced in securities as a source of risk, thereby 
implying a negative relationship between disclosure quality and information risk. 
Agency theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy and Palepu, 2001) point 
out analysts’ role as external monitors for management and imply a negative 
association between analysts’ monitoring costs and disclosure quality. This 
explanation implies a positive relationship between disclosure rankings and 
firms’ future operating performance.  As increased transparency of disclosure 
will help the investors to monitor the listed companies effectively and protect 
their rights.  
In details, transparency and disclosure are rated as important elements in 
the corporate governance system. Thus information to shareholders is one of 
the most important aspects of CG, because it reflects the degree of 
transparency and disclosure of the firm towards its shareholders. Disclosure is 
making something known or revealing something (Williams, 2005; Bandsuch et 
al., 2008). The OECD (2004, p.49) stated: 
“A strong disclosure regime can help to attract capital and maintain 
confidence in the capital market”. 
From the above quotation it seems that disclosure is very important, 
especially in MENA countries including Jordan, because it attracts new capital. 
Shareholders and possible investors require access to regular, reliable and 
comparable information in sufficient detail in order for them to be able to assess 
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the stewardship of management. Furthermore, disclosure helps companies 
improve public understanding of their structure and activities, corporate policies 
and performance with respect to environmental and ethical standards, and 
companies' relationships with the communities in which they operate. This will 
help investors in their investment decisions (OECD, 2004). So, a strong 
disclosure regime will help in establishing an effective CG system. In line with 
the OECD, Solomon and Solomon (2004) stated that an increase in corporate 
transparency is a major initiative of CG reform in any country, as emphasised in 
the Cadbury Report: 
“The lifeblood of markets is information and barriers to the flow of 
relevant information represent imperfections in the market ... The more the 
activities of companies are transparent, the more accurately will their securities 
be valued” (1992, p.33). 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) also indicated: 
“Increased and improved disclosure is likely to reduce agency costs as 
better information flows from the firm to the shareholders, which in turn reduces 
information asymmetry” (2004, p 120). 
The OECD (2004) pointed out that transparency would include disclosure 
of quantitative and qualitative matters concerning employees and other 
stakeholders in the corporation, governance structures and policies, corporate 
targets and prospects, and execution of unusual and complex transactions, 
transactions on derivative products and their level of risk. In summary, a CG 
system should provide disclosure and communication of key facts about a firm 
ranging from financial details to governance structures. 
 
CH-3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
98 
Furthermore, a number of studies have examined the influence of different 
characteristics on annual reports disclosures. These characteristics include 
culture, size, industry and profitability (Street et al., 2000; Wallace et al., 1994).  
Easley and O’ Hara (2004) declared that investors required a higher return to 
hold stocks with higher information. They found that one significant implication 
of their theoretical model is that companies can affect their cost of capital by 
their choice of accounting standards. 
Another issue in communication factor is role of the board chairman to 
contribute in planning the agenda of the board’s meeting. Boards have a limited 
number of meetings (Renton and Watkinson, 2001). According to Renton and 
Watkinson (2001) the board members control and rule the board meetings, 
while the chairman has the duty of planning, preparing for and managing the 
meetings of the board of directors. Carver and Oliver (2002) argued that the 
board of directors wishes to rule itself initially. Actually, the board’s agendas 
should be placed by the board of directors. Consequently, it is unreasonable 
that the chief executive officer governs the board’s agenda. The CEO can 
include some items that he desires to discuss in the board’s meetings. 
Accordingly, several studies examined the significance of the chairman of the 
board in having an effective board and directors have other duties and 
responsibilities. At the present time, practitioners and scholars highlight on the 
importance of evaluating the board of directors individually as well as evaluating 








CG reforms including guidelines, codes and laws have been established 
to protect shareholders’ rights and restore investors’ confidence in the capital 
market. From the agency theory perspective, these reforms have largely 
contributed to the evolution of a number of CG mechanisms that aim to mitigate 
the agency conflicts resulting from the separation between ownership and 
control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Dey, 2008). These reforms adopts 
shareholder value as an overall objective, accordingly, theses reforms mitigates 
the agency conflicts between managers and  shareholders, aligns their interests 
and creates shareholder value ((McLaren, 2005; Crowther, 2003).   
In details, according to OECD (2004) members of the board and key 
executives should be required to disclose to the board whether they, directly, 
indirectly or on behalf of third parties, have a material interest in any transaction 
or matter directly affecting the corporation. Abusive self-dealing occurs when 
persons having close relationships to the company, including controlling 
shareholders, exploit those relationships to the detriment of the company and 
investors. As insider trading entails manipulation of the capital markets, it is 
prohibited by securities regulations, company law and/or criminal law in most 
OECD countries. However, not all jurisdictions prohibit such practices, and in 
some cases enforcement is not vigorous. These practices can be seen as 
constituting a breach best practice of good corporate governance as they 
violate the principle of equitable treatment of shareholders. The Principles 
reaffirm that it is reasonable for investors to expect that the abuse of insider 
power be prohibited. In cases where such abuses are not specifically forbidden 
by legislation or where enforcement is not effective, it will be important for 
governments to take measures to remove any such gaps. 
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According to Fama and Jensen (1983), NEDs act as referees in conflicts 
between shareholders and managers. Parkinson (1993) indicated that NEDs 
have the ability to evaluate management's performance. The Cadbury Report 
(1992) identified two particularly important contributions of NEDs to firm 
governance namely, reviewing the performance of the board and of the 
executives and taking the lead where potential conflicts of interest arise. If 
executive directors occupy a large number of board seats, they will control the 
board and their ability to protect shareholders’ interests is compromised 
(Davidson et al., 1996). Vance (1983, cited in Monks and Minow, 2001) stated:  
“Corporate apologists and critics alike agree, at least in theory, that if 
outside directors command a powerful majority in the boardroom, they will be 
better able to check the tendency of those in top management to abuse their 
position of power”. The idea from the above argument is that if independent 
NEDs control a majority on boards this will help to prevent managerial abuse 
and protect shareholders' interests. 
Another issue includes directors’ involvement in defining the firm’s 
business concept, developing a firm mission and recommend services activities 
which include representing the firm’s interest in the community, linking the firm 
with the external environment, presiding over shareholders’ meetings, and 
participating in firm functions (Judge and Zeithaml, 1992; Pearce and Zahra, 
1992; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). The board's engagement in developing human 
resources management, product quality, and customer satisfaction are all an 
engagement in strategy formulation. A UK firm survey in 1993 showed that 
‘customer satisfaction’ and ‘delivering quality’ are at the top of the list of 
chairmen’s responses (Coulson, 1993). 
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Beyond acquiring resources representing stakeholders’ interests, 
Mintzberg (1983), Pearce and Zahra (1992) and Goodstein et al., (1994) 
showed that the strategic role of the board involves taking important decisions 
on strategic changes that help the organisation to adopt important 
environmental changes.  
3.3.10 Conscience 
Effective corporate governance is likely to encourage more corporate 
social responsibility (CSR), which in turn is expected to improve stock prices.  
Thus, effective corporate governance is more tending to enhance shareholder 
value through encouraging better CSR (Jizi, 2013). The economic 
consequences of CSR imply that CSR is an investment rather than an expense 
which in turn maximise shareholder value (Jizi, 2013). Managers are agents of 
the stockholders and should therefore give priority to serving them by 
maximizing financial gains. Managers must seek to maximize shareholders 
value and they should not engage in any acts that may lead to its reduction. In 
its simplest form, they argue that managers should do whatever is legal in order 
to maximize shareholder value. Therefore, CSR can become a very useful tool 
to maximize shareholders value (Devinney et al., 2013). According to Lantos 
(2001) CSR is ‘social contract’ between a firm and society, therefore better 
understanding of CSR will encourage firms to create a strategy to enhance 
overall business performance, CSR has also been described as a tool to build 
good corporate reputation.(Lewis ,2003 ; Porter, 2003). More scholars assert 
that CSR Maintaining and increasing profitability (Goyder, 2003; Hopkins, 
2003). CSR enhance efficiency and firm performance for shareholders by acting 
as a monitoring mechanism to reduce agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders (Reverte, 2009; Raelin & Bondy, 2013:420). Thus CSR can 
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ultimately help achieve and/or enhance profitability (Wan, 2003; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997).   
In details, in 1998 after the Asian financial crisis, the World Bank and the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)  started to 
encourage countries to apply the concept of CG by encouraging international 
conferences and seminars which were not only limited to Asian countries but 
also to other countries such as the USA and  European countries  attended 
them. In addition, over the last five years a series of international conferences 
have been held under the title “The Asian CG Roundtable” to exercise 
procedures to attain better management in different aspects in Asian countries. 
From the definition of CG, it can be said that CG is the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities between a number of participants in the corporation, like the 
board of directors, shareholders, managers and other stakeholders, in setting 
rules and procedures for making corporate decisions.   
One of the important responsibilities of the board's chairman is to ensure 
the board’s effectiveness. This includes leading the board in thinking through its 
role and design (Carter and Lorsch, 2004). An effective chairman can make an 
enormous difference to the board’s performance. The chairman's time 
commitment is significantly greater than that of other directors. He must not only 
prepare for and attend the board and committee meetings, but also have the 
time to interact with the chief executive, to meet with other staff and directors, 
and to carry out important external relationships (Doug, 2003).This relationship 
may include participation in the community development, sponsoring 
educational program and involving in charitable contribution. The next section is 
devoted to theories of CG.  




This chapter has provided many useful insights into the critical factors of 
corporate governance based on the framework developed by European Centre 
for Best Practice Management (ECBPM). Furthermore, it has reviewed 
empirical studies on each of the critical factors of corporate governance in both 
developed and developing countries. Although the survey of the literature has 
shown that a large number of studies have examined the subject of CG in the 
context of developed and developing countries, there is no evidence that this 
subject has been examined in Jordan.  
Furthermore, agency theory is the main framework for the current study. A 
review of Corporate Governance theories has provided many useful insights 
into the introduction of Corporate Governance. Furthermore, a theoretical 
framework of corporate governance therefore, will attempt to bridge the gap in 
the literature relating to the corporate governance system in Jordan through a 
systematic investigation on critical factors of corporate governance in Jordanian 
firms. There is no evidence that this subject has been examined in Jordan. The 
next chapter is devoted to the research methodology of the study. 
 




4 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction
This chapter addresses methodological issues according to social science 
research guidelines. These issues guided the current study to examine the 
subject of corporate governance in Jordanian firms. This chapter begins with 
highlighting the research objectives and research questions, then data 
collection method. In order to answer the research question, this study 
employed a mix of quantitative methodology of a questionnaire survey and 
qualitative methodology of semi-structured interviews. 
 Data collection in the current study is divided into three stages. First, 
review of previous literatures which have addressed corporate governance in 
many developed and developing countries. Second, questionnaire was 
designed to collect data regarding determinant of current corporate governance 
practices, implementing them in Jordan. Last, this study employed semi-
structured interviews to provide a more depth overview of the current state of 
corporate governance in Jordan. 
4.2 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this research is to provide a comprehensive study of 
the determinants of current practice of corporate governance in Jordanian 
companies. In detail, the research objectives will be as follows: 
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 To identify the determinants of critical factors for implementing best 
practice of corporate governance in Jordan. 
 To explore the current practice of corporate governance system in 
Jordan. 
 To identify the factors that inhibit the best practice of corporate 
governance in Jordan. 
 To empirically examine the effects of corporate governance on firm 
performance (financial measures) in Jordan. 
 To explore the participants' perceptions regarding the effect of corporate 
governance on firms’ performance in Jordan.  
 To investigate the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm’s characteristics (Firm size, Firm age and sector) in Jordan. 
 
4.3  Research Paradigm 
Saunders et al. (2007) give this definition: “A paradigm is a way of 
examining social phenomena from which a particular understanding of these 
phenomena can be gained and explanations attempted.” According to Hussey 
and Hussey (2003), research paradigm can be defined as the philosophies and 
assumptions people have about the development of knowledge. These 
philosophies direct the study investigation. They influence the manner the study 
is conducted, how the data is gathered and analyzed and how the conclusions 
are explained (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Apparently, there is no agreement in 
the literature on the number of available paradigms. For instance, Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) stated that there are four paradigms. These are: constructivism, 
critical theory, positivism and postpositivism. Later, they recommended a fifth 
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paradigm called participatory (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). In contrast, Saunders 
et al. (2003) declared that there are three main methods of the epistemological 
perspective. These are: positivism, interpretivism, and realism.  Formally, there 
are two main paradigms prevailing in the literature. These are: interpretivism 
and positivism (Burns, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Hussey and Hussey, 
2003). Moreover; many terms are employed to explain these two paradigms as 
shown in Table 4.1. 
  Table 4-1 4:Alternative terms for the major research paradigms. 
 
Source: Hussey and Hussey, 2003, p. 47. 
This study followed primarily a positivist approach. Nevertheless, the 
positivist approach does not permit the researcher to change direction as data 
gathering has started and it does not give a deep understanding of social 
processes, therefore an interpretive approach will be adopted in this study. 
Hammersley (1999) stated that a quantitative approach to research can 
produce acceptable and reliable findings. This study is therefore used 
triangulation approach to give better understanding of the findings and results. 
4.3.1 Positivist Approach 
In broad terms, positivism believes in one reality. The researcher is 
independent and neither affects nor is affected by whatever is being observed 
or studied. S/he formulates objective explanation in a value-free way (Saunders 
et al., 2003). According to Hughes (1996), a positivist paradigm is used by 
researchers which depend on quantitative methodology. In positivism, the world 






CH-4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
107 
which it is the business of science to discover (Hughes, 1996). The phrase 
"positivism" had been created in the nineteenth century by August Comte, and 
the ideas related with it were very important at that time (Hammersley, 1995).  
This study will employ this approach to answer the main research question 
about the current practice of corporate governance in Jordanian firms. This 
approach allows the researcher to gather huge amount of comparable data. The 
researcher plans to compare the results obtained from the research with 
literature reviewed earlier. 
4.3.2  Interpretive Approach 
As for the current study, qualitative methodology will be employed to 
provide   a broader overview of the current state of corporate governance in 
Jordan. This will help mainly to answer the research question (RQ-2) asked 
“What is the current state of corporate governance system in Jordan?”  Hughes 
(1996) shows that the main concern in data collection process is to be aware of 
whether the meaning of the items intended by the researcher is equivalent to 
that understood by the respondent (p.115).The researcher has to know that 
terminology is simply understood by participants and has the identical meaning 
as  planned , particularly, when a questionnaire is designed. Interestingly, 
Hughes pointed out that the interpretive approach can permit the researcher to 
gain more in-depth data and knowledge on the topic (1996). Moreover, it 
permits the researcher to attain more data and knowledge on the subject. Also, 
it perceives subjective but multiple realities. The researcher engagement with 
what is being studied or observed has an influence on him/her and on the 
situation being observed or studied (Hussey and Hussey, 2003). Briefly, 
Positivist and Interpretive Approach depend on a number of assumptions. 
These are summarized in Table 4. 2. 
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Generally, it is hard to classify a business research under one definite 
paradigm. The majority of business research merges both paradigms (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2003; Hussey and Hussey, 2003). This is 
the case in corporate governance research too. After examining literature, there 
is no one true manner to approach a study in this field. Such projects cannot be 
described as adopting either positivist or interpretivist paradigm. Generally, 
doctoral research uses a hybrid approach that merges both techniques. This 
practice is known as triangulation.   
Table 4-2: The main assumptions of the positivist and interpretivist paradigms 






Develop ideas through 
induction from data 




Multiple methods are used to 
establish different views of 
phenomena 





selected for specific reasons 
Large number 
randomly 
Relationship of the 
researcher to that 
researched 
Focus on meanings 
understand what is 
happening 
Focus on facts 
look for causality 
Role of values Biased Unbiased 
Epistemological 
Relationship of the 
researcher to that 
researched 
Interacts  
Focus on meanings 
Understand what is 
happening 
Independent  
Focus on facts 
Look for causality 
Ontological  
Nature of reality 
Subjective 
Multiple 
As seen by the researcher  
Objective 
Singular 
Apart from the researcher 
Source: adapted from Hussey and Hussey, 2003, p. 48, and Easterby-Smith, 2002, p. 27. 
 
4.4 Triangulation 
“Triangulation refers to the use of different data collection methods within one 
study in order to ensure that the data are telling you what you think they are 
telling you” (Saunders et al., 2000:98) .Hussey and Hussey describes 
triangulation as “the use of different research approaches, methods and 
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techniques in the same study” (2003, p. 74). There are many kinds of 
triangulation according to Denzin (1978), Easterby-Smith et al., Thorp and Lowe 
(1991), Hussey and Hussey (1997) and Seal (1999), including: 
1. Data triangulation: (in which data is gathered at different points in time and 
from various sources of data. e.g. quantitative and qualitative, primary and 
secondary…)   
2. Method triangulation (employing more than one method of data collection. 
e.g. questionnaires, interviews, archive, observations ...), this kind of 
triangulation is the most generally used. 
3. Design triangulation (merging different research design e.g. exploratory, 
descriptive and analytical, inductive and deductive, quantitative and 
qualitative …) 
4. Theory triangulation (in which a theory is borrowed from one field and 
utilized to clarify a phenomenon in a different field). 
5. Investigator triangulation: in which many researchers separately collect 
data on the same phenomenon and compare their differences and 
similarities. Certainly, this will minimise personal bias. 
Nowadays, the adoption of the triangulation approach is not only possible, 
but also recommended (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2003).  
There are various benefits for employing a triangulation approach. For instance, 
Creswell (2003) argues that a combined design is advantageous to better 
understanding of the concept being examined. Further, Easterby-Smith et al., 
(2002) argue that a mixed research techniques avoid the research from 
becoming method-bound. Thus, each strategy removes the method-effect of the 
other (Saunders et al., 2003). This will increase the validity and reliability than a 
single strategy by offering more ways of creating evidence in support of main 
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arguments (DenZin, 1978; Hussey and Hussey, 2003), and in turn, gives extra 
confidence in the outcomes of the study (Saunders et al., 2003) .However, the 
triangulation strategy itself is not free from disadvantages. Table 4.3 illustrates 
the advantages and disadvantages of triangulation strategy. 
Table 4: Advantages and disadvantages of a mixed approach strategy 
Advantages 
Words add meaning to numbers, while numbers add accuracy to words. 
Answer a broader and more range of research questions. 
The outcomes of one phase can be employed to develop the next phase of the study 
Offer stronger evidence for results achieved. 
Add more insights and understanding to the concepts being examined. 
Increase the generalisability of the results.  
disadvantages 
More expensive and time consuming. 
The researcher has to know about multiple methods and strategies and how to 
combine them. 
Might require a research team rather than a single researcher.  
Source: Johnson and Christense, 2007. 
The selection of appropriate data collection depends on the topic and 
research questions. Remenyi (1998) clarify that the area to be investigated and 
research questions are the key drivers in the selection of research 
methodology. Furthermore, Robson (1993) indicates that if the methods are not 
given answers to the research questions, it is a warning to amend something. 
For that reason, the researcher should guarantee while choosing data collection 
methods that the data collected are answering the research questions. Hence, 
methods will rely on what the researcher is trying to answer. 
Based on the above argument and according to the aims of this study the 
researcher employed multi-method combining quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to give more advantages for the study. One of the advantages is 
that it enables triangulation to take place.  A triangulation strategy is adopted in 
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terms of data collection methods and types of data to be collected as illustrated 
in Table 4.3. This decision is made for the following reasons: 
1. To achieve the possible benefits of the triangulation strategy listed in 
Table 4.3. 
2. To improve the reliability of the outcomes of the study.   
3. To increase confidence in the achieved findings. 
4. To cancel out the method effect, since the results attained from different 
methods converge. Thus, the researcher will mix quantitative and 
qualitative methods throughout the different stages of the research and 
results from the different methods be compared to see how far they are 
consistent.   
Table 4-3: Elements of research methodology in the current study 
Methodology elements Triangulation 
  
Data collection methods Interviews 
Questionnaire 
Type of data Primary and secondary 
 
  
4.5 Population, Sample and Participants 
4.5.1 Population 
It is important in any sample based research to identify the population 
being surveyed to guarantee that the sample chosen gives a precise 
representation of the population (Thomas, 1996).  The target population of the 
current study includes both the industry and service sectors of non financial 
firms listed at Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) at the end of 2011.Table 4.5 
shows the total number of both the industry and service sectors of non financial 
firms which are listed at the end of 2011.  
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Table 4-4: Number of companies in each sector for the total population of 
Companies listed on ASE 






The current study focuses on the industry and service sectors of non 
financial firms listed at Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) at the end of 2011. The 
firms from the financial sector (for instance, banks, insurances etc) were 
excluded from the study, as these firms have their own regulated agency with 
their own code of CG, which are very different from the rest of the firms listed in 
Amman Stock Exchange. According to the Directory of Jordanian Corporations, 
CD-ROM issued by the Amman Stock Exchange, the total number of the 
manufacturing and services sectors of non financial firms listed at the end of 
2011 is 201.  Thus, census was undertaking as the sample was in fact the 
population of all eligible firms and a questionnaire was distributed to each of 
them, in total 201 firms. 
4.5.3 Participants 
Senior managers are the key stakeholders in an organisation who are 
aware of CG in any of the listed firms. Hence, to select the participants for the 
present research, a purposive sampling strategy was employed. In the case of 
the questionnaire survey in this study, all the participants were the senior 
managers of non financial firms listed in the Amman stock exchange.  
It is assumed that senior managers will conduct the actions necessary to 
achieve the firm’s goals. Senior managers know what the final results should 
be. This might motivate managers to perform to their best ability (Letza, 1996). 
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The reason for selecting senior managers is to choose the participants who are 
the most knowledgeable, in terms of the issue being studied. This, in turn, helps 
in achieving the research objectives and answering the research questions.  
4.6 Research Methods and Data 
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005) state that research methods refer to the 
methods employed to collect data. There are various methods that can be 
employed to gather data. For instance: questionnaire, interviews, analysing 
documents, observations, etc. In the present research, a data triangulation 
strategy (a combination of methods) is adopted. The methods are: semi –
structured interviews and a questionnaire. These methods are discussed in the 
following subsections.  
4.6.1 Questionnaire Survey 
According to Bryman (2004, p.109) “social surveys are likely to be 
particularly appropriate where larger scale issues are concerned” .To collect 
data on the manner firms, a questionnaire was designed with the aim of 
obtaining data about the determinants of critical factors for implementing best 
practice of corporate governance in Jordan and the factors that inhibits the best 
practice of corporate governance in Jordan.  
4.6.1.1 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was designed bearing in mind the appropriateness of 
the content of questions, sophistication of the language used, the type of 
questions asked and the sequencing of questions in the questionnaire. 
Questions were designed carefully in order to be easily understood and 
answered accurately and clearly, and the vocabulary used must be 
comprehensible to all participants. The design and structure of the 
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questionnaire is very important, it has a strong correlation to the response rate 
achieved.   
The questionnaire design followed guidance in Gillham (2000) and De 
Vaus (2001). In order to simplify the procedure of collecting and analyzing the 
data, the questions for the questionnaire in the survey were set as closed 
questions.  As Sekaran argues: 
“Closed questions help the participants to make quick decisions to 
choose among the several alternatives before them. They help the 
researcher to code the information easily for subsequent analysis” 
(2003:239.).  
 
Questions aimed to be obvious, consistently understood, meaningful, 
related and closely defined.  More of a hard mission than may it appear at the 
beginning. Additionally, the questionnaire needs to elicit rich and pertinent 
information. In the design of the questionnaire, awareness was given to the 
steps explained by Bourque and Fielder (1995), who recommended that in 
order to assist participants’ answer the questionnaire without need for help, 
questions ought to be as simple as possible, short and precise. This applies to 
the instructions given as well. The questionnaire benefited from 
recommendations by the European Centre for Best Practice Management 
(ECBPM) and insights attained from the pilot interviews as well as a thorough 
review of the related literature in the corporate governance fields. 
The questionnaire comprised 61 questions split into various sections. 
Each section collected a specific kind of data. All scales were standardized to a 
seven-point Likert scale, with 1 to 7, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 
3=moderately disagree 4=neutral, 5=moderately agree, 6= agree, 7=strongly 
agree. This is in order to keep consistency and facilitate the analysis of data.  
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Before distributing the questionnaire, it was evaluated by professionals 
and academic experts since the questionnaire had to be written in a suitable 
and understandable style. Questions and wording were amended based on 
their comments. This issue is discussed in the following sections.  
4.6.1.2 Question Wording 
The wording of an individual question will influence the sort of answer 
extracted. Therefore, in designing the questionnaire unclear questions were 
removed. 
4.6.1.3 Translation and Pre Testing 
Pre-testing a questionnaire is a very important step in ensuring its validity 
and reliability. Thomas (1996) ;( Bryman, 2004) ;( Hussey and Hessey 1999); 
Gilllham (2000) Oppenheim (1992, p.26) noted: 
“Pilot work can be of the greatest help in devising the actual wording 
of questions, and it operates as a healthy check”. 
  
Pre-testing of this questionnaire was crucial because most of the corporate 
governance literature is written in the English language but Arabic is the 
common language in Jordan and there was a probability that some of the 
participants were not well versed in English. The first draft of the questionnaire 
was prepared in English and then translated into the Arabic language. Each 
participant was sent two copies of the questionnaire, one of the Arabic version 
and the other in the English version. Participants were given the option to 
answer whichever versions they prefer.  
To ensure a high response rate and to check the questionnaire’s validity 
and reliability for the current study, it went through several developmental steps 
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prior to final circulation. In the first stage, a draft of the questionnaire was 
prepared by writing down all questions based on the literature review and other 
questionnaires employed in previous studies. Once completed, this draft of the 
English version was evaluated by Faculty Staff of the Accounting and Finance 
department of the University of Bradford and a number of PhD students in the 
department to extract their comments on the phrasing, sequence and 
composition of the questionnaire. A draft was also sent to ten academics in 
Jordanian universities (all having a PhD in accounting and finance from the UK 
and the USA). The items of the questionnaire were mapped against the 
research questions and objectives. Redundant questions were removed. Typing 
mistakes, grammatical errors and unclear terms were dealt with appropriately. 
The length of the questionnaire was kept as short as possible. The design of the 
questionnaire was adapted to assure its attractiveness. As a result of pre-
testing, a second draft of the English version was prepared. 
The second draft of the questionnaire was then piloted by a group of 
referees.  According to their recommendations, many changes were made, 
some questions were removed, some questions were added and minor 
modifications were made to some questions and the introductory paragraph. A 
third draft of the English version was developed. The new draft of the English 
version was pre-tested by senior managers from seven different Jordanian 
firms.  The managers in Jordanian firms were asked to complete the 
questionnaire and comment on the content of the questions, clarity, their 
coverage, layout, and the required time to fill the questionnaire. In general, all of 
them affirmed that the questionnaire was well prepared. At the end of this phase 
the final draft of the English version was developed. 
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The fourth draft of the English version was translated from English into 
Arabic with expert assist. This created the first draft of the Arabic version. The 
translation was delivered to Faculty staff of Yarmouk University (all of them 
having a PhD in accounting and finance from the UK and USA) to confirm the 
meaning in Arabic. Simultaneously, a draft copy was delivered to a language 
expert in Arabic to confirm the meaning and grammar and to review it for any 
residual errors. Changes to the translation were made based on the referees 
suggestions. Finally, the amended Arabic questionnaire was pre-tested with 
eight managers in Jordanian firms. All managers were able to finish the 
questionnaire in less than 25 minutes. No problems were encountered during 
the pre testing process. 
In short, piloting the questionnaire was a lengthy process. It was 
conducted over many stages. As mentioned in the previous sections of 
sampling and data collection, many experts in the field of finance and CG 
participated in this process. Changes were made to both versions of the 
questionnaire according to their suggestions and recommendations; the Arabic 
and the English version. At this point, the scholar was confident about the 
validity of the questionnaire, and that it could be used to collect the data for the 
present research. 
4.6.1.4 Distributing the Questionnaire  
The preliminary field work, such as contacting companies started during the 
period September to October 2011. Through the social network of the 
researcher a senior director in Securities Exchange Commission, who is directly 
involved with corporate governance issues in Jordan, was approached. He gave 
the contacts of participants as well as reference letters so that the participants 
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will be willing to support the researcher in collecting data. With the help of this 
person, the participants were contacted by phone.  
The purpose of contacting them was for the following reasons:  
1. Motivate the participants to participate. 
2. Give the participants an idea about the research and its objectives. 
3. Allow the participants know when to expect the questionnaire and how. 
4. Provide the participants with a general idea about the confidentiality of the 
research. 
5. Introduce the researcher to the participants. 
A research assistant was employed to help in distributing and collecting 
back the questionnaires. The actual distribution of the questionnaires started on 
7/10/2012 and was completed in 5 days. This was possible to do in such a short 
period of time, as all the company’s headquarters are based in Amman, the 
capital city of Jordan.  A total number of 201 questionnaires were delivered to 
the participants. To reduce the problem of low response rate, all questionnaires 
were delivered by hand to each participant. Additionally, the questionnaire was 
accompanied by two covering letters. One was from the researcher, a second 
letter supporting the study was provided by Yarmouk University asking for 
participants’ cooperation. By 13/12/2012, a total number of 112 questionnaires 
were collected. Once checked, 8 questionnaires were not included in the study 
because of the incomplete responses. The remaining 104 questionnaires were 
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On 16/12/2012, the non-participants were contacted by phone for the 
following reasons: 
1. Remind them about the questionnaire and motivate them to complete it. 
2. Notify them about another copy of the questionnaire that would be 
delivered to them within a week from this phone call. 
 A week later, the second copy of the questionnaire was delivered to 
the non-responding firms. At mid of January a total number of thirteen 
questionnaires were collected back. Only nine of them were usable. The 
number of the usable and non-usable questionnaires illustrates in Table 4.6. 
 Table 4-5: Number of the usable and non-usable questionnaires. 
Batch Collected Usable Non-usable 
First 112 104 8 
Second 13 9 4 
Total 125 113 12 
 
A total number of 125 questionnaires were collected back as illustrated in 
Table 5.6. As a result, a high response rate of 62% was achieved.  However, 
only 113 of the collected questionnaires are usable for analysis. The remaining 
12 were discarded as the returned questionnaires were incomplete due to the 
lack of seriousness of the participants. 
4.6.2 The Interview Method 
 Semi-structured interview was adopted to gather data from interviewees 
from Jordanian firms and extend the findings of the quantitative study. An 
interview is the action including personal contact between two sides, namely, 
the respondent and the interviewer (Nigel and Harrocks , 2010) .It can be 
conducted via phone, face to face, or any other communication device (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2006). Steinar (2007) stated that interviews can obtain what a 
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person thinks, knows and likes. As a way of obtaining information it is not 
restricted to use with a specific research methodology. While surveys 
conducted through interview are generally expensive and may decrease the 
ability to keep anonymity, which can be very important when sensitive problems 
are being investigated. On the other hand, they are sometimes favourable to 
questionnaire surveys because of the role the interviewer can engage in 
directing the questioning, ensuring respondent participation, explaining the 
meaning of answers and answering the respondent’s questions. 
Furthermore, the interview permits the researcher to control the interview 
conditions, yields in a higher response rate than the questionnaire, and the 
interviewer can explore for further data. In general, the interview is favourable 
when asking complex and longer questions (Oppenheim, 1992; DeVaus, 
1996;Steinar (2007); Nachmias and Nachmias, 2008; Nigel and Horrocks, 
2010). 
Normally, there are four categories of personal interviews, namely, 
structured, semi-structured, unstructured and focus group interviews (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). In the structured interview, questions are close-ended and the 
order in which they are asked is similar in every interview. The questions to be 
asked are standardized and pre-determined for all interviews. The interviewer 
reads the questions and records the answers on a standardised answer sheet. 
This kind of interview is not flexible but easy to analyse and more objective. 
Sekaran (1992, p.192) explained this kind of interview as follows: 
“Structured interviews are those conducted by the interviewer when he or 
she knows exactly what information is needed and has a predetermined list of 
questions that will be posed to participants”. 
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The semi-structured interview follows a less rigid format, which merges 
characteristics from   a structured interview and an unstructured interview. It lies 
between both kinds (Cooper and Schindler, 2006). In a semi-structured 
interview, standardised questions are included, there are also open-ended 
questions intended to obtain more qualitative data (Steinar, 2007). According to 
Hussey and Hussey (1999) the advantage of semi-structured interviews 
appears in the process of “open discovery”, when the topics explored change 
from one interview to a new one as different aspects of the topic are discovered. 
In an unstructured interview, there are no prearranged questions.  
Generally, the interviewer has a general idea about the topic of the interview. 
His goal is to explore an issue in more depth (Saunder, et al., 2003). Often, the 
unstructured interview is called the “informal conversational interview” (Steinar, 
2007). It offers the highest flexibility with which to follow information in whatever 
direction seems to be suitable. Usually, it allows interviewees to answer 
questions within their personal background and provides the interviewee the 
chance to talk about the topic. Sekaran (1992, p.190) stated: 
“The type and nature of the questions asked of the individuals might vary 
according to the job level and type of work done by participants”. 
 
The focus group interview is an interview with a small group of people on a 
particular issue. It permits researchers to concentrate on group norms and 
dynamics about topic they want to examine. The degree of control of the group 
discussion will decide the nature of the information created by this technique. 
According to Sekaran (1992, p.218): 
“Focus groups typically consist of eight to twelve members randomly 
chosen, with a moderator leading discussions regarding a particular topic”. 
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An interview is often believed to be a good data collection method particularly 
for exploratory studies. However, it can be utilized for explanatory and 
descriptive studies as well. An interview assists in gathering important data that 
are pertinent to the issue under investigation. This in turn helps in formulating 
the research questions and objectives (Saunder, et al., 2003).  
In the present research, questions were qualitative in nature because 
they sought to obtain participants’ opinions. Therefore, all the interviews 
conducted were semi-structured. The semi-structured interview is argued to 
commonly provide a high percentage of outcomes (Miller, 1991). There are 
quite a lot of advantages of semi-structured interview (Gerlad and Jay, 1985), 
including: 
 There is evidence to believe that people enjoy talking. 
 High response rate. 
 Easy to clarify the objectives of the study 
 Easy to respond to any questions a respondent might have. 
 The interview is important in obtaining data about sensitive, personal and 
sometimes perceived unexpected data. 
 
Despite the advantages mentioned above, there are quite a few expected 
difficulties in conducting semi-structured interviews since: 
  Some data is of a sensitive nature, participants would therefore probably 
choose to answer questionnaires in order to avoid any personal 
embarrassment. 
 Data collected is very limited hence could be better collected by 
questionnaire. 
 
In the current study, seven interviews were conducted with managers of 
Jordanian firms and four interviews were conducted with regulators. It is 
important to note that all interviewees were fully qualified and adequately 
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experienced to discuss the relevant issues. The interviewees selected for the 
interview survey was taken from those participants who had indicated 
willingness and were interested to participate in the interview stage.  
All Interviews were face to face and took between thirty and forty five 
minutes. All interviews were conducted in October and November, 2012. The 
samples chosen by the researcher for interviews were top managers of 
Jordanian companies of non financial sector. Prior to undertaking the 
interviews, the researcher tried to collect some information about the companies 
to enable him to be fully prepared to ensure the interviews could be conducted 
smoothly.  
In addition, the interviewees who had agreed to participate in the survey 
were contacted by phone to set the date and the time of the interview. These 
interviews were recorded upon the prior approval from the interviews, except 
two interviews, where the participants disagreed to record their interview. 
However, the researcher had to sign a confidentiality agreement with the 
participants that all the recording would be destroyed once the data is being 
interpreted and the recording will not be shared with anybody else other than 
the researcher. Each interview began with welcoming the interviewee and 
appreciating him/her for participating in the study. Interviewees were informed 
that interview outcomes would be employed for study purposes only. This 
declaration was essential to motivate interviewees to answer freely. After that 
the importance and objectives of the present research were explained. Each 
interviewee was asked to give some information about himself and his firm. The 
questions asked did not follow a typical order. Furthermore, new questions were 
asked to the interviewees to explore issues brought up by them. However, all 
aspects of concern were dealt with during every interview. Each answer to each 
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question was carefully written down on an interview schedule. The researcher 
moved to the next question only after each answer had been correctly recorded. 
The contents of each interview were translated from Arabic to English with help 
of a language expert. To insure the accuracy and reliability of responses, they 
were subsequently reviewed by a native English speaker and an expert in 
Accounting. Huge effort was made to ensure no details were lost during the 
translation and transcription process.  
4.6.3 Data 
In line with the triangulation strategy adopted, as noted earlier the data 
for the present research consist of primary and secondary data to help answer 
research questions. Primary data is first hand data gathered by the researcher 
for the purpose of the problem at hand. This data is collected by means of 
surveys and interviews. On the other hand, secondary data comprise any data 
that have already been gathered by others. This data can be acquired from 
different sources such as journal articles, theses, books, magazines and 
conferences proceedings regarding corporate governance.  
In short, the present research gathered both quantitative and qualitative 
data. The quantitative data is gathered in numerical form. This data was 
gathered by means of questionnaire survey. On the other hand, the qualitative 
data is usually non-numerical. It was gathered through semi-structured 
interviews.    
4.6.3.1 Editing and Exploring Data 
One of the key issues related to the primary data collection is data 
preparation. Data preparation means processing and exploring data.  It deals 
with topics like: non response bias, validity and reliability, entry and data coding, 
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missing data and distribution normality. Data were examined and prepared 
before being analyzed and presented.   
4.6.3.2 Labelling the Variables 
As pointed out earlier, a total number of 113 usable questionnaires were 
collected back by the mid of December 2012. First of all, each respondent 
(questionnaire) was given an ID number to make it easy to check back the raw 
data if a mistake in data entry was identified. The following step was to decide 
on the label (abbreviated name) to be given to each item. In relation to this, 
each item is to be measured by one or more question. Each question was given 
a label to connect it easily to the item it measures. For instance, one of the 
items examined in the current study is “constitution”. This item was measured 
by seven questions. The label given to this item is “CONS”. Each question that 
measures this item is labelled: CONS1, CONS2, CONS3, CONS4, CONS5, 
CONS6, and CONS 7. To facilitate entering and processing data, the latter 
needs to be coded. Coding means giving numeric values to the responses. 
Finally, the data were entered into an SPSS sheet1.  
4.6.3.3 Reliability and validity 
The credibility of study results depends on the reliability and validity of the 
measuring instrument (Hussey and Hussey, 2003).  
4.6.3.3.1 Reliability  
According to Bryman and Cramer (2005), reliability refers to the 
consistency of a measurement scale or instrument. Reliability has two aspects: 
internal and external. External reliability refers to the level of consistency of an 
                                                 
1 SPSS statistical software version 16.0 was used. 
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instrument over time. A comprehensive process of testing and piloting was a 
major factor in trying to ensure external reliability.  Internal reliability addresses 
the internal consistency of the items that form a scale. With composite scales, 
internal reliability is considered important. Reliability is usually measured by the 
Cronbach’s alpha method. This method suggests that the reliability of each 
scale is measured in terms of the value of the overall (α), which ranges from 0 
to 1. The higher the value of (α) the more reliable is the scale. Generally, an 
alpha of 0.7 or higher means a reliable scale (De Vaus, 2004). However, in 
social science studies if an alpha value is as low as 0.6, it is considered 
acceptable (Sekaran, 2003; Velde, et al., 2004). Moreover, Nunnally and 
Bernstein (1994), recommend that for the early phases of any research, a 
reliability of 0.50-0.60 is acceptable.  
4.6.3.3.2 Validity  
Validity refers to the degree to which a scale measures what it is 
assumed to measure. According to De Vaus (2004, p. 27), “Validity has to be 
argued for: it is not proven”. However, the most common way in assessing 
validity is to evaluate the face validity (Hussey and Hussey, 2003). This is 
considered satisfactory to ascertain validity particularly when a new scale is 
developed (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). All the composite scales are developed 
for the purpose of this study. It is worth to note that the face validity of all scales 
and the questionnaire as a whole was assessed by a panel of experienced 
referees as recommended by De Vaus (2004).   
4.6.3.4 Testing for Non-Response Bias 
It is crucial to find out whether a non response bias is expected to be a 
problem in a given study or not. Churchill and Brown (2004, p. 477) listed two 
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different ways to evaluate the degree to which important differences exist 
between participants and non participants. These are: 
 Contact a sample of non respondent  
 Conduct an analysis of late participants vs. early participants. 
In the current study, the two methods recommended by Churchill and Brown 
(2004) to evaluate the extent of the non response bias problem were attempted. 
These are discussed in the next few paragraphs. 
 All non responding firms were contacted by phone. The purpose of 
these calls was:  
 To get answers to the main key questions of the questionnaire, namely 
the current practices of corporate governance in Jordan. These answers 
were then to be compared with those acquired from the responding firms. 
Suitable statistical techniques would be employed to check for significant 
differences between the two groups.  
 To know why the participants refused to participate in the current study.  
Unfortunately, none of the contacted firms agreed to provide answers to the 
question about their practices of corporate governance in Jordan. Hence, the 
first method recommended by Churchill and Brown, (2004) to evaluate the non 
response bias problem could not be used. Nevertheless, the phone 
conversations demonstrated that these firms did not participate in the current 
study because of one or more of the following reasons:  
 They were too busy. 
 The data to be offered are regarded as too sensitive. 
 Bad experience with previous researchers and studies. 
The second method suggested by Churchill and Brown (2004) is to 
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compare the responses of early participants with those of late participants. The 
idea is that late participants are expected to be more similar to non participants 
than early participants. In the current study there are two groups of participants. 
The first group is the early participants and totalling 104 firms. The second 
group is late participants and totalling 9 firms. The Mann Whitney U test is 
applied. Therefore, the following null and alternative hypotheses are tested by 
the Mann Whitney U test:   
H0: There is no significant difference between the early 
responding firms and late responding firms. 
H1: There is a significant difference between the early 
responding firms and late responding firms. 
 
Since the significance level for the Mann Whitney U test between late and early 
responding firms is higher than 0.05, then it is clear that the null hypothesis can 
be accepted. This means that there is no significant difference between early 
responding firms and late responding firms. Thus, non response bias is not a 
problem.  
4.6.3.5 Data Analysis 
This section clarifies the kinds of statistical tests employed and 
justifications for the use of such tests. To analyse the data gathered from the 
questionnaire survey, many statistical tools could be employed. Regarding the 
current study, simple statistical tools were employed to present findings to show 
means and frequencies. The selection of statistical tests to be used depends on 
many factors (Siegel and Castellan, 1988, p.33; Huck and Cormier, 1996, 
p.555). The four key factors were the number of subjects in each group, the 
number of groups involved, whether the groups were independent or correlated 
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and the measurement scale of the data values. In this study, the number of 
Jordanian listed firms responding to the questionnaire survey was 94 and they 
were classified into two sectors, namely, manufacturing and services. 
Kerlinger (1986) stated four different reasons for adopting statistical 
analysis. The factors were aid in the study of the samples and population, 
decrease a large quantity of data to understandable and a manageable form, 
enable the deduction of reliable inference and help in decision making 
.Therefore, after coding the responses of questionnaire data, the data was then 
transferred to the SPSS computer package for analysis. As the study 
concentrates on current corporate governance practice in Jordanian firm, it is 
suitable to analyse participants’ return in terms of the behaviour of different 
statistical moments. The first moment is Mean and the second moment 
employed is the Standard Deviation.  The idea was to create an indicator to 
compute the variability of an individual response within a particular distribution. 
Therefore, the probability distribution of the Standard Deviation of participants’ 
answers computes how much the outcome can differ below or above the 
expected outcome of the Mean (Oppenheim, 1992) . To examine differences 
between independent samples, the researcher carried out non-parametric tests 
which are appropriate with ordinal data. 
4.6.3.5.1 Non-parametric Statistics 
Non-parametric statistics usually do not involve inference to a parameter. 
Most procedures are based upon frequency distributions and/or rank order 
rather than Means and, therefore, do not require interval-level data, or 
assumptions about the shape of the underlying distribution. Further, they make 
relatively few assumptions about the nature of the population distribution (Milton 
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et al., 1996). Although nonparametric tests have few assumptions, there are 
some general assumptions that should be taken into account, which are random 
samples and independent observations (Pallant, 2005). In general, various 
advantages can be gained from using non-parametric test and Bereson and 
Levine (1992) have summarised these as follows: 
 Non-parametric methods may be used on all types of data. 
 Non-parametric methods are generally easy to apply when the sample 
sizes are small 
 Non-parametric methods permeate the solution of the problem without 
testing the parameters of the population. 
Non-parametric tests in social science research are equally as important as 
their parametric counterparts. Siegel and Castellan (1988) argue that 
behavioural scientists rarely have data that satisfies the assumptions of the 
parametric test, which includes achieving the sort of measurement that permits 
meaningful interpretation of parametric tests. Hence, non-parametric statistical 
tests play a prominent role in behavioural and social sciences. The non-
parametric test was employed in this study because the firm characteristics 
were not treated in the regression as a control variable. To test the difference 
between independent samples, the researcher carried out the Mann-Whitney  
test to investigate whether there are  sig differences  between sectors( industry 
vs. service) while  Kruskal-Wallis was used to investigate the size and age 
effect , more precisely to investigates whether there are  significant difference 
among firms attributed to size and age . Factor analysis was also used as a 
data reduction method, which will be explained in the next section. 
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4.6.3.5.2 Factor analysis 
Factor analysis is a statistical technique that examines the relationships 
amongst a wide range of data sets to uncover the underlying dimensions 
(factors) amongst them. This permits a large number of observed variables to 
be summarized into a fewer number of factors (Pallant, 2007).  
There are two types of factor analysis: exploratory and confirmatory. 
Exploratory factor analysis is the most common form of factor analysis. 
Normally, it is used in the early stage of the research process to identify the 
underlying structure of a large set of variables where there is no prior theory. It 
is also used as a reduction tool that enables a large number of related variables 
to be reduced into a small manageable number of factors. Confirmatory factor 
analysis on the other hand, is more sophisticated and normally used in the 
advanced stages of the research process to test a hypothesis or confirm a 
theory (Pallant, 2005). Generally, when performing factor analysis, there are 
four main issues need to be decided upon. These issues are discussed in the 
following sections. 
5.6.3.5.3. The suitability of data for factor analysis 
Before proceeding with factor analysis, the suitability of the data set for 
factor analysis must be verified. Two statistical tests are used to assess 
factorability of data: the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
(KMO) and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Field, 2005).  
The KMO compares the magnitudes of the observed correlation 
coefficients to the magnitudes of the partial correlation coefficients. It is 
calculated for both individual and multiple variables. The value of the KMO 
statistic ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the KMO statistic, the more 
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suitable is factor analysis for the given data set. Kinnear and Gray (2000) 
considered a KMO value below 0.5 as poor and therefore unacceptable for the 
purpose of factor analysis. Moreover, Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999, p. 224) 
suggested the guidelines shown in Table 5.5, for interpreting the KMO statistic. 
These guidelines in addition to the cut-off point suggested by Kinnear and Gray 
(2000) are used in the current study. 
Table 4-6: The guideline for interpreting the KMO value. 
KMO value Interpretation 
0.5≤KMO< 0.7 Normal 
0.7≤KMO< 0.8 Good 
0.8≤KMO< 0.9 Great 
KMO< 0.9 Superb 
 
Bartlett'stest of sphericity is used to test the null hypothesis, generally 
speaking. If the computed chi square statistic is significant (ρ<.05), then the null 
hypothesis may be rejected. Therefore, it is appropriate to proceed with the 
factor analysis for the given data set. 
a. The factor extraction method 
Factor extraction refers to identifying the smallest number of factors that 
can best represent the correlation amongst the data set (Kim and Mueller, 
1978). Different extraction methods are available. For example, principal 
components, image factoring, maximum likelihood factoring, etc. The empirical 
evidence indicates that all methods produce similar results. Differences, if any, 
in the initial solutions usually disappear after rotation (De Vaus, 2004). 
However, principal components analysis is the most commonly used method. 
Furthermore, it produces more easily interpretable results. Therefore, this 
method is used in the current study. 
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b. The number of factors to be retained 
Although there are many techniques to assist in the decision concerning 
the number of factors to be retained, the most commonly used is the Kaiser’s 
criterion or eigenvalue rule. The eigenvalue statistic is computed for each factor. 
It represents the amount of total variance explained by the factor. The total 
variance that any factor can explain is standardized to one; therefore, using this 
criterion means that only components with eigenvalues of more than 1.0 are 
retained for further investigation (Bryman and Cramer, 2005). Many researchers 
recommend the use of a combination of methods to determine the appropriate 
number of factors to be retained. Following this recommendation, the Scree plot 
test is used, in the current study, to support the result of the Kaiser’s criterion. 
According to this method, the cut-off point for selecting the factors to be 
retained is at the point where the curve breaks/influxes (Field, 2005). 
  
c. The rotation method 
Rotation is simply a linear transformation of the initial solution to make 
interpretation easier. Rotation does not change the underlying solution; rather, it 
differentiates more clearly between factors by making some items load more 
clearly on one factor than on the others. This clarifies the true contents of each 
factor and makes interpretation much easier (Bryman and Cramer, 2005).  
A factor loading is equivalent to a correlation coefficient between each 
item and the factor. It helps in ascribing items to factors. According to De Vaus 
(2004), items with a loading coefficient of at least 0.3 are ascribed to the factor. 
However, the current study adopts the cut-off point of 0.4 as suggested by 
Stevens (1992) and Hair, et al., (2005). Therefore, an item with a loading, the 
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absolute value of which is greater than or equal to 0.4 (i.e. explaining around 
16% of the variance in the factor) is said to belong to the factor. Moreover, 
items with cross loading (loading on more than one factor) are recognised with 
the factors to which they theoretically and logically belong (i.e. according to the 
conceptual meaning) in addition to their factor loading. 
Factor analysis is not a clear-cut technique. It involves many steps and 
decisions that will affect the final solution. For example, decisions have to be 
made as regard to the factorability of data, extraction method, extraction criteria 
and so on.  
 
4.7 Skills 
The character of the researcher should have some particular interpersonal 
and technical skills in order to do well in the collection of the data. One of these 
features which the researcher believe necessary is the ability to be flexible, 
open to integrate ideas and being open-minded in particular. Time management 
skills of the researcher have been improved by participating in the time 
management training workshops. It is obvious that the data collection method is 
relatively difficult, a lot of actions that should be observed so that the projected 
outcome are accomplished successfully. The Gantt chart that the researcher 
has made as part of  PhD program requirements, where the researcher chart 
the activities which he should be doing each month, gave the researcher more 
advantage concerning this issue. Furthermore, experience, networking and 
knowledge are more necessary skills that are linked to the design of the 
questionnaire. In regard to the researcher’s experience, the researcher has 
worked as the branch manager of a Bank in Jordan and currently on study 
leave as a lecturer at the Yarmuk University, department of banking and 
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finance, School of Management. This experience has been very useful for the 
researcher in his research, more specifically during the organization of 
interviews, interviewing managers as well as getting quick response for the 
questionnaire survey.  
4.8 Ethical consideration 
Ethical considerations are summarized in the following points: 
 Participation in the study will be voluntary.  
 Interviewee will be told that he/she has the freedom not to answer any 
question he/she does not want to answer. 
 Participants will be informed of the nature and purpose of the study, and 
the expected benefits to the society.  
 Anonymity of the participants will be assured. It will be made clear to all 
participants that neither their names nor their firms’ names will be 
revealed at any stage in the study. Furthermore, participants will be 
assured that all data collected will be kept confidential and will be used 
for the purposes of the current study only. 
4.9 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher has provided the justification for the choice 
of research methods, i.e. the questionnaire, and its advantages and 
disadvantages. Questionnaires have explored the issues related to the use of 
corporate governance in Jordanian firms. The questionnaire design, pilot testing 
and distribution procedures have also been discussed. Moreover, this chapter 
discussed the semi-structured interview used in the study as well as 
philosophical paradigm was discussed and justified. 
In this study a triangulation approach in terms of research methods, 
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design and kind of data to be gathered is   used. A combined design of 
exploratory, descriptive and analytical phases is employed. The lack of 
systematic research about corporate governance in Jordan context imposed the 
exploratory phase. Identifying the current state of corporate governance in 
Jordan, justified the need for the descriptive study prior to undertaking more 
sophisticated analysis. Finally, evaluating the current practices of corporate 
governance in Jordan is most feasible through analytical phase. 
Moreover, a literature review and informal semi-structured interviews 
were used to complete the exploratory phase. On the other hand, a 
questionnaire was employed to collect the data needed for the descriptive and 
analytical phases of the study. Before it was distributed it went through a long 
procedure of appraisal and piloting. A number of academics, senior managers, 
and professionals participated in this process. 
 In October 2012, a total of 201 questionnaires were handed in to the 
participants. A high response rate of 62% was achieved. However the rate of 
the usable questionnaires was 56% which is regarded satisfactory for the 
purpose of statistical analysis. The chapter presented the procedures applied to 
prepare the data for the statistical analysis. In addition, the tests used to 
examine reliability and validity of the data presented as well. The steps 
employed to prepare the raw data for analysis have been discussed in this 
chapter. All steps and or techniques used have been clarified and justified. The 
data preparation started with coding and entering the raw data into the SPSS 
sheet and finished with discussing factor analysis. The next chapter is devoted 
to the questionnaire survey results with factor analysis, and will also discuss   
regression models. 




5 QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY RESULTS  
5.1 Introduction 
  As pointed out in Chapter Four, a questionnaire (see Appendix A) was 
employed to gather data regarding the current practice of corporate governance 
systems in Jordanian firms.  The main purpose of this chapter is to present the 
results gathered through the questionnaire survey. 201 questionnaires were 
distributed among Jordanian firms in both the manufacturing and service 
sectors of non financial firms. 125 filled questionnaires were returned. However, 
12 questionnaires were not completed and therefore 113 returned 
questionnaires were used for data analysis. This high response rate has been 
achieved mainly due to the fact that the questionnaires were distributed to 
educated, senior level managers who feel the necessity of continuous 
improvement through research and development in their institutions   
 The following section covers the analysis stage. First, this section will 
give an overview of the descriptive statistics and mean levels for each item in 
the questionnaire. Second, factor analysis will be discussed and presented and 
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5.2 Respondents’ Demographic Details 
As pointed out earlier, respondents involved in this study comprised four 
groups, namely, chief executive officers (CEOs), deputy directors, financial 
managers and directors of internal audit in Jordanian companies. It was 
important to gather information about their place of work. This information about 
respondents was helpful in introducing respondents to the questionnaire, as 
well as obtaining useful data. The results of the analysis of the respondents’ 
details are discussed in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Job Position and Place of Work 
The findings in Table 5.1 show that 26 participants were deputy directors, 
whereas 61 were financial managers and 22 were directors of internal audit 
departments. The second question in part one of the questionnaire investigated 
respondents’ place of work. Table 5.1 shows 58 respondents worked in the 
industrial sector while 51 worked in the services sector.  
 Table   5-1: Respondents’ Positions and Place of Work 
 
                             JOB 
SIC 
Total  Industrial Service 
  Deputy 
Director 
15 11 26 
Financial 
Manager 
32 29 61 
Director of 
internal audit 
11 11 22 
Total 58 51 109 
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5.2.2 Respondent Firms’ Size and Age 
113 companies responded to the questionnaire but there were 8 firms with 
missing data. The responding firms varied in size as shown in Table 5.2. 
According to the total asset criteria, the firms ranged from small firms with total 
assets of less than $10,000,000 to large firms with total assets of more than 
$40,000,000.  Table 5.2 shows that the majority of the companies were in the 
10-40 million interval. Unfortunately, in Jordan there is no formal definition of 
firm size that can be employed as a criterion to categorise firms. Hence, a 
decision was made to employ the EU definition of small, medium and large 
firms. 
The same table shows that the majority of the companies fell in the interval 10-
25 years old. Based on this result one might argue that responding firms were 
mature enough to be familiar with the practices in their field. The next largest 
group was younger firms that were less than 10 years. The minority were from 
older companies of 26 years or more. The following section discusses the 
analysis of the questionnaire’s findings.  





Less than  
10 m 10m - 40m Greater than 40 m 
  Less than 10 Year 
  
19 8 3 30 
10-25 5 40 3 
 
48 
26 and more 
 
2 11 20 27 
Total 26 53 26 109 
        
     




One of the most important factors of best practice of corporate governance 
in the Jordanian firms is corporate constitution. Respondents who participated 
in this study were asked about their level of agreement with listed variables, 
using a scale from 1 to 7, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=moderately 
disagree, 4=neutral, 5=moderately agree, 6=agree, and 7=strongly agree. 
Seven questions were considered, as displayed in Table 5.3. The results 
indicate that, generally, participants scored highly, on average, on all the 
elements measuring good practice in constitution, since all items recorded 
mean scores of 4.7 out of 7.  
Among the items recording the highest ranking and mean scores were 
“disclosure of the structure hierarchy/network of the firm in the annual report” 
(mean 5.8) and "directors are required to disclose any matters that may affect 
the firm" (mean 5.6).    
Respondents were asked if the firm includes information on the 
responsibilities of the board committee in the annual report and if the firm 
specify the maximum duration for directors – including the chairman – to serve 
on the board. The weakest agreement level was associated with these items, 
which recorded mean scores of 3.9 and 4.0 respectively.  
The results reported in Table 5.3 show that, in general, participants agreed 
in that there is a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board (mean 4.6). The roles of the chair and the CEO are split 
between different directors (mean score 4.7) and all board committees are 
composed of executive and non executive directors (NEDs) (mean 4.3). Thus, 
all the items had a mean score of 4 or above.  
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Bivariate analysis was undertaken to examine whether there were 
differences in the responses with regard to industry, age and size of firms. A 
Mann-Whitney test was carried out to identify whether there were sector 
(manufacturing and services) differences. The results presented in Table 5.3 
show a non significant level of .915 which is greater than the alpha level of .05. 
This means that there are no significant differences in element 1 (constitution) 
across the two sectors. On the other hand, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed 
statistically significant differences in this element according to companies’ age 
(p-value= 0.00), and size (p-value= 0.00).  




Element : Constitution 





























There is a formal and transparent 
procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board. 
The roles of the Chair and the CEO are 
split between different directors. 
Directors are required to disclose any 
matters that may affect the firm. 
All board committees are composed of 
executive and non executive directors 
(NEDs).   
We specify the maximum duration for 
directors –including the chairman-to serve 
in the board. 
We include information on the duties and 
responsibilities of board committee in our 
annual report. 
We disclose the structure 















































































  Average   4.7         
  
 




A further element which is a critical factor in corporate governance is 
corporate control. Respondents in this research were requested to give their 
answers on control factors of best practice of good corporate governance in 
their firms. Participants were asked to point out their level of agreement with 
listed variables on a seven-point scale as mentioned earlier. Responses to the 
questions are presented in Table 5.4.  
 As can be seen from Table 5.4, the findings indicate that, generally 
speaking, respondents scored highly on average on all the elements measuring 
good practice in control. This is demonstrated by most variables having mean 
scores of 4.8 and above. Moreover, participants ranked "the firm reviews the 
effectiveness of the internal control system" and “the firm describes the work of 
the audit committee in the annual report” as the first and second key items of 
control for best practice of good corporate governance in Jordan (mean 5.9 and 
5.8, respectively). In general, participants showed a strong level of agreement 
with regard to the listed factors.    
In the current research, “firms directors and auditors explain their 
reporting responsibilities in the annual report” was ranked as the third factor, 
with a mean score of 5.7. As can be seen from Table 5.4, participants 
considered the three factors mentioned as key critical factors with mean scores 
of 5.9, 5.8 and 5.7 respectively.  The least important factors were, "firm 
discloses, in the annual report, whether the auditor provides non auditing 
services or not" and “our firm links rewards to long term performance” as 
indicated by their mean scores of 4.8 and 4.9, respectively.   
With regard to whether there were any significant differences at the level 
of 5% (p<0.05) or not. The control factors of the best practice of good corporate 
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governance in Jordanian firms according to sector (p-value= 0.287), which are 
not significant at α=0.05, are measured by the Mann-Whitney test. Testing for 
significant differences as measured by the Kruskal Wallis test at the level of 5% 
(p<0.05) in terms of age (p-value= 0.00) and size (p-value= 0.00), the results 
showed significant differences as is clearly shown by the reported p-value. 




Element : Control 



























Our firm links rewards to long term 
performance.  
In our firms directors and auditors explain 
their reporting responsibilities in the 
annual report.  
Our firm discloses, in the annual report, 
whether the auditor provides non auditing 
services or not. 
 Our firm directors are not involved in 
determining their own remuneration. 
Our firm reviews the effectiveness of the 
internal control system. 
Our firm describes the work of the audit 
committee in the annual report. 
Our firm identifies in the annual report the 
key risk areas of the business and the 






































































  Average   5.3     
 
5.5 Competence 
 Respondents participating in the study were asked to give their answers 
on competence factors of best practice of corporate governance in their firms. 
Participants were asked to point out their level of agreement with listed 
variables on a seven-point scale as mentioned earlier. Responses for the five 
elements considered are summarised in Table 5.5, and indicate that 
participants agreed with all factors mentioned, with an average mean score of 
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5.0. This indicates that competence factors are effective factors for best 
corporate governance practice. 
As can be seen from Table 5.5, participants strongly agreed that their 
firms review the proper technology and systems used in the firm to achieve the 
firm’s goals (mean 5.6), enlighten new directors about the long/short term 
objectives and mission of the firm (mean 5.3) and update its directors about the 
trends and new global issues of corporate governance (mean 5.2). Also, the 
findings show that the least important factor is whether the firm trains new 
directors to read and analyse the financial statements (mean 3.9). Thus, the 
results suggest that both non-financial and financial transaction information in 
Jordanian companies needs more disclosure and transparency.  
With regard to whether there were any significant differences at the level 
of 5% (p<0.05) concerning the control factors of good corporate governance in 
Jordanian firms according to sector i.e., industrial or service (p-value= 0.85). 
Moreover, testing for significant differences as measured by the Kruskal Wallis 
at the level of 5% (p<0.05) in terms of age (p-value= 0.018), and size (p-value= 
0.00), showed significant differences as can clearly be observed by the reported 
p-value. This means that older firms and large-size firms are keener to adopt a 
balanced corporate governance system compared to newly formed and small-
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Element : Competence 


























Trains new directors to read and analyze 
the financial statements. 
Enlightens new directors about the 
long/short term objectives and mission of 
the firm. 
Updates its directors about the trends and 
new global issues of corporate 
governance. 
Reviews the proper technology and the 
system used in the firm to achieve the 
firm’s goals. 
Evaluates its process and transactions 
































































 Average   5.0      
  
5.6 Compliance 
Respondents participating in the study were asked to give their answers 
on compliance factors of best practice of corporate governance in their firms. 
Responses to the six elements considered are displayed in Table 5.6. 
Participants recorded an average mean score of 5.2 which indicates that 
compliance factors are effective factors for best corporate governance practice. 
As can be seen from Table 5.6, participants strongly agreed that the 
audit committee ensures compliance with law and assures an implementation of 
the board’s decisions (mean 5.8), the firm implements the one share/one vote 
system in terms of directors’ election (mean 5.3), the firm monitors the 
application of corporate governance principles and best practice to its particular 
circumstances (mean 5.4) and the audit committee works independently of top 
management (mean 5.3). The findings also show that the least important factors 
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are “the firm applies a clear mechanism for the board of directors’ retirement 
and resignation” (mean4.8) and “the firms review and disclose the equality of 
employment opportunities in the annual report” (mean 4.3) 
 With regard to whether there were any significant differences at the level 
of 5% (p<0.05) concerning the control factors of good corporate governance in 
Jordanian firms according to sector (p-value= 0.173), they were not significant 
at α=0.05, measured by the Man-Whitney test. Moreover, testing for significant 
differences by the Kruskal Wallis test at the level of 5% (p<0.05) in terms of age 
(p-value= 0.027), and size (p-value= 0.00) showed significant differences as 
can clearly be observed by the reported p-value.  




Element : Compliance 





























 In our firm, audit committee ensures 
compliance with law and assures an 
implementation of the board’s decisions. 
In our firm, audit committee works 
independently from top management. 
Our firm implements the one share/one 
vote system in terms of directors’ election.  
Our firm reviews and discloses the 
equality of employment opportunities in 
the annual report. 
Our firm applies a clear mechanism for the 
board of directors’ retirement and 
resignation.  
Our firm monitors the application of 
corporate governance principles and best 
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The fifth factor of best corporate governance practices is 
competitiveness. Respondents participating in the study were asked to give 
their answers on control factors of the best practice of corporate governance in 
their firms. Responses for the six elements considered are displayed in Table 
5.7. The results indicate that participants recorded an average mean score of 
5.2. This indicates that competitiveness factors are effective factors for best 
corporate governance practice. 
As can be seen from Table 5.7, participants strongly agreed that their 
firms disclose the names of the board and the key executive directors in the 
annual report (mean 6.0), disclose the ownership of the major shareholders 
within the firm (mean 5.9), state the firm’s objectives and goals in the annual 
report (mean 5.6), articulate its role in economic growth (mean 5.3) and protect 
the interests of the minority shareholders (mean 5.2). The findings also show 
that the least important factor is, "evaluates and discloses the performance of 
the board and the management in the annual report" (mean 3.3). 
With regard to whether there were any significant differences at the level 
of 5% (p<0.05) concerning the control factors of best practice of good corporate 
governance in Jordanian firms according to sector, the p-value= 0.176, which is 
more than the alpha level of 0.05, so this result suggests that there are no 
differences across the two sectors. Moreover, testing for significant differences 
as measured by the Kruskal Wallis test at the level of 5% (p<0.05) in terms of 
age (p-value= 0.492) and size (p-value= 0.740), showed no statically significant 
differences.    
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Element : Competitiveness 

























Evaluates and discloses the performance 
of the board and the management in the 
annual report. 
States the firm’s objectives and goals in 
the annual report. 
Discloses the ownership of the major 
shareholders within the firm. 
Discloses the names of the board and the 
key executive directors in the annual 
report. 
Articulates its role in the economic growth.   



























































  Average    5.2      
  
5.8 Culture 
The sixth critical factor in corporate governance is culture. The main goal 
of the related questions was to determine the features of the culture factor in 
Jordanian listed firms. Seven questions were considered, as displayed in Table 
5.8. Participants recorded average mean scores of 3.9.   
The findings in Table 5.8 show that participants ranked "firm has clear 
formal and informal polices", "firm clearly defines corporate responsibilities in 
relation to the environment in the annual report" and "firm business 
relationships rules are clearly defined and available to all"  as the main factors, 
with means of 4.8, 4.7 and 4.2 respectively. Also, the results indicate that 
participants considered the three factors mentioned as more important than 
factors such "the ethical code is well documented and understood by 
employees", with a mean value 3.8. On the other hand, the least influential 
factors were "our firm clearly defines corporate responsibilities in relation to 
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human rights in the annual report" and "in our firm, there is a statement about 
the consequences of violation of the code of ethics" with mean values of 2.8 
and 2.9 respectively.  
With regard to whether there were any significant differences at the level 
of 5% (p<0.05) concerning culture critical factors, according to sector (p-value= 
0.442), age (p-value= 0.363) and size (p-value =0.31), the Man-Whitney and the 
Kruskal Wallis test results, shown in Table 5.8, indicate no statistically 
significant differences.   































In Our firm, the ethical code is well 
documented and understood by 
employees. 
In our firm business relationships rules are 
clearly defined and available to all. 
Our firm has clear formal and informal 
polices. 
Our firm clearly defines corporate   
responsibilities in relation to the 
environment in the annual report. 
Our firm clearly defines corporate 
responsibilities in relation to human rights 
in the annual report. 
In our firm, there is a statement about the 
















































































One of the most important factors of best practice of good corporate 
governance is corporate commitment. Respondents who participated in the 
study were asked to give their opinions on corporate commitment in their firms, 
using a scale from 1 to 7. Six elements were considered, as displayed in Table 
5.9. 
The results indicate that participants recorded average mean scores of 
4.0. This indicates that commitment factors are effective factors for best 
corporate governance practice. This outcome is supported by the ranking of the 
mean which positioned “the rights of stakeholders are respected” in first position 
in the analysis (mean= 5.1).  Among the items recording the highest ranking 
and mean scores were, "institutional investors contact senior executive to 
exchange views and information" (mean 4.6), "there is a clear and transparent 
mechanism for stakeholders to obtain redress for violation of their rights" (mean 
4.5), and "employees are allowed stock ownership or profit-share" (mean 4.0). 
Further, when respondents were asked if there was scope for adopting an 
executives’ share option and if employees were represented on the board, the 
weakest agreement level was associated with these items which recorded 
mean scores of 3.3 and 2.1 respectively.  
The Man-Whitney test was carried out to identify sector (industrial and 
service) differences.  The results, presented in Table 5.9 below, show a 
significance level of 0.18 which is greater than the alpha level of .05. This 
means that there are no significant differences across the two sectors. 
Furthermore, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed no statistically significant 
differences for this element according to companies’ age (p-value= 0.688) or 
size (p-value= 0.50). This means that all the firms have sound best practice and 
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a balanced corporate governance system for this construct.   




Element : Commitment 






















The rights of stakeholders are respected. 
There is a clear and transparent 
mechanism for stakeholders to obtain 
redress for violation of their rights. 
Employees are represented on the board. 
Employees are allowed stock ownership 
or profit-share. 
There is scope for adopting an executive’s 
share option. 
Institutional investors contact senior 


























































  Average   4.0     
  
 
5.10  Communication 
Communication is rated as an important element in the corporate 
governance system. Eight elements were considered, as displayed in Table 
5.10.  
The overall results show that items relating to communication recorded 
an average mean score of 5.9. According to the ranking expressed in Table 
5.10, “our firm discloses, in the annual report, the accounting standards 
adopted” was ranked first among items relating to communication in firms 
(mean 6.2). This was followed by “disclose information on the compensation for 
the board members and management team in the annual report” (mean 6.1). 
“Discloses information about affiliated and subsidiary firm” (mean 6.0) 
and “firm discloses any interlocking directorships in the annual report” (mean 
5.9) were ranked third and fourth respectively. While “discloses the number of 
CH-5 QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY RESULTS 
 
152 
board meetings held during the year” (mean 5 .8) was ranked fourth, followed 
by “there is a clear and transparent mechanism for stakeholders to 
communicate effectively with the firm” (mean 5.7), “our firm includes a section 
on corporate governance practices in the annual report” (mean 5.7) and “in our 
firm NEDs develop an understanding of the views of major shareholders” (mean 
5.5).  
As can be seen from Table 5.10, participants rated the items mentioned 
related to disclosing information, such as “firms discloses, in the annual report , 
the accounting standards adopted”, the highest (mean value 6.2), compared to 
the rest of the items under communication. On the other hand, the least scored 
item was “our firm includes a section on corporate governance practices in the 
annual report” (mean 5.5). 
The Man Whitney test was carried out to identify sector differences (i.e., 
industrial and service). The result in Table 5.10 shows the significance level 
was p-value=0.601. This is more than the alpha level of .05, so these results 
suggest that there is no difference in disclosure and transparency across the 
two sectors. Moreover, testing for significant differences as measured by the 
Kruskal Wallis test at the level of 5% (p<0.05) in terms of age (p-value= 0.03), 
and size (p-value= 0.053) resulted in significant differences as can clearly be 
observed by the reported p-value. Moreover, the mean rank results from the 
Kruskal Wallis test show values 56.17 and 70.56 for small and large firms. This 
shows that the respondents from large firms differed significantly from those 
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Element : Communication 





























Our firm includes a section on corporate 
governance practices in the annual report. 
In our firm NEDs, develop an 
understanding of the views of major 
shareholders. 
In our firm, We disclose information on the 
compensation for the board members and 
management team in the annual report. 
Our firm discloses any interlocking 
directorship in the annual report. 
Our firm discloses information about 
affiliated and subsidiary firms. 
Our firm discloses, in the annual report , 
the accounting standards adopted 
Our firm discloses the number of board 
meetings held during the year.   
In our firm, there is a clear and 
transparent mechanism for stakeholders 














































































  Average   5.9     
  
5.11 Conduct 
Respondents participating in this study were asked to give their answers 
for conduct factors relating to best practice of good corporate governance in 
their firms. Six elements were considered, as displayed in Table 5.11.   
Participants (firms) strongly agreed that there were strict guidelines for 
safety, health and the environment (mean 5.6), clear guidelines on privacy and 
data protection (mean 5.5), guidelines for serving as a director (mean 5.5), and 
guidelines regarding conflicts of interest (mean 5.4). There were also adequate 
procedures in place to guard against insider trading (mean 5.3). The findings 
show that the least important variable was “we have clear policy about waiver 
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from the codes” (mean 4.0).  
The Man-Whitney test results in Table 5.11 indicate no statistically 
significant differences concerning the conduct factors of best practice of good 
corporate governance in Jordanian firms according to sector (p-value= 0.869). 
Testing for significant differences as measured by the Kruskal Wallis test at the 
level of 5% (p<0.05) in terms of size (p-value= 0.01) resulted in significant 
differences as can clearly be observed by the reported p-value, while no 
statistically significant differences exist according to  age (p-value= 0.288). 




Element : Conduct 























There are guidelines for serving as a 
Director. 
There are adequate procedures in place 
to guard against insider trading. 
There are strict guidelines for safety, 
health and the environment. 
There are clear guidelines on privacy and 
data protection. 
There are guidelines regarding conflict of 
interest. 





































































One of the most important factors of the best practice of corporate 
governance is corporate conscience. Respondents who participated in the study 
were asked to give their opinions on corporate conscience in Jordanian firms, 
using a scale from 1 to 7. Five elements were considered, as displayed in Table 
5.12. According to the ranking, “we maintain an independent relationship 
between our firm and the ‘recipient’ of the charitable contribution” was ranked 
first among items relating to the community care factor in Jordanian firms (mean 
5.8), followed by “our firm participates in community development programmes” 
(mean 5.7), “in our firm we have a clear policy on implementing Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (mean 5.6) and “our firm is involved in charitable 
contribution” (mean 5.6), which were ranked second, third and fourth 
respectively, while “our firm sponsors educational and/or training programmes 
for the community” (mean 5.5) was ranked fifth.   
The Man-Whitney test was carried out to identify sector (industrial and 
service) differences. The result presented in Table 5.12 shows a significance 
level of 0.311 which is greater than the alpha level of .05. This means that there 
are no significant differences in element 10 (conscience) across the two 
sectors. On the other hand, the Kruskal Wallis test revealed statistically 
significant differences in this element according to companies’ age (p-value= 
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Element : Conscience 
























Our firm participates in community 
development programmes. 
In our firm we have a clear policy on 
implementing Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Our firm sponsors educational and/or 
training programmes for the community. 
Our firm is involved in charitable 
contribution. 
We maintain an independent relationship 
























































 Average    5.6       
 
 
5.13 General Perception of Best Practice of Corporate Governance 
Contributing to Improving Firm Performance 
The purpose of this construct is to present the effect of best practice of 
corporate governance on firm performance as perceived by the respondents. 
Respondents who participated in the study were asked to give their views using 
a scale from 1 to 7, where 1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=moderately 
disagree, 4=neutral, 5=moderately agree, 6=agree and 7=strongly agree. Six 
elements were considered, as displayed in Table 5.13. The results indicate that, 
generally, participants showed a strong level of agreement with regard to the 
factors listed, since all items recorded mean scores of 5.2 or above.  
Participants (firms) strongly agreed that all of the items of best practice of 
corporate governance contribute to improving firm performance. According to 
the ranking expressed in Table 5.13, “separation between the position of CEO 
and Chairman” was ranked first followed by “a strong disclosure regime” (mean 
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5.8), “the existence of institutional investors” (mean5.7), “the use of board 
subcommittees” (mean 5.6), “the existence of independent NEDs” (mean 5.5) 
and “the small size of the board” (mean 5.2).   
     The Mann-Whitney test was carried out to identify sector (industry and 
service) differences.  The results in Table 5.13 show the significance level (p-
value=0.207) was not significant at α=0.05. Hence, it can be concluded that 
there is no real difference in agreement with the items between the two sectors. 
Testing for significant differences as measured by the Kruskal Wallis test at the 
level of 5% (p<0.05) in terms of age (p-value= 0.03), and size (p-value= 0.053) 
resulted in significant differences as can clearly be observed by the reported p-
value. Moreover, the mean rank results from the Kruskal Wallis test show the 
values 56.17 and 70.56 for small and large firms. This shows that the 
respondents from large firms differed significantly from those representing 
smaller firms.   




Element : Performance 



















The small size of the board.   
The existence of institutional investors. 
Separation between the position of CEO 
and Chairman 
The existence of independent NEDs. 
The use of board subcommittees. 
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5.14 Factors Inhibiting the Best Practice of Corporate Governance in 
Jordan 
This question was to find factors that could prevent best practice of 
corporate governance in Jordanian firms. Respondents to this research were 
requested to give their answers about factors preventing best practice of 
corporate governance in their firms. Participants were asked to point out their 
level of agreement with listed variables, using a scale from 1 to 7. Responses to 
this question are presented in Table 5.14. The results indicate that, generally, 
participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements mentioned as factors 
preventing best practice of corporate governance, with an average mean score 
of 5.3 out of 7. Among the items recording the highest ranking and mean scores 
were “lack of knowledge of board of directors about corporate governance 
principles” (mean 5.9) and “cost of applying corporate governance system” 
(mean 5.8) as the first and second key items preventing best practice of good 
corporate governance in Jordan.   
In the current research, major shareholders were ranked as the third 
factor (mean 5.6). As can be seen from Table 5.14, participants considered the 
three factors mentioned as key critical factors, with scores of 5.9, 5.8 and 5.6 
respectively for the factors “lack of knowledge of board of directors about 
corporate governance principles”, “cost of applying corporate governance 
system” and “major shareholders”, rather than factors such as “hierarchical 
structures of the firm” and “family ownership” (means 5.4 and 5.3 respectively). 
The lowest average scores overall were associated with “weakness of the legal 
environment for firms”, “tribal loyalties of the board” and “government 
intervention in firms” (means 5.3, 5.2 and 4.3, respectively).  
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Bivariate analysis was undertaken to examine whether there were 
differences in the responses with regard to industry, age and size of firms. The 
Man-Whitney and Kruskal Wallis test results in Table 5.14 indicate no 
statistically significant differences existed across the two sectors, size or the 
age of the firm which is shown by the reported p-value. 
Table 5-14: Respondents’ Answers for Factors Inhibiting Best Practice of Good 




Element : Competence 
























Weakness of the legal environment for 
firms. 
Lack of knowledge of board of directors 
about corporate governance principles. 
Tribal loyalties of the board.  
Government intervention in firms. 
Major shareholders. 
Cost of applying corporate governance 
system. 
Family ownership. 






















































 Average   5.3     
  
5.15 . Factor Analysis 
In order to determine the main critical factors for implementing best practice 
of corporate governance in Jordanian listed firms, factor analysis was used as a 
data reduction method. The 10 constructs were subject to principal components 
analysis (PCA) using SPSS version 16. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) 
measure of sampling adequacy was carried out, with each factor exceeding the 
recommended value of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1974). To aid in the interpretation of the 
factors, Varimax rotation with Kaiser normalisation was performed (Bryman & 
Cramer, 2002, p.265). In addition, scale reliability was reported for each factor 
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analysis conducted. Then, regression analysis was conducted. 
5.15.1 Analysis of Constitution Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the constitution factor. Four questions 
remained after the analysis was conducted. Those questions scored above the 
acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings explaining around 56% of the 
variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 2.24. Three questions were deleted 
from the analysis as they did not achieve the acceptable threshold of 0.60, and 
by deleting them the conceptual meaning of the remaining questions remained 
acceptable in terms of measuring the concept of constitution. 
  Table 5.15 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the 
constitution concept. However, questions five, six, and seven were deleted from 
the analysis. Scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor analysis for 
the constitution concept was reported, and achieved as high as 0.734, an 
indication of good factor reliability. Before going further in the factor analysis, 
the factorability of the data was examined. The value of the overall KMO was 
normal at .732 which exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In addition, 
the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results show 
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There is a formal and transparent procedure for the appointment of new 
directors to the board. 
The roles of the Chair and the CEO are split between different directors. 
Directors are required to disclose any matters that may affect the firm. 
All board committees are composed of executive and non executive 






  Total Variance explained 56% 
 Eigenvalues  2.24 
 kmo 0.732 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity 0.000 
  
5.15.2  Analysis of Control Factor 
Varimax factor rotation on the variables that are supposed to measure 
the control factor was performed. Only one question was deleted; "our firm 
frequently changes the corporate auditor". This question did not achieve the 
acceptable threshold for factor loading and by deleting it the conceptual 
meaning of the remaining questions were still acceptable in terms of measuring 
the concept of control. 
  Seven questions remained after the analysis was conducted. Those 
questions scored above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings 
explaining around 43.24% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 
3.45. Table 5.16 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the control 
concept. Scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor analysis for the 
control concept was reported and achieved as high as 0.801, an indication of 
good factor reliability. Before going further in the factor analysis, the factorability 
of the data was examined. The value of the overall KMO was normal at .830 
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and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In addition, the Bartlett’s test 
of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results show that factor analysis 
was suitable for the data. 


















Our firm links rewards to long term performance.  
In our firms directors and auditors explain their reporting responsibilities in 
the annual report.  
Our firm discloses, in the annual report, whether the auditor provides non 
auditing services or not. 
Our firm directors are not involved in determining their own remuneration. 
Our firm reviews the effectiveness of the internal control system. 
Our firm describes the work of the audit committee in the annual report. 
Our firm identifies in the annual report the key risk areas of the business 










  Total Variance explained 43.24% 
  Eigenvalues  3.459 
 kmo .830 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.3 Analysis of Competence Factor 
Varimax factor rotation on the variables that are supposed to measure 
the competence factor was performed. No items were deleted from the analysis 
as they all scored above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings 
explaining around 57.13% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 
2.857. Table 5.17 gives an overview of the questions of the competence 
concept. Scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor analysis for the 
Competence concept was reported and achieved as high as 0.810, an 
indication of good factor reliability. Before going further in the factor analysis, 
the factorability of the data was examined. The value of the overall KMO was 
normal at .823 and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In addition, 
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the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results show 
that factor analysis was suitable for the data. 

















Trains new directors to read and analyze the financial statements. 
Enlightens new directors about the long/short term objectives and 
mission of the firm. 
Updates its directors about the trends and new global issues of 
corporate governance. 
Reviews the proper technology and the system used in the firm to 
achieve the firm’s goals. 










 Total Variance explained 57.13% 
 Eigenvalues  2.857 
 Kmo .823 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.4 Analysis of Compliance Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the compliance factor. All questions 
remained after the analysis was conducted except one. Those questions scored 
above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings explaining around 
58.84% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 2.94. One question 
was deleted from the analysis as it did not achieve the acceptable threshold of 
0.60, and by deleting it the conceptual meaning for the remaining questions 
remained acceptable in terms of measuring the concept of compliance. 
 Table 5.18 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the 
compliance concept. However, the following question was deleted from the 
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analysis, "our firm applies a clear mechanism for the board of directors’ 
retirement and resignation".  In addition, scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for 
the final factor analysis for the compliance concept was reported and achieved 
as high as 0.823, an indication of good factor reliability. Before going further in 
the factor analysis, the factorability of the data was examined. The value of the 
overall KMO was normal at .841 and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of 
.5. In addition, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These 
results show that factor analysis was suitable for the data. 


















In our firm, audit committee ensures compliance with law and assures an 
implementation of the board’s decisions. 
In our firm, audit committee works independently from top management. 
 
Our firm implements the one share/one vote system in terms of directors’ 
election.  
Our firm reviews and discloses the equality of employment opportunities 
in the annual report. 
Our firm monitors the application of corporate governance principles and 










 Total Variance explained 58.9% 
 Eigenvalues  2.942 
 kmo .841 
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5.15.5 Analysis of Competitiveness Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the competitiveness factor. All 
questions remained after the analysis was conducted except two. The accepted 
questions scored above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings 
explaining around 63.37% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 
2.53. Two questions were deleted from the analysis as they did not achieve the 
acceptable threshold of 0.60, and by deleting them the conceptual meaning for 
the remaining questions remained acceptable in terms of measuring the 
concept of competitiveness. 
Table 5.19 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the 
competitiveness concept. However, the following questions were deleted from 
the analysis: "evaluates and discloses the performance of the board and the 
management in the annual report" and "protects the interests of the minority 
shareholders". In addition, scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor 
analysis for the competitiveness concept was reported and achieved as high as 
0.806, an indication of good factor reliability. Before going further in the factor 
analysis, the factorability of the data was examined. The value of the overall 
KMO was normal at 0.774 and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In 
addition, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results 
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States the firm’s objectives and goals in the annual report. 
Discloses the ownership of the major shareholders within the firm. 
Discloses the names of the board and the key executive directors in the 
annual report. 






  Total Variance explained 63.37% 
 Eigenvalues  2.535 
 kmo .774 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.6 Analysis of Culture Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the culture factor. Three questions 
remained after the analysis was conducted and three were excluded. The 
accepted questions scored above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor 
loadings explaining around 49.45% of the variance in the factor with an 
eigenvalue of 1.48. Three questions were deleted from the analysis as they did 
not achieve the acceptable threshold 0.60, and by deleting them the conceptual 
meaning of the remaining questions were still acceptable in terms of measuring 
the concept of culture. 
Table 5.20 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the culture 
concept. However, the following questions were deleted from the analysis: "in 
our firm, the ethical code is well documented and understood by employees", 
"our firm has clear formal and informal polices" and “our firm clearly defines 
corporate responsibilities in relation to the environment in the annual report". In 
addition, scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor analysis for the 
culture concept was reported and achieved as high as 0.655, an indication of 
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acceptable factor reliability. Before going further in the factor analysis, the 
factorability of the data was examined. The value of the overall KMO was 
normal at .568 and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In addition, 
the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results show 
that factor analysis was suitable for the data. 












In our firm business relationships rules are clearly defined and available 
to all. 
Our firm clearly defines corporate responsibilities in relation to human 
rights in the annual report. 
In our firm, there is a statement about the consequences of violation of 






  Total Variance explained 49.45% 
 Eigenvalues  1.484 
 kmo .568 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.7 Analysis of Commitment Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the commitment factor. Three 
questions remained after the analysis was conducted and three were excluded. 
The accepted questions scored above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for 
factor loadings explaining around 69.65% of the variance in the factor with an 
eigenvalue of 2.09. Three questions were deleted from the analysis as they did 
not achieve the acceptable threshold of 0.60, and by deleting them the 
conceptual meaning for the remaining questions remained acceptable in terms 
of measuring the concept of commitment. 
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 Table 5.21 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the 
commitment concept. However, the following questions were deleted from the 
analysis: "employees are represented on the board", "employees are allowed 
stock ownership or profit-share" and "there is scope for adopting an executive’s 
share option". In addition, scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor 
analysis of the commitment concept was reported and achieved as high as 
0.782, an indication of good factor reliability. Before going further in the factor 
analysis, the factorability of the data was examined. The value of the overall 
KMO was normal at .732 and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In 
addition, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results 
show that factor analysis was suitable for the data. 











The rights of stakeholders are respected. 
There is a clear and transparent mechanism for stakeholders to obtain 
redress for violation of their rights. 






  Total Variance explained 69.65% 
 Eigenvalues  2.09 
 kmo .699 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.8 Analysis of Communication Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the communication factor. Four 
questions remained after the analysis was conducted and four were excluded. 
The accepted questions scored above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for 
factor loadings explaining around 55.47% of the variance in the factor with an 
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eigenvalue of 2.21. Four questions were deleted from the analysis as they did 
not achieve the acceptable threshold of 0.60, and by deleting them the 
conceptual meaning of the remaining questions remained acceptable in terms 
of measuring the concept of communication. 
  Table 5.22 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the 
communication concept. However, the following questions were deleted from 
the analysis: "our firm discloses any interlocking directorship in the annual 
report", "our firm discloses information about affiliated and subsidiary firms", 
"Our firm discloses, in the annual report, the accounting standards adopted" 
and "In our firm, there is a clear and transparent mechanism for stakeholders to 
communicate effectively with the firm". In addition, scale reliability (Cronbach's 
Alpha) for the final factor analysis of the communication concept was reported 
and achieved as high as 0.730, an indication of good factor reliability. Before 
going further in the factor analysis, the factorability of the data was examined. 
The value of the overall KMO was normal at .721 and exceeded the minimum 
acceptable level of .5. In addition, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant 
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Our firm includes a section on corporate governance practices in the 
annual report. 
In our firm NEDs, develop an understanding of the views of major 
shareholders. 
In our firm, We disclose information on the compensation for the board 
members and management team in the annual report. 








  Total Variance explained 55.47% 
 Eigenvalues  2.21 
 kmo .721 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.9 Analysis of Conduct Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the conduct factor. All questions 
remained after the analysis was conducted except one. Those questions scored 
above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings explaining around 
54.51% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 2.72. One question 
was deleted from the analysis as it did not achieve the acceptable threshold of 
0.60, and by deleting it the conceptual meaning for the remaining questions 
remained acceptable in terms of measuring the concept of conduct. 
 Table 5.23 gives an overview of the remaining questions of the conduct 
concept. However, the following question was deleted from the analysis, "we 
have clear policy about waiver from the codes".  In addition, scale reliability 
(Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor analysis for the conduct concept was 
reported and achieved as high as 0.790, an indication of good factor reliability. 
Before going further in the factor analysis, the factorability of the data was 
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examined. The value of the overall KMO was normal at .788 and exceeded the 
minimum acceptable level of .5. In addition, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was 
significant (ρ = .000). These results show that factor analysis was suitable for 
the data. 
















There are guidelines for serving as a Director. 
There are adequate procedures in place to guard against insider 
trading. 
There are strict guidelines for safety, health and the environment. 
There are clear guidelines on privacy and data protection. 







 Total Variance explained 54.51% 
 Eigenvalues  2.72 
 kmo .788 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.10  Analysis of Conscience Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the conscience factor. All questions 
remained after the analysis was conducted. The accepted questions scored 
above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings explaining around 
56.72% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 2.83. Table 5.24 
gives an overview of the questions of the conscience concept. In addition, scale 
reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor analysis of the conscience 
concept was reported and achieved as high as 0.807, an indication of good 
factor reliability. Before going further in the factor analysis, the factorability of 
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the data was examined. The value of the overall KMO was normal at .839 and 
exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In addition, the Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results show that factor analysis 
was suitable for the data. 
















Our firm participates in community development programs. 
In our firm we have a clear policy on implementing Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Our firm sponsors educational and/or training programs for the 
community. 
Our firm is involved in charitable contribution. 
We maintain an independent relationship between our firm and the   








 Total Variance explained 56.72% 
 Eigenvalues  2.83 
 kmo .839 
 Bartlett’s test of sphericity .000 
 
5.15.11 Analysis of Performance Factor  
Factor analysis was performed using Varimax factor rotation on the 
variables that are supposed to measure the performance factor. All questions 
remained after the analysis was conducted. The accepted questions scored 
above the acceptable threshold of 0.60 for factor loadings explaining around 
55.61% of the variance in the factor with an eigenvalue of 3.33. Table 5.25 
gives an overview of the questions of the performance concept and the factor 
loadings. In addition, scale reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) for the final factor 
analysis of the performance concept was reported and achieved as high as 
0.839, an indication of good factor reliability. Before going further in the factor 
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analysis, the factorability of the data was examined. The value of the overall 
KMO was normal at .835 and exceeded the minimum acceptable level of .5. In 
addition, the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (ρ = .000). These results 
show that factor analysis was suitable for the data. 













The small size of the board.   
The existence of institutional investors. 
Separation between the position of CEO and Chairman.   
The existence of independent NEDs. 
The use of board subcommittees. 







 Total Variance explained 55.6% 
 Eigenvalues  3.33 
 kmo .835 
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5.16 Regressions with ROA and Performance as Dependant Variables  
The effect of corporate governance on performance was tested using a 
multiple regression model. The form of the initial regression model employed in 
this study is:   
 
Y = β0 + β1 x1+ β2 x2 +.... + βk xk + errors 
 
For example, in the equation above, the dependent variable Y will be the 
performance of the firm  and the independent variables, xi, i=1, …, 10, will be 
the 10 constructs of corporate governance critical factors as defined earlier in 
Chapter Three. Subsequently, the initial regression model, based on the 
ECBPM proposal, is given by: 
 
Performance = β0Age + β1Size+ β2Sector+β3Constitution + β4Control+  
         β4Competence + β5Compliance +β6Competitiveness+ 
         β7Culture + β8Commitment + β9Communication+  
         β10Conduct + β11Conscience +errors 
 
 
The researcher fitted this model to the data of both the dependent and 
independent variables using a backward elimination approach, where the full 
model is fitted and the variable which is least significant is removed from the 
model (Kutner et al., 2004). This process continues until the most parsimonious 
model is found, which has all the significant remaining independent variables 
present. This model is then tested for goodness-of-fit, and the model 
assumptions are validated. 
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Step 1 The Full Model  
 According to Table 5-27 the model has an adjusted R2 of 0.232. This 
means that the model explains almost 23% of the variation in the performance 
amongst sampled firms. Furthermore, the F statistic (.000) indicates that that 
the null hypothesis that all coefficients = 0 can be rejected. This means that the 
independent variables are jointly significant in explaining the performance of the 
firms.  
 During the regression procedure, multicollinearity was assessed by the 
variance inflation factor (VIF). The VIF assesses multicollinearity for each 
individual variable. Gujarati (2003) suggested the following criteria for judging 
the VIF statistics:  
 If the VIF of a variable is greater than 10, then the variable is considered 
highly collinear. 
In the current study, the VIF for the variables investigated was well below the 
accepted levels suggested by Gujarati (2003), where the VIF of all variables 
ranges between 1.069 and 2.594, with an average of 1.395. These statistics are 
shown as part of the summary tables, Table 5.24, of the regression results. 
Based on the results of the test performed, it can be concluded that 
multicollinearity was not problematic in the current study. 
  With respect to control variables, the estimation results presented in 
Table 5.26 shows no effect of size, age or sector on the firm’s performance 
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In step one, the initial full model is fitted, and the result is presented in Table 5.26. The 
regression equation is: 
 
 
Performance = -2.353 + -0.135 Age + 0.234 Size+ 0.102 Sector+0.095   
                        Constitution + 0.003 Control+ -0.011 Competence +  
                        0.153 Compliance + 0.027 Competitiveness+ -0.067 Culture +  
                        0.042 Commitments + 0.038 Communication+   
                         0.032 Conduct + 0.144 Conscience +errors 
 
From this, we can see that control, competence, competitiveness, 
culture, communication, commitment, conduct, size, age or sector do not make 
significant contributions to the model, and so they will be removed in the next 
step. 
 The analysis uses return on asset (ROA) as the dependent variable. In 
the regression analysis only three factors were significant in having effects on 
ROA. The factors are constitution, compliance and conscience.  Standardised 
coefficients are reported as the following: constitution (beta value = 0.095), 
compliance (beta value = 0.153) and conscience (beta value = 0.144). The final 
results are presented in Table 5.26. The regression equation is: 
 
Performance =-2.353 + 0.095 Constitution+ 0.153 Compliance+ 0.144  
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Table 5-26: Summary of the regression results 
 β SE T P VIF 
Constant -2.353 0.044 -53.540 0.000 1.194 
Constitution 0.095 0.045 2.102 0.038 1.186 
Compliance 0.153 0.047 3.249 0.002 1.069 
Conscience 0.144 0.046 3.124 0.002 1.260 
Control 0.003 0.049 0.068 0.946 1.182 
Competence -0.011 0.046 -0.234 0.816 1.109 
Competitiveness 0.027 0.048 0.550 0.584 1.111 
Culture -0.067 0.048 -1.418 0.159 1.289 
Commitment 0.042 0.048 0.872 0.385 1.359 
Communication 0.038 0.047 0.802 0.425 1.176 
Conduct 0.032 0.051 0.630 0.530 2.594 
Size 0.234 0.074 1.737 0.086 2.520 
Age -0.135 0.094 -1.019 0.311 1.091 




Table 5-27 : Model Summary 
R R2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. 
.502 0.252 0.232 3.676 .000(a) 
 
 
Step 2 The Final Model 
The final reduced model with control, competence, competitiveness, culture, 
communication, commitment, conduct, size, age and sector removed—as they 
are non-significant—is presented in Table 5.28. The researcher reran the 
regression with only the significant variables, the results estimated coefficient 
on constitution, compliance and conscience critical factor of CG were found to 
be statistically significant at 5% level on the regression model. The regression 
equation is: 
Performance =.110+ 0.016 Constitution+ 0.014 Compliance+ 0.018   
     Conscience  
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5-28: Summary of the regression results 
 β SE T P VIF 
Constant .110 .006 19.885 .000 1.194 
Constitution .016 .006 2.883 .005 1.186 
Compliance .014 .006 2.313 .023 1.069 




Table 5-29 : Model Summary 
R R2 Adjusted R2 F Sig. 






















The findings of this study indicate that Jordanian firms, especially large and old 
ones, apply CG systems. This chapter has presented a descriptive analysis of 
the independent variables in the current study. The responding firms belonged 
to two sectors, namely the industry and service sectors. These firms varied in 
their size from small to large, though small and medium size firms dominated 
the sample 
A number of topics have been discussed. First, a brief descriptive overview of 
the statistics about the companies participating in the survey has been given. 
Then, the mean levels of all the questions in the questionnaires were presented 
and the questions with the highest mean levels were highlighted. Factor 
analysis was conducted on each of the ten factors of good corporate 
governance.  In addition, performance factor analysis was conducted.  A 
number of questions were excluded from the process as they did not achieve 
the minimum threshold acceptable for factor loadings. The reliability of each 
scale was reported as all of the scales reported achieved an acceptable 
reliability score.  Finally, regression analysis was conducted using the 
dependent variable, financial performance (ROA). The results show that 
compliance, conscience and constitution factors were significant on the ROA 
regression model. Actually, without taking into account these critical factors, the 






6 INTERVIEW RESULTS 
6.1 Interview Results and analysis 
 
6.2 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the nature of current CG practices in 
Jordanian listed firms. It also seeks to identify the current barriers facing the 
application of the Jordanian CG code. In an attempt to explore these issues a 
series of semi-structured interviews were conducted with Jordanian regulators 
and managers in a number of Jordanian listed firms .Thus, this chapter is 
divided into two parts. Part one examines the views of managers while part two 
examines the of views regulators. Each part divided into section. The first 
section concentrates on current CG practices within Jordanian listed firms. The 
second section deals with the current barriers facing the application of the CG 
Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. The 
remainder of the chapter ends with major findings derived from the analysis of 
semi structured interviews. A summary of this chapter findings are presented at 
the end. The following presents participants’ demographic details. 
6.3 General Information   
The interviews were accomplished with seven managers and four 
regulators. Each interview took, on average, 60 minutes. Table 6.1 offer some 
important information regarding the interviewees. Table 6.1 presents that the 
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organisational positions qualifications and experience of interviewees are 
among the most critical factors that can be relied upon to achieve high quality 
information. Thus, more reliable or high quality information is expected. General 
information about these participants is shown in Table 6.1. 
Concerning participants ‘qualification two studied in the US, two others 
studied in Jordan and three studied in the UK and Egypt. Concerning work 
experience, two have experience of more than 15 years three others have 
experience of more than 20 years; while the two remaining have more than 25 
years of experience. The second group of interviewees were from the Jordan 
securities commission (JSC), particularly, the Capital Market Institutions 
Monitoring Department and disclosure Department. They were a manger and 
his deputy. Three of them held a Master in Economics and Accounting, whereas 
the other held a Bachelor degree in Banking and Finance. All of them had nine 
years of experience or more.  
6-1 Details of Interviewees 
Managers - Listed firms 
No Interviewee’s Position in firm Qualifications Level 
and Place 
 Experience-Years 
1 General Manger and member of 
the board of directors 
MBA and Master in 
Engineering - USA 
 30    
2 General Manger and member of 
the board of directors 
MSc in Finance -UK 23  
3 Financial Manager Master in 
Accounting-Jordan  
17   
4 Financial Manager CPA-USA 26 
5 Financial Manager MSc  in Accounting-
UK 
21 









Regulators- Jordan securities commission 
1 Director of Capital Market 
Institutions Monitoring Department 
Master in Financial 
Markets-Jordan 
19 
2 Deputy of Capital Market 




3 Director of disclosure department Master degree in 22 




4  Deputy of disclosure department Bachelor in Banking 
and Finance-Jordan 
9 
6.4  Analysis of Interviews with Managers 
This part seeks to examine the views of the Jordanian regulators in 
relation to identifying and mitigating barriers specifically with regard to the 
introduction of the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange.   
6.4.1 The Current Practice of Corporate governance 
The first part of interview includes participants’ information about current 
CG practices of Jordanian listed firms and the main barriers affecting CG 
practices. Generally, CG mechanisms consist of stockholder rights, disclosure 
and transparency, responsibilities of BOD’s and board committees   (OECD, 
2004; Saidi, 2004; McGee, 2008; Burton et al., 2009).Thus, the analysis of 
participants’ responses to these issues is presented and examined in the 
following subsections.   
6.4.1.1 The Protection of Shareholder Rights 
OECD (2004) suggested that the CG framework should protect the rights 
of stockholders to elect members of the BODs, to get pertinent information on 
the firm on regularly and to vote in the Annual General Meeting (AGM).Thus, 
participants were asked to provide their perception on the implementation of 
shareholders’ rights in Jordanian listed firms regarding vote at AGM, as a 
general manager emphasised that all stockholders have the right to vote at the 
AGM. He stated: 
"Certainly, all shareholders have a legal right to vote at the AGM”. Another 
added “As matter of fact, all stockholders have the right to vote at the AGMs”. 
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Regarding stockholders’ rights to obtain information, all participants 
argued that every stockholder has the right to obtain information regarding the 
firm’s financial and non financial operations. The following statements from 
managers may clarify this point: 
 “In general, investors and stockholders have the right to obtain relevant 
information. At the same time, they do not have the right to know any private 
information". 
 This finding align with the results found by Milan (2007), who found that 
stockholders should be informed of all the details concerning stockholders 
meetings,   
 Concerning profit sharing, Managers pointed out: 
“Our firm paid 8% of the total net income. The dividend distribution policy is one 
of the duties and responsibilities of the BOD’s before being offered to the 
assembly". 
 With regard to the right to attend and participate at the AGM, OECD 
(2004) supports this point that stockholders have the right to vote at the 
assembly meeting. All the firms tend to employ the rules of Jordanian 
commercial law of rights regarding stockholders at the AGM.  This is consistent 
with suggestion made by the OECD (2004). 
6.4.1.2 Non executive directors 
One important issue in CG is NEDs. According to Hermalin and 
weisbach (1991) provides the control system for firms. In other words, NEDs 
are seen as the check system.  Further, they play as controller of 
management’s performance (Pettigrew and McNultty, 1995; Mak, 1996).  The 
Jordanian law forces Jordanian firms to appoint an audit committee from NEDs 
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(not fewer than three) as a link between management and external   
accountants. This is a good step to meet OECD (2004) recommendation that 
the BODs should include a minimum of three NEDs who are able to influence 
the board’s decisions. 
 Managers were asked to state factors they thought affect the 
appointment of NEDs in Jordanian firms. The majority of managers agreed that 
global business contacts and experience were important factors influencing the 
appointment of NEDs in these firms. Some interviewees considered them as 
some of the most important factors. A participant said: 
“I do believe that global business contacts and experience were important 
factors influencing the appointment of NEDs in Jordanian firms.” 
Another added: 
“I think that business contacts play an outstanding role in the process of 
appointing and selecting NEDs.” 
 Also some managers added another important factor, personal qualities and 
attributes and not afraid to speak up. One, participant expressed his opinion as 
follows: 
“Yes, there are important criteria, such as strong and effective personalities. In 
my view, if NEDs have weak personalities, despite their management skills, 
qualifications and experiences, they will be unable to  impose their opinions and 
viewpoints.”  
This result was similar to that reported by Hussain and Mallin (2003). They 
investigated the dynamics of CG in Bahrain, by testing the board structures of 
firms in the country. They found key factors affected on the appointment of 
NEDs were business experience, reputation and relevant skills. From the above 
we can say that experience, possessing global business contacts skills and 
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professional qualifications play an important role in determining the appointment 
of NEDs in Jordanian firms. 
Interviewees were asked to give their opinion if CG policy in Jordan will 
lead to an increase in the number of NEDs.  Generally, they agreed on their 
presence through the Code that requires all Jordanian firms to appoint NEDs, 
but the current situation needs more improvements. This findings supported by 
the findings reported in the PWC Survey (1997) that indicated that seventeen 
percent of firms had two, twenty three percent had three, and sixty percent had 
more than three NEDs. One participant commented: 
“I expect if we adopt a strong system of governance in Jordan, this will 
lead to increase the number of NED’s in listed firms.” 
“The CG Code for Shareholding Firms Listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange declares there should be at least three NEDs in those firms. Their 
function is to observe the firm’s BOD’s administration. This will increase 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ confidence in the firm and will attract local and 
foreign investors. ”  
 Some interviewees suggested that NEDs play an important role inside the firm. 
A participant stated: 
“In my view, NEDs play a significant role only in the large firms, such as 
communications, mining, and electricity. They supervise the work both the firm 
administration and the board of directors. They also study all the present 
projects that will be undertaken by the firm in the future and ascertain their 
suitability to firm policy. ”  
The above results support those obtained by Dahya et al., (2002) found that 
most firms in China in their study recognised that the supervisory board falls 
into one of the following types: a board that does nothing or a board that merely 
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provides advice.   
 Concerning the separation the two positions of Chairman and CEO, most 
firms separate positions. The following point of views may clarify this issue: 
“Of course, the position of the CEO and Chairman are totally separated". “The 
CG Code for Shareholding Firms Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
recommended full separation between that the positions of chairman and the 
executive manager on the BODs"   
 These findings are in line with the results of Black et al. (2008), which found 
that most Brazilian firms separated the position of CEO /Chairman. These 
results are also in line with common CG recommendations (OECD, 2004). 
However, these results go against the findings of Abd-Rahman (2008), who 
found most Egyptian listed firms as having no separation the position of 
Chairman/CEO. Also, the participants were asked to give their opinion on the 
extent to which the boards of their firms carried out the following tasks and 
responsibilities referred to in the CG Code for Shareholding Firms Listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange: issuing rules specifying the responsibilities of the 
BODS; setting the firm’s objective; evaluating   performance of the management 
rules identifying the relationship with different stakeholders and reviewing the 
firm’s internal policies. 
 Concerning the general rules specifying the responsibilities of the BODs 
are well defined by the CG Code for Shareholding Firms Listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange according to the interview data. However, some interviewees 
assured the need for written rules which were requested by external partner. 
Some interviewees stated: 
"There are many rules stated in Jordanian corporate governance code, 
which explain the role of the BOD’s and set out the responsibilities and tasks 
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assigned to the board member”. 
“Frankly, I can say there are no rules, but the BODs are effectively to 
prepare a draft which identifies its duties.” 
 With regard to setting the Firm's objectives and according to the 
interview data, the majority of firms declared that their BODs play a significant 
role in setting the firm's objectives .A general manger stated on this issue: 
“Actually, our BODs took a significant step in preparing a package of 
goals and strategies, as I know this is one of the main functions of the BODs“. 
In addition, a financial manager stated: 
"In fact, the BODs members are key players in deciding the objectives of the 
firm as well as the means of achieving these goals and objectives”. 
This  similar to the results made by the Cadbury Report (1992); OECD (2004); 
Solomon et al. (2003) and Gupta, (2008) who found that BODs duties are to 
decide the direction of the firm through clarifying its goals and strategies. On the 
other hand, a Deputy Manager argued that the BODs did not play a significant 
role in setting the firm’s objectives. This task was primarily played by the CEO, 
while the BODs role was to adopt or adapt these objectives. He stated: 
“In our firm, it is the CEO who decides all objective and tries to convince 
the BODs of that. Yes, I understand that all the tasks that should be done by the 
BODs are accomplished by the CEO because of his knowledge of many 
practical side of the work”. 
These findings are in accordance with the findings of Petra (2005), who 
recognised two key features that help the BODs accomplish its duties: having 
reliable and strong BODs.   
 With regard to evaluating performance of the management, the 
participants assured that performance of the management was evaluated by 
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BODs. A participant puts it in the following terms. 
"Yes, the BOD’s evaluate the executive management using many 
financial and non-financial indicators". 
This finding is in accordance with that supported by Black et al. (2008). 
They affirmed the important role played by the BODs members in appraising    
performance of the management. Moreover, the findings consistence with the 
results of Al-Ajlan,(2005), who investigated the duties of the BODs in Saudi 
Arabia firms. He found that there was a mixture of opinions among the 
respondents in relation to whether BODs in Saudi Arabia firms were really 
monitoring and   the   management’s performance.  
Concerning policies are identifying the relationship with different 
stakeholders; the information gained from participants confirmed that all firms 
do not have such policies. Hence, some respondents declared that their firms 
were functioning according to Jordanian laws (for instance commercial law), 
which specified the right of all stakeholders. The main reason behind the lack of 
policies was the Jordanian business environment had recently moved toward 
privatisation. Some extractions from participants clarify these points: 
"The firm operates in accordance with a set of regulation to identify and 
protect stakeholders' rights. In fact, a lot of concepts need to be explained to 
keep right’s of stakeholder ". 
"Unfortunately, there are no regulations that clarify such relations with 
different stakeholders; however the BOD’s relatively aware that stakeholders 
are the heart of a firm’s interest. Hence, it executes a set of everyday works that 
maintains their interest and rights ". 
"As I declared previously, there is no detailed code for CG for the 
stakeholders, but in general members of the BODs have relevant guidelines". 
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These results are in accordance with the suggestions made by the OECD 
(2004), that the rights of stakeholders should be protected by law. Further, this 
is consistent with Letza et al. (2004), who studied the accountability of 
stakeholders. They affirmed that since the community is probable to be 
influenced by firm’s operations, firms should extend its accountability to 
community. Additionally, Collier (2008) assured that stakeholders have 
influence on firms; therefore, they need appreciation from the management of 
the firm.   
Regarding reviewing the firm's internal policies, the information gained 
from participants indicated that the internal policy was one of the main duties of 
the BODs. A participant stated that: 
"The BODs duties include monitoring the firm’s internal policies ". 
Moreover, a participant stated that: 
"Generally, the BODs review both financial and non-financial policies”. 
 Some firms employ specialists to perform this duty. This was confirmed by a 
participant: 
"It is common that our firm frequently reviews the internal policies with 
the help of experts, if needed ". 
It was also clear that some firms examine their internal policies according to 
economic circumstances. According to a participant:   
 “The firm reviews internal policies always depend on the economic 
circumstances”. 
With regard to Internal Control System, respondents shown that they 
have an effective internal control system (ICS). As a director of Internal and 
auditing department argued: 
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"Well, I do believe the ICS must be developed not in our firm but in all 
firms in the country". 
 Participants were solicited whether their firm has an auditing unit. The 
participants assured that it was useful having internal auditors. All participants 
argued that the unit has full autonomy and the internal auditors report to the 
audit committee and BODs. A manager said: 
"Our internal auditing unit is totally managed by a qualified accountant 
who report to BODs.” 
A manager explained: 
 “The auditing unit works under the BODs supervision and auditing 
committee and has many duties concerning financial supervision. Moreover, the 
auditors are totally independently supervised by the Chief Executive Officer”. 
6.4.1.3 Conflict of Interest and committees 
Agency problem is the conflict of interest between mangers and 
shareholders, and it appears when the managers ignore the benefits of 
shareholders (Mallin, 2007).The majority of participants mentioned that their 
firms have no written guidelines for the executives regarding this issue. In fact 
the staff and the executives are guided by some regulations, which already exist 
in firms’ law. Though, some participants stated that the lack of written guidelines 
was   as a result of the idea of CG is somehow relatively new. As a manager 
said: 
"The concept of corporate governance, hence, it is still at the dawn stage 
for such guidelines ". 
In addition, a board member and general manager stated: 
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“No worries, as corporate governance is a new idea for Jordan. There 
are similar regulations on what to be done by the staff “. 
 
On the other hand, a manger claimed that they have written guidelines 
concerning conflict of interest. He said: 
 "As I mentioned before, there is a control system in our firm. in fact, there 
are by-laws that organise and control the relations with external parties ". 
All participants also claimed that their firm do not have written code of conduct 
which could follow. This because the fact that CG is new in Jordan. A general 
manager stated: 
"... As a result of poor experience with the concept of CG, these dilemma 
are still in one way or another not of interest ". 
This in line with the results of Dahawy (2008), who found that CG in 
Egypt, was  weak  as a result of the lack of  experience about the   benefits and 
needs of  such system. Moreover, these findings also in line with the results of 
Duca, Gherghina et al. (2007), who found that some firms in Romania  had no   
a written code of ethics officially  determining the responsibilities of BODs and 
directors. 
Concerning audit committees all participants confirmed that they have an 
audit committee. As a manger in a firm said: 
"Sure, we have an audit committee and it includes at least three BODs 
members and this committee is chaired by expert accountant”. 
However, only one participant said that their firm did not have an audit 
committee. They justify that this may be because of the fact that CG is just in 
early stage in Jordan and that many firms are not aware of its benefits.   
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This consistent with the results found by Dahawy (2008); Gupta (2008), and 
Black et al. (2008). Furthermore, this results was supported by Solomon, et al. 
(2003), who also found that few firms in Taiwan had established audit and 
remuneration committees 
 On the other hand, all participants claimed that their firm did have no 
nomination committee. Interestingly, the responsibility of the nomination 
committee became the duties of the general assembly. The following statement 
clarifies this issue: 
"In our firm, we do not have nomination committee, but the general 
assembly undertakes its responsibilities ". 
Furthermore, other participants mentioned that BODs as responsible for all the   
nomination committee duties, for instance, nominating managers for   executive 
positions in addition to informing them about the code of CG to comply. Further, 
he argued: 
"The BODs is responsible for nominating managers for all positions". 
Interestingly, a participant claimed that his firm has a nomination 
committee. He claimed that nomination committee was the BODs, which was in 
charge for nominating managers in many posts. It seemed as if this participant 
did not recognize the difference between the BODs and nomination committee. 
It is worth to note that all participants claimed that they have no a nomination 
committee and emphasized that all responsibilities were carried out by the 
BODs.  
This finding conflicted with the recommendations of many corporate 
governance codes in both developing and developed countries (The Combined 
Codes 2006; OECD 2004; Cadbury 1992). Furthermore, this result was 
consistent with the results provided by Solomon, Lin et al. (2003). They showed 
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that few firms in Taiwan had established audit and remuneration committees.  
The results also confirm the results of Abd-Rahman (2008), who found that the 
BODs of almost half of the Egyptian firms did not establish remuneration 
committees. 
Also, some participants agreed that an investor relation department was 
important to solve any problems meet by the investors. It provided stockholders 
with pertinent information, In addition to coordinate between the firm and the 
market. A general manager stated: 
“Investor relation department are providing stockholders with some   
information and other pertinent statistics in addition to dealing with ASE. ".   
In line with fairness and transparency, a firm has the responsibility to 
support effective relations with stockholders and other stakeholders (Milan, 
2007) 
6.4.1.4 Disclosure   
 Participants were solicited to give their views on how effectively their 
firm employed the disclosure requirements of the Jordanian Corporate 
Governance Code concerning of social policies, BODs committee and related 
party transactions. All participants admitted that disclosure and transparency is 
vital and significant for firms to stay in the market.  
  Concerning to the annual report of the BODs, the participants agreed 
that their firms disclosed this with financial. In contrast, one participant claimed 
that his firm did not disclose an annual report of the BODs. He claimed that only 
financial statements were disclosed and as he pointed out: 
"No more than the financial statements are disclosed, but the BODs 
annual report has never been published. Our firm provide the investors with the 
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basic financial statements, namely balance sheets and income statements". 
Other participants stated that their firms disclosed only the names of the 
committee members. This may still be because of the fact that CG is in early 
stage in Jordan. A participant stated: 
“Only the names of the committee members are disclosed in the annual 
report ". 
On the other hand, the other participants s mentioned that their firm had no a 
BODs committees. Thus, they did not give any statements concerning this 
question. 
 Another emerging issue of importance in corporate governance is 
corporate social responsibility (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). Corporate social 
responsibility has become very important for many countries, and the new trend 
of governments is to release accountability indexes concerning social and 
environmental accountability. Firms must have a helpful role in spreading social 
culture (Solomon and Solomon, 2004). For these reasons, all participants in the 
current study were solicited to give their personal opinion on firms’ success in 
discharging accountability to society and behaving socially responsible in 
Jordan. Some participants indicated that the current effort of Jordanian firms is 
weak, because financial lists in most public firms are free from any indication 
that they take social responsibility into consideration. But in their opinion, the 
application of effective CG will encourage firms to adopt social responsibility in 
the future. A participant made the following statement: 
“Actually, there are no such a systems created by the firm to be 
accountable to the society. So, the problem is in the system, and that is why it is 
very critical to apply good CG in Jordanian firms in order to overcome such a 
problem.” 
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Some interviewees thought all firms should be as socially responsible firms, 
through investment in human resources, providing job opportunities for the 
society, and designing training courses for people. These entire variables would 
help firms to be accountable to the society. A participant remark that: 
“The firm should work to serve the society and utilise all human 
resources in the society to motivate potential employees to work in the private 
sector, in that way promoting the importance of this sort of firm in the Jordanian 
environment.”  
This result is consistent with recommendations and findings obtained by 
Solomon arid Solomon (2004). Andrew and Samantha (2001) and Sparkes 
(2002) indicated that institutional investors have huge socially responsible 
investment as part of their portfolio investment strategies. On the other hand 
some interviewees thought discharging accountability should be a partnership 
effort between government, public listed firms and the society. One stated: 
“Discharging accountability should be adopted by the firm, the 
government, and the society. This is the best policy to discharge accountability 
and behave as a socially responsible firm. 
During the interview it was found that interviewees mentioned the importance of 
a new policy to be introduced by the government in concentrating on the 
society. They suggested designing many workshops and conferences to direct 
the firms to increase the awareness of the importance of corporate social 
responsibility and applying the principles of the good CG system in Jordan. This 
view was provided by a manger in a firm who remarked: 
“Currently, our firm understand its duties to the society and its conduct as 
a socially responsible firm.  Undoubtedly this is because of the current interest 
of the Government in applying good CG system and thereby setting effective 
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criteria for this system. ”  
Also, some participants considered that at present corporate social 
responsibility is not very important dilemma in Jordan. Nevertheless, they 
expected the status quo to change with the recent implementation of the CG 
system in Jordanian firms, since they feel that this system motivates the firm’s 
interest in the community. Confirming this view, participants made the following 
statement: 
“Not yet, but I do wish it would happen as soon as possible with the 
implementation of CG in all Jordanian firms.”  
 "Really, in Jordan if there were social responsibilities, the society 
wouldn't know about it". 
 Generally, the government of Jordan has paid quite efforts in recent 
years to society and CSR. Furthermore, It is also paying attention on the effect 
of firms’ operations on the environment. 
 Concerning related part transaction, participants confirmed that their firm 
had no related party transactions. As a participant claimed: 
"In fact, there are no such transactions, and even if there were, they 
cannot be approved because of the lack of disclosure and transparency".  
This finding could be justified because of the weakness of transparency and 
disclosure and in Jordan. 
6.4.2 Factors inhibiting the application of good CG in Jordan 
As regards the main factor inhibiting the practice of corporate 
governance in Jordan, different barriers were suggested by participants, such 
as: weak management team; poor legal environment; government intervention; 
ownership structure of firms; high financial cost of applying the good CG system 
and deficiency of training programs for members of BODs about good CG 
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system. As a result of such investigation, it is found that the majority of 
interviewees believe the lack of systems and procedures governing firm 
activities are the first factor inhibiting the practice of effective formal governance 
in Jordanian companies. These opinions are supported by a manger said: 
“I agree, because current systems and procedures in Jordan are free 
from the obligation for Jordanian firms to apply good CG system.”  
Some managers suggested another factors. They stated: 
“Generally, I agree with this finding, but large shareholders might affect 
the firm's decisions –making process.” 
"Majority of firms’ management leadership have no high level of 
knowledge about its industry.”. 
In addition, a manager stated: 
 
"Poor management leadership is a key barrier in understanding and 
applying this system ".  
 
Further, one manger relate this to the lack of knowledge about its benefits, and 
the absence of education and training programmes.   
This result confirms the recommendations made by Dahawy (2008); extra 
attention is required on education and training among all stakeholders to 
develop the application of good CG in Egypt. This response supports findings 
and recommendations made by Malin (2007) and Solomon (2007), who argues 
that it is very significant for stockholders to decide for themselves BODs, 
composed of highly educated members interested to take decisions that will 
increase the firm performance and thereby maximise shareholders value.  
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Furthermore, this consistent with findings provided by Fawzy (2003) she 
declared that the Egyptian legal system is  still need extra efforts to increase the 
effectiveness of applying good CG in the country. Wong (2009) also examined 
the various CG reforms in Philippines after the employment of the code of CG, 
and he noted that there was a poor law supporting CG in the country.  
Thus, managers recommend it is one of the main barriers of CG as a 
large number of BODs staff and directors do not comprehend the system. They 
believe that in Jordan the issue of CG training is ignored. Directors should be 
aware that if they become less informed about training benefits, their firms will 
continue to stay behind in this regard. Therefore, it is important for integrating 
CG lessons in their training sessions. Both the stock exchange and the 
Jordanian government should assist each other to solve these barriers. This 
was supported by a director, who mentioned: "We are desperate for training 
courses and seminars to mitigate the gap between our firms and developed 
countries". 
In addition, a manager stated: 
 
"I have attended many training programmes offered by the government, but 
none of them was about the CG system”. 
 
This is in line with the recommendations made by the UAB (2007), which assert 
the need to implement training programs on CG for appropriate staff in the Arab 
countries. This finding is also consistent with the results of Dahawy (2008) who 
stated that the need to increase the focus on training programs to employees 
and other stakeholders to develop the application of CG in Egypt. 
 In contrast, others attributed this to other problems, as lack of 
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transparency. Further, they highlighted that there are quit laws in Jordan, but 
the problem is with it is implementation.  A manager stated: 
  
"..., I don’t count the Jordanian legal climate to be real barriers as there 
are such rules that many other Arab countries don't have... in general, the 
actual  problem  is with it is implementation". 
  This finding is in line with the recommendations presented by Chong 
and Lopez-de-Silanes (2007). Their results highlighted that the Latin American   
under analysis suffered from a poor legal protection and poor capital markets as 
a result of poor enforcement of their regulations.     
Government intervention also was mentioned as one of the barriers of 
the implementation of good CG. Participants assured that the barriers that 
prevent good CG in Jordan is simply because the government of Jordan is still 
interfering in state firms. Unfortunately, this is contrary to the government of   
Jordan claims in front of the international community as they totally support the 
implantation of good CG in Jordan. They continued to argue that even in those 
firms which were already privatised, the government intervention is a barrier to 
firm activity. Simply, the government still partly owns stocks in these firms and 
dealt them as state firms. In support of this, a general manger said: 
 
"The government still exerts a great deal of control over many firms in 
Jordan despite their privatisation, which negatively affects their activities”. 
 
The ownership structure of some firms in Jordan was pointed out by some 
participants, who declared that this was dominated by families and thus 
represent a barrier to good CG.  Really, the effect of some parties over some 
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firms has created many problems. This was mentioned by a general manager, 
who said: 
“Family ownership affects the firm to operate in their best interest and 
thus ignoring the shareholders and other stakeholders’ interest". 
The other barriers to the implementation of good CG in Jordan 
mentioned by some participants were the financial cost. This is because god 
CG requires the creation of many committees connected with BODs as well as 
requires some experts from outside the firms and sometime outside the country. 
Hence, the other participants claimed that good CG is a costly system, but its 
benefits exceed its costs. Surly, this relates to a lack of awareness of both the 
government and directors of the firm. A CEO of a firm stated that: 
"In spite of the cost, such a good CG system achieves transparency, 
which is more than valuable”. 
Moreover, a   general manager stated: 
"There is some cost, but compared to the benefits it will be nothing”. 
Also, he remarked:  
 “It won't be significant enough to be described a barrier.”  
This result was in accordance with the results of Business Roundtable (2006). 
The results showed the high costs of implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley in the 
USA. This finding also confirmed the results of Duca et al. (2007), which 
revealed that most firms in Romania consider the adoption of a good CG 
system as difficult because of huge financial cost.    
  The next part of the chapter present semi structured interviews with 
Jordanian regulators.  
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6.5  Interviews with Jordanian Regulators 
This part seeks to examine the views of the Jordanian regulators in 
relation to current practice of CG and identifying and decreasing obstacles, 
specifically with regard to the introduction of the CG Code for shareholding 
companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange.   
6.5.1 The current practice of CG System in Jordanian Firms 
This section presents and discusses many issues regarding the current 
practice of good corporate governance practices in Jordan, general ideas about 
the introduction of the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the 
Amman Stock Exchange, the advantage of applying this code and the status 
quo of CG in Jordan.   
6.5.1.1 The Jordanian CG Code   
 In general, the participants answered positively to the idea of 
implementing the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange. Although it is clear that the findings of the interview survey   
supported applying good CG system in Jordanian firms since all of them were in 
favour of the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange.  A participant stated that: 
"Corporate governance code is necessary for any stock exchange. But, 
the stock exchange may be too rushed in implementing such a code."   
Other participants expressed their views as follow: 
 
 "The CG code is a good step toward maximising the firm performance". 
"The CG code is outstanding if correctly implemented.”. 
Moreover, the key reason behind the application of the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange was mentioned 
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by a participant: 
"... We had to explain some important issues related to the firms to be 
listed in the Amman stock exchange, and definitely CG was one of them. 
Corporate governance was completely unknown to employees of these firms, 
so this code makes them aware of good CG system". 
 Also, the other participants remarked that the code was copied. They stated: 
“It is important to have such a code in Jordan, but as I know most of its 
items are copied from other codes.” 
“The CG code is completely new in our country and preparing such a 
code is a big scheme, and I am sure all the firms will shortly identify the benefits 
of implementing it”. 
Further advantages are presented and discussed in the following subsection. 
6.5.1.2 The Advantages of Applying the Corporate Governance Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange  
   The most common benefits were presented by the interviewees are 
organising relationships between the BODS, investors and shareholders and      
shareholders’ rights protection. As one of the participants stated: 
“There is at least one advantages of applying the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange; t which is   
protection of shareholders’ rights in the Jordanian firms”. 
On the same idea, some interviewees remarked: 
 "The main benefits are organising the relationships between the   
shareholders and BODs”. 
These results are in accordance with those mentioned by La Porta et al. 
(1999). They stated that protecting minority shareholders is vital to good CG. 
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They also provided that investors are highly motivated when the firm develops 
effective CG to protect interest of minority shareholders’  wealth(La Porta, De-
Silanes et al., 1999). Participants expressed their opinions as regards the 
benefits of applying the Jordanian Corporate Governance Code: 
  "In my opinion, applying good CG will lead to market growth as 
well as transparency. Furthermore; it may lead to foreign investment". 
"There will be many benefits, as investor confidence and firm protection 
against collapse, which utilise the country as a whole". 
 These results were also in accordance with those provided by Gregory 
and Simms (1999) and La Porta et al. (1999). Moreover, the OECD principles 
support this finding: 
"Good CG helps to assure that firms use their capital efficiently. It helps 
to maintain the confidence of investors both foreign and domestic. "(OECD, 
2004) 
It should be noted that participants emphasized the need for good CG principles 
especially in Jordan as a result of their importance in preventing corruption in 
their firms. As a financial manager said: 
“The concept of CG is still in early stage in Jordan, even though, I am 
more than sure that the interest in  the practice of good CG will increase by time 
in Jordan  precisely because it has suffered a lot from corruption. Therfore, it is 
in need, more than ever, of CG in order to keep firms running and to maximize 
shareholders value”. 
6.5.1.3 The Status Quo of CG in Jordan 
The interviewees in the interview survey were solicited to express their 
opinion about the status quo of CG in Jordan. The participants answered 
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positively to the issue of the current implementation of the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange in Jordan but 
the existing situation needs more development.  It is clear that the findings 
obtained from regulators tend to support the findings extracted from the 
mangers of Jordanian listed firms regarding the application of the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange by these firms. 
On the other hand, some Jordanian regulators believed that the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange code was not 
strongly applicable. As regulator put it: 
 "Frankly, I don't believe that firms listed on the Jordanian stock 
exchange practice CG system since directors of the firms do not understand 
such code ". 
 However, some regulators justify the poor application of the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange to the lack of 
directors’ knowledge of it and the panic that it would minimise their own rights. A 
regulator explained: 
"Applying CG principles to some extent is not easy since Jordanian firms 
aren't ready well yet.”. 
 Another regulator believed that the reason for not applying effectively 
the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
is the absence of investment awareness in Jordanian firms. He commented: 
“Actually, most of corporate governance principles exist in theory, since 
it’s included in the Jordanian companies law. Even though, most Jordanian 
firms did not apply these principles, and this, in my view, is because of the 
absence of investment awareness in Jordanian listed firms.” 
It is worth to mention the results made by Dahawy, (2008); Wong, (2009); and 
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McGee, (2008), who studied CG applications in selected Asian markets and 
found that the practices of CG principles was very weak. In addition, Greenspan 
(1999); Harvey and Andrew (1999) examined the East Asian CG, remarked that 
weak CG is one of the main causes of the East Asian financial collapse of 1997. 
Furthermore, it is very important note made by Peng and Heath (1996) who 
claimed that the week CG mechanisms generate a weak governance climate, 
which in turn will definitely create Agency problems. 
In short, Jordanian firm law included the principles of CG. But, the 
problem is set with the applying this system, since it vary from one firm to 
another according to the internal policy of each firm The interviewees  pointed 
that this dilemma cannot be sorted unless the government of Jordan appoint an 
external body to manage the application of good CG principles. This outcome is 
consistent with the results made by Hussain and Mallin (2003, p.249) in their 
study on Bahrain: 
“Whilst Bahrain does not have a CG code yet, the firm law include some 
interesting point that will contribute to the CG framework in Bahrain. In fact, 
there are some optimistic characteristics and improvements in CG in Bahrain”. 
Clearly, in theory, some Jordanian firms comprehend the Jordanian CG Code, 
practically, it is absent absolutely. Some regulators stated that the problem with 
the implementation of the code is the lack of knowledge of the directors about 
its benefits; on the other hand, some assumed that this was because the code 
was copies from other developed countries.  At the same time, others believe 
that the Jordanian firms worries that CG application would minimise their own 
rights. This outcome is in accordance with Duca et al. (2007), who stated that in 
Romania there was not actual interest in CG concept. Thus, in order to have 
real interest in the concept of corporate governance, the government should 
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designs training programmes and spread the culture of governance between 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Dahawy (2008). 
6.5.2 Factors inhibiting the application of good CG in Jordan 
This section aimed to identify which barriers most affected the 
implementation of the corporate governance practices in Jordan as noted in the 
interviews with mangers of listed firms and the questionnaire survey results. 
The participants were given a list of barriers facing the application of the CG 
Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. Eight 
barriers recognised by the participants, the regulators ranked three of them as 
critical barriers.   
Regulators mentioned ‘Lack of knowledge of board of directors about CG 
principles’ as the most significant barrier. This result confirm and extend the 
recommendations made by Mallin, (2007) and Solomon (2007), who stated that 
it is important for shareholders to decide for themselves BODs, composed of 
qualified members, who are interested to make decisions that will benefit the 
firm as a whole and increase shareholder value. Moreover, the impacts of the 
‘weakness of the legal environment’ for firms in Jordan followed by the ‘financial 
cost of applying corporate governance system’ were the two barriers noted by 
regulators to be among the barriers for implementation of t the CG Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. This outcome is 
confirmed by Wong (2009); Klapper and Love (2004) who showed that CG 
system are important in countries with poor legal regulations. 
Concerning vehicles of overcoming these barriers, participants agreed 
that designing training programmes and seminars, in addition to introducing CG 
education plan. Furthermore, Jordanian firms needed more    support from the 
regulator to implement CG. A regulator remarked: 
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"These barriers can be eliminated by organising seminars, implement 
campaigns via media programmes ". 
It is worth to note that the concept of good CG somehow is in early stages in 
Jordan. Definitely, there is a lack of information and knowledge about good CG, 
however implementing effective corporate governance without doubt will offer 
huge benefits to managers, shareholders and other stakeholders.  In addition, 
Jordanian firms should bear in mind to cover the cost of training board of 
directors’ members as well as management team and other firms’ staff. 
  Respondents were solicited to give their opinion concerning the barriers 
preventing practicing good CG in Jordanian firms and how to overcome these 
barriers. Respondents mentioned two important barriers according to them, 
namely, ‘ownership structure’ and ‘weakness of the legal system’’. Also, they 
recognised the absence of regulations for CG as it is a new concept in Jordan 
As a regulator said: 
“Two barriers are hindering practising good corporate governance in 
Jordan, namely, ownership structure and the absence of good corporate 
governance rules. Therefore, the CG Code for shareholding companies listed 
on the Amman Stock Exchange is needed”   
 Tribal loyalties of the board members and major shareholders finally 
were mentioned by a regulator as a barriers, unfortunately, they did not provide 
and solutions to overcome problem. Furthermore, the respondents believed that 
raising shareholders and other stakeholders’ awareness may promote the 
application of good CG in Jordan. He remarked: 
“Raising shareholders and other stakeholders’ awareness, this is 
counted as one of the barriers which hindering application of good corporate 
governance”. Also, he added:" The government in Jordan should educate 
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stakeholders about the benefits of the application of good CG". 
 This point of view is line with results obtained from Duca et al. (2007), who 
claimed that in spite of the government efforts, there was no real interest in CG 
issues. At the same time, respondents confirmed that there were no more other 
barriers from their experience that were significant.   
6.5.3 Future Development of CG in Jordan 
Many issues relating to the future development of CG in Jordan were 
discussed in this section, namely, raising  awareness  between different bodies 
about the concept of CG and recognize the duties for both developing CG 
practices and supervising compliance with the Jordanian Corporate 
Governance Code. Participants confirmed public awareness can be done with 
cooperation between the private and public sectors; through spread awareness 
among all firms. In addition, universities should work with the government to 
organise conferences, as well as publish brochures and leaflets. In fact there is 
a lot of ideas to be done to increase the awareness of the impotence principles 
of CG.  A regulator said: 
"All government arms should be cooperated to increase public 
awareness of CG by organising conferences and publish newsletters. 
Universities should be considered because it is the main source of knowledge 
especially in developing economies including Jordan". 
 Spreading awareness should be one of the duties and responsibilities of 
firm managers to organise training for BODs and the employees concerning the 
implementation of good CG in Jordan, and to impose penalties for violation any 
rules of this system. Further, the awareness could be promoted by giving more 
power to the Jordan Securities Commission, as it is an independent authority   
to introduce the concept of good CG in Jordan and to ask all listed firms to 
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apply it. Additionally, the government should compel all firms listed on the ASE 
to apply the CG Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange. Furthermore, the Jordan securities commission can bear the 
responsibility of developing and applying the concept of CG system in Jordan. 
This view was supported by a regulator who stated: 
“The body that can be best to develop the concept of CG is Jordanian 
Securities Exchange Commission. Therefore, they should play a huge role in 
developing corporate governance system in Jordan”. 
 The reason behind this response is that the securities exchange 
commission is the main source of regulation for all listed firms in Amman Stock 
Exchange.   
Finally, the interviewees were solicited to justify who should be 
responsible for ensuring compliance with the corporate governance Code for 
shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. Interviewees 
believed that this is a very tough job for one group to supervise compliance with 
this code and so recommended cooperation between all of them namely, 
private and public sector, definitely without excluding the stock exchange. 
Furthermore, professional societies and Universities should all of them work 
together to compel all Jordanian listed firms to apply good corporate 
governance system. On the other hand if it is possible ask the securities 
exchange commission to impose fines for noncompliance. A regulator puts it in 
the following terms: 
"I have previously mentioned that each sector must apply the principles 
of good corporate governance in a right way otherwise impose fine for 
noncompliance". 
At the same time, some interviewees had the same opinion that the Jordan 
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securities commission should supervising compliance with the corporate 
governance Code for shareholding companies listed on the Amman Stock 
Exchange because they consider it is more influential than any entity. A 
regulator declared: 
"Yes, of course it is the responsibility of the securities exchange 
commission in Jordan as it is more influential than any entity. Actually, it is quite 
easy for them to monitor the compliance of the firms with the code”. 
Also a regulator argued: 
“As I know, the securities exchange commission in Jordan plays a 
significant role in monitoring compliance with the code ". 
In short, all interviewees considered that currently good CG practice in 
Jordanian firms is weak and is still in the initial stages. However they believe 
that it could be improved through the establishment of effective system of CG, 
Asking all Jordanian listed firms in the Amman Stock Exchange to apply it. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the Jordan Securities Commission should compel all 
Jordanian firms to practice an effective good CG and overseeing its practices. 
This will help firms to attract more external and local investors (Black et al., 
2006). The SEC should bear the responsibility of implementing this system 
effectively in all Jordanian firms to support it in the global market. One regulator 
stated: 
“The CG system is quite limited, as the existing CG system does not 
compel all Jordanian listed firms on ASE to practice good CG principles; thus, 
there is differences in applications between firms”.   
This outcome supports the results and suggestions made by Saidi (2004), who 
examined the CG system in Lebanon. One of the main suggestions was the 
need for an independent entity to supervise the application of CG in the country. 
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6.6 Main Study Findings 
The main findings that can be drawn from analysis of the semi-structured 
interviews are: most Jordanian firms were applying most CG system; CG is a 
useful mechanism for protecting shareholders’ and stakeholders’ rights; 
‘possessing global business contacts and experience’ play an important role in 
determining the appointment of NED’s in Jordanian companies; financial and 
non financial information in Jordanian firms need more disclosure and 
transparency; ‘lack of knowledge of BODs about CG system’ as the most 
significant obstacle; the government should launch training courses for 
members of the corporate management to overcome the barriers of applying 
good CG; The Jordan security commission is a very Important commission, and 
should motivate and force all Jordanian firms to practise an effective good 
corporate governance system. 
6.7 Answering the Research Questions 
Concerning the current practice of CG system within Jordanian firms (RQ3), 
participants confirmed that the existing application of CG system is weak and 
needs more improvement. Therefore, the problem lies in applying this system, it 
differs from one firm to another according to each firm’s internal policy, and this,   
is due to the absence of an external party to supervise its implementation  
 In regards to the main barriers inhibiting the practice of corporate 
governance in Jordan (RQ2), participants agreed that ‘lack of knowledge of 
BOD’s and management about CG’ and ‘the lack of systems and procedures 
that govern firm activities’ are the primary factors inhibiting the practice of good 
CG in Jordan, because there is no system that compels firms to implement the 
good CG system, and there are no procedures to monitor its practice. 




The main objective of this part of the study was to provide a broader overview of 
the status quo of CG in Jordan provided and give more insight into barriers 
facing the implementation of the code to extend the findings of the quantitative 
study. Thus, the semi-structured interview was adopted to gather data from 
interviewees from regulators and Jordanian firms. Interviews included both 
open-ended and closed-ended questions and included questions about the 
current application of corporate governance in Jordanian firms. 
 Concerning to voting rights, the results indicated that participants knew of 
the advantages of voting rights and firms allowed their shareholders to use the 
method of voting. However, cumulative voting was not employed in spite of this 
safeguarding the rights of minority shareholders by allowing them to work as a 
group to elect a candidate of their choice, who, as a member of the board of 
directors, would represent them. Shareholders of all the firms obtained relevant 
and timely information regarding financial and non-financial matters. They also 
had the right to share profits as well as to attend and participate at the AGM. 
Concerning board members, most of the participants agreed that board 
members have highly qualified and have the right mix of experience, skills, and 
backgrounds. The results also showed that most of firms have different people 
in the two positions of the Chairman and the CEO. As regards the tasks and 
responsibilities assigned to the board of directors, the results indicated that the 
majority of firms reported that their board played an important role in setting 
objectives and strategy. Furthermore, the general written rules stipulate the role 
and responsibilities of the board of directors. However, the results revealed that 
all the firms do not have their own corporate governance rules and written 
policies clarifying the relationship with stakeholders. In terms of top 
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management performance evaluation, the results demonstrated that this is done 
by board of directors, which effectively appraises the executive management 
using multiple financial and non-financial indicators. The results indicated that 
most firms have a good internal control system and there are bodies inside and 
outside that ensure the effectiveness of such a system. 
The participants agreed that it was important to have independent 
internal auditors, who were highly educated in both accounting and auditing. 
However, with regard to the conflict of interest with the board of directors, the 
results indicated that the majority of participants stated clearly that their firms 
have no clear written regulations for the directors and staff regarding this issue. 
In addition, the majority of interviewees indicated that much of the data and 
information in Jordanian firms needed more disclosure and transparency. Also, 
all interviewees indicated that the audit committee is very important in the firm, 
and is the independent authority that supervises the work of the firm’s 
administration, as this committee ensures trust and peace of mind to 
shareholders and the board of directors, providing that it is offered complete 
independence of the board of directors and the firm’s executive directors 
Finally, a number of obstacles affecting corporate governance were 
suggested by the participants. These were weakness of the organisation 
management, weakness of the legal environment; absence of training programs 
for members of board of directors about the governance system and the 
financial cost of applying the governance system   
On the other hand, the overall impression gained from the regulators that 
while substantial progress had been made in those firms attempting to 
implement the Jordanian corporate governance code, it was not reasonable to 
expect complete compliance in firms, and within a corporate culture, where the 
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right of stakeholders were new concepts and no history of effective corporate 
governance existed. In order to provide a more complete picture of Jordan 
attempts to improve corporate governance code, the findings provided valuable 
insight into obstacles facing the implementation of the code,    
Thus, this study investigated the views of Jordanian managers and 
regulators. While agreeing with senior managers about the urgent need for an 
effective corporate governance code in Jordan, regulators considered the level 
of implementation of the code still lower than expected. Regulators regarded the 
main advantages of corporate governance as being protection of shareholder 
rights; oversight of management performance; and regulation of the relationship 
between boards of directors, shareholders and auditing committees. Regulators 
agreed with the managers that the code faced many obstacles to its successful 
implementation, of which the most important were perceived to be lack of 
knowledge about corporate governance among Jordanian firms followed by the 
weakness of the legal environment for firms in Jordan, the weakness of the 
legal environment, lack of training among directors about corporate governance 
and weak investment awareness among investors were the obstacles noted by 
participants. 
Suggested solutions to overcoming these obstacles were: organising 
workshops and training, as well as developing corporate governance education 
programmes. In addition, firms were felt to need more freedom, empowerment 
and support from the government in this context. Overall, education was 
perceived to be the key to overcoming obstacles to the code and the lack of 
experience within the country of operating organizations within a free market 
system. This chapter completes the presentation and analysis of the findings 
from the data collection of this study, and in collecting the principal observations 
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of the Jordanian managers and regulators fulfils the purposes of objective two 
and three.  The next chapter provides a comprehensive discussion on the 
analysis of the results and findings of the quantitative and qualitative data that 
presented in chapter five questionnaire survey results and chapter six interview 
results. 





7 DISCUSSION   
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of the analysis of the 
results and findings of the quantitative and qualitative data presented in Chapter 
Five, the questionnaire survey results, and Chapter Six, the interview results 
with examination of relevant literature. The current study is intended to fill the 
gap in the literature by investigating and providing a comprehensive review of 
the status quo of corporate governance in Arab countries, including Jordan. 
Such a comprehensive view would serve as a basis to identify weaknesses and 
problems of corporate governance in MENA countries. Moreover, the current 
study provides evidence by confirming and extending the usefulness of applying 
an effective corporate governance system not only in developed countries but 
also in developing countries, including Jordan. The results of this research will 
help the main regulatory bodies to overcome problems and improve the 
weaknesses in their current practices to ensure the success of their corporate 
governance improvement initiatives. It also provides support for related parties 
to cooperate in improving the current corporate governance code in Jordan to 
meet international standards. Thus, the findings of this study will be useful for 
developing and improving the current corporate governance system in 




 To identify the determinants of critical factors for implementing best 
practice of CG in Jordan. 
 To explore the current practice of the CG system in Jordan. 
 To identify the factors that inhibit best practice of CG in Jordan. 
 To empirically investigate the effects of CG on firm performance 
(financial measures) in Jordan. 
 To explore the respondents' perceptions regarding the effect of CG on 
firm performance in Jordan. 
 To investigate the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age and sector) in Jordan. 
7.2 Major Study Findings 
The methods used in this study to explore the current practice of CG in 
Jordanian firms were questionnaire and interview surveys as explained in 
Chapter Five. A questionnaire was used to collect data from directors in 113 
Jordanians firms. All interviews were conducted with managers and regulators 
in Jordanians firms. The next subtopic will discuss the findings extracted by 
both methods. 
7.2.1 The Current Practice of the CG System in Jordan 
The overall impression from the interview survey, discussed in Chapter 
Six, indicated that most Jordanian firms are applying most CG systems, 
because CG is considered a useful mechanism for protecting shareholders’ and 







The general findings were that most large Jordanian firms are applying the 
CG system. These results are in line with findings reported by Fiegener et al. 
(2000), Huse (2000), Johannisson and Huse (2000) and Zahra et al. (2000). 
They found that governance recommendations are mostly derived for large 
firms and their reasoning may be of limited value for small sized and newly 
founded businesses.  
In relation to shareholders’ rights, in general, the interview findings 
indicated that most interviewees agreed that shareholders’ rights are protected. 
Among items receiving the highest interest were the right of shareholders to be 
informed of the rules that govern general meetings and the right of shareholders 
to be given the opportunity to participate in and vote at general meetings. These 
findings support recommendations provided by the OECD (2004) which stated 
that a CG framework should protect shareholders’ rights as well as ensure that 
all shareholders are undertaking and practising their rights. As indicated by 
interviewees, shareholders’ rights exist in principle under Jordanian Firm Law 
but in practice they differ from one firm to another. Thus, more attention must be 
paid by the Jordan Securities Commission to obligating all Jordanian firms to 
apply this principle or to supervise their application of it. However, as made 
clear by the interviews, shareholders’ rights are the most important principle to 
take into account when applying an effective CG system. In Jordan, these 
rights, especially those of small investors, are often ignored or not considered. 
These results support the findings and recommendations made by Mallin (2001) 
La Porta et al. (1998) and Solomon and Solomon (1999) that effective 
application of a CG system will protect shareholders’ rights.    
The finding that shareholders’ rights, especially those of small investors, 




the above literature and studies have been conducted in developing countries 
and, as mentioned, Jordan is a developing country, which means similar 
practices and procedures are found as occur in other developing countries. 
However, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the legal protection of investors 
is an essential element of an effective CG system. If small investors are to be 
attracted to firms, they need some legal protection. Thus, weak legal protection 
of minority shareholders’ rights will create conflicts of interest between mangers 
and shareholders, which in turn increase the tendency for, and size of, agency 
problems. 
It may be concluded from the research findings that shareholders’ rights is 
the most important principle to take into account when applying an effective CG 
system, and should be observed by both large and small firms. In addition, The 
CG Code for Shareholding Firms Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange should 
obligate all Jordanian firms to apply it and carry out inspection of the application 
of this code in each firm. 
Interview findings show that the roles and responsibilities of the board of 
directors should be defined under Jordanian Firm Law and the CG Code for 
Shareholding Firms Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange. However, their 
application differs from one firm to another according to each firm’s internal 
policy, although the Jordanian firm law system specifies the authorities and 
responsibilities of boards of directors via the basic systems in Jordanian firms, 
and the CG Code for Shareholding Firms Listed on the Amman Stock Exchange 
addresses the authorities and responsibilities of the boards of directors via its 
recommendations. Furthermore, boards of directors have to be aware that their 
goal is to protect the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. 




to ensure that it monitors all the work of the firm’s management, thus facilitating 
questioning of the board by shareholders which may reduce the conflict 
between them and, in turn, agency costs. 
The interview results also indicated that CG policy in Jordan will lead to an 
increase in the number of NEDs and most firms split the positions of the 
Chairman and the CEO. Furthermore, they agreed that boards of directors play 
an important role in setting the firm's objectives and strategies. Also, the result 
showed that not all firms have their own CG rules and written policies illustrating 
the relationship with different stakeholders, and most of the firms recognised the 
fact that top management performance was evaluated in different ways. 
Reviewing the internal policies was one of the main responsibilities of the board. 
The results stated clearly that Jordanian firms have no clear written regulations 
concerning conflicts of interest and confirmed that firms in Jordan have no 
written professional code of conduct which directors and staff employees could 
follow. 
 Overall, it may be concluded from the study’s findings that the board of 
directors’ responsibilities are clearly set in Jordanian firm law, and they should 
maximise shareholders’ and stakeholders’ value, which coincides with the main 
goal of shareholders and consequently leads to a reduced agency problem. 
These results support the findings and recommendations made by the OECD 
(2004), Prentice (1993), the Cadbury Report (1992) and Monks and Minow 
(2001). Melis (1999) provided empirical evidence that the main goal of firms is 
to maximise the value for shareholders. However, the Jordanian firm law 
system gives stakeholders the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights, and this undoubtedly increases the trust of stakeholders.  




problem as well as strengthen links between the firm and stakeholders which 
means reducing the conflict of interest and agency problem between them 
which in turn will enhance the performance of the firm and at the same time 
maximise shareholders’ value. The findings were, in general, in line with 
recommendations made by the Cadbury Report (1992) and Mitchell and Sikka 
(1996). The OECD (2004) stated that a CG system should protect the rights of 
other stakeholders, such as banks, bondholders and workers. CG should also 
encourage active cooperation between the corporation and stakeholders, since 
this will enhance the performance of both CG and the market. 
Findings from the interviews revealed that the disclosure of information on 
financial and operating results required greater transparency in Jordanian firms 
due to the lack of systems and lists that define the importance of spreading 
such data and information.  More disclosure and transparency can be achieved 
by implementing an effective CG system. This finding, in general, is in line with 
recommendations made by the OECD (2004) and Min-Young Lee (2001). 
The results also indicate that, in general, respondents agreed to increase 
the number of NEDs in Jordanian firms.  As regards factors influencing the 
appointment of NEDs, the interview results indicated that possessing global 
business contacts and experience as first and second factors respectively, play 
an important role in determining the appointment of NED’s in Jordanian firms.  
The system governing Jordanian firms declares there should be at least three 
NEDs in those firms operating in Jordan. This result was in line with the results 
obtained by Hussain and Mallin (2003). Further, Solomon et al. (2003) 
supported the agency theory approach to CG, as they considered the presence 
of outside directors improved corporate accountability to shareholders and this 




enhanced firm performance. Furthermore, Jordanian Firm Law and the 
Jordanian CG Code require Jordanian firms to appoint an audit committee from 
NEDs (not fewer than three) to be the key link between management and the 
external legal accountant. This decision is a good step in the legislative reforms 
in Jordan to meet the Cadbury Report’s (1992) recommendations. Thus, 
participants believed that CG policy in Jordan will lead to an increase in the 
number of NEDs, especially in large firms. This result was in line with the results 
obtained by Bloch (1997) and Barry (1998). 
 It may be concluded that a NED is a very important instrument that should 
be considered carefully in the process of establishing the code of CG in Jordan. 
The Firm Law requires all firms to appoint at least three. The problems lie in the 
methods of choosing them, i.e. family members or close friends may be 
appointed with no knowledge of firm business, and may therefore lack 
independent judgement. This finding, in general, is in line with the 
recommendations and findings reported by Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Pearce and Zahra (1992), Pettigrew and McNultty (1995), Mak (1996), Salmon 
(1993), and Solomon and Solomon (2004). Mangel and Singh (1993) claimed 
that NEDs have more opportunity for control, encouraged by their 
responsibilities as directors and by their equity position. Thus, NEDs are seen 
as raising boards’ effectiveness. Johnson et al. (1993) stated that the board’s 
composition has the power to influence its goal of monitoring managers and 
protecting the interests of shareholders.  Cadbury (1992) identified two 
particularly important contributions of NEDs to firms’ effective governance, 
namely, reviewing the performance of the board and executives and taking the 
lead where potential conflicts of interest arise. It is recommended by agency 




interest between shareholders and mangers. 
 In the interviewees’ view, therefore, the Jordan Securities Commission 
should force all Jordanian firms to practice an effective CG system and monitor 
its implementation. This will encourage firms to have a strong monitoring and 
management system which will help attract local and external investors. 
Interview results indicate that current CG systems in Jordanian firms tend 
to be weak, and need more development, because of the absence of 
investment awareness and the absence of the obligation of all Jordanian firms 
to apply this system or to supervise their application of it. But it could be 
developed via the CG code, obligating all Jordanian firms to apply it.  This result 
is in line with the findings reported by Kim (1998), Melis (2000), Harvey and 
Roper (1999) and Greenspan (1999).  Finally, Peng and Heath (1996) indicate 
that the lack of legality for formal governance mechanisms creates a weak 
governance environment, which may lead to agency problems. Thus, the 
current state of the CG system in Jordan needs more guidance and 
development, increased investment and awareness of the importance of 
applying an effective CG system in Jordanian firms. 
Part of this study investigated whether Jordanian firms had sub-
committees, such as audit and nomination committees, or not. It also aimed to 
determine the number of NEDs on each committee. The results indicate that all 
Jordanian firms have an audit committee.  This finding can be explained due to 
Jordanian Firm Law requiring each Jordanian firm to establish an audit 
committee. Moreover, empirical findings gathered in this study show that most 
of the firms’ audit committees comprised at least three NEDs. This result was in 
accordance with those obtained by Proned (1993), Collier (1993), Keasey and 




Regarding nomination committees, clearly, participants showed that not all 
Jordanian firms have such committees.  This finding can be explained by 
Jordanian law requesting each Jordanian firm to establish an audit committee 
but not requiring it to establish nomination committees. This finding was in 
accordance with that of Solomon et al. (2003), who found that a small number 
of Taiwanese listed firms have created nomination committees. 
All interviewees thought the audit committee was very important to the 
firm, recognising that Jordanian Firm Law and the Jordanian CG Code establish 
the presence of an audit committee in each firm, specifying its role and duties. 
They also considered that the audit committee possesses independent 
authority, and its role is to supervise the work of the firm’s administration and 
internal audit administration. Through its complete independence from the 
board of directors and the firm’s executive directors, shareholders and 
stakeholders can be confident that decisions made take into account their 
interests as well as those of the firm. This result means that the audit committee 
plays an important role in aligning the interests of both shareholders and 
managers, which will enhance the performance of the firm and thereby 
maximise shareholder wealth.  This result was in line with the results obtained 
by Peat Marwick (1987), Marrian (1988), Collier (1993), Keasey and Wright 
(1993) and Proned (1993).   
In short, the interview results indicated that the most common benefits of 
implementing CG in Jordan were the protection of shareholders’ rights, 
appropriate management performance, organising relationships between the 
BOD, increasing disclosure and transparency of Jordanian firms and protecting 
firms from crisis. All this will reduce the agency problem and increase the value 




foreign investors. In fact many parties will derive great benefit from applying the 
CG system in Jordanian firms, as this system considers the interests of all 
sectors in society and all sides related to the firm. In addition, local and external 
investors, employees, banks and lenders, and local society, gain very important 
and direct benefits from applying the CG system in Jordanian firms. These 
results were in line with the questionnaire survey findings. 
 Participants agreed with all the aspects mentioned for achieving good CG 
in Jordan. The interview survey results aim to confirm, and give better 
understanding of, the results obtained from the questionnaire survey. Almost all 
interview participants (directors of financial departments) responded positively 
to the concept of introducing a CG system to Jordanian firms. They thought that 
applying effective CG would encourage firms to create strong relationships 
between firms and shareholders and other stakeholders as well as help to 
strengthen internal control and management systems. Thus, effective CG is a 
mechanism that may align the interests of managers and shareholders (Clarke, 
2007). The problem arising from the conflict of interests between mangers and 
shareholders is the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This result 
was consistent with the findings provided by La Porta et al. (1997), and La Porta 
et al. (2000). They highlighted the importance of effective CG in emerging 
markets. Their results indicate that across countries, CG is an important factor 
in financial market development and firm value. The next section will discuss 








7.2.2 Critical Factors of the Best Practice of Corporate Governance in 
Jordan 
As noted, there is no research published on critical factors for 
implementing best practice of CG in Jordan. Thus, this study focuses and 
disuses the following critical factors.   
7.2.2.1  Constitution 
Corporate constitution is based on the idea that the interests of 
shareholders should be the primary concern of the corporate board of directors 
(BOD). For instance, shareholders should be informed of the rules that govern 
general shareholder meetings and the right of shareholders to have the 
opportunity to place items on the agenda of general meetings (La Porta et al., 
1998; Solomon and Solomon, 1999; OECD, 2004). Thus, the CG system should 
protect shareholders’ rights. Also, related party transactions have always been 
a critical issue of interest in terms of the protection of shareholders’ rights. 
Jordanian firms comply with those items at least, to avoid risk since the related-
party transactions of controlling shareholders damage firm performance (Clarke 
2007). 
Regarding activities of the Chairman and the CEO, the aim of this question 
is to look at the separation of functions and activities of the CEO and the 
Chairman, split between various directors to attain good CG practice (Ibrahim et 
al., 2011) in Jordanian firms. In order to accomplish this goal, respondents from 
the firms involved in this research were asked if the activities of the CEO and 
Chairman were split between various directors in their firms. The findings 
revealed that Jordanian firms separated the positions of the CEO and the 
Chairman, and split these positions between various directors in their firms. 




Chairman to attain an effective CG system. These findings support the results 
of Faccio and Lasfer (1999), Dahya et al. (2000) and Young et al. (2001).    
Ibrahim et al. (2011) confirmed that CG mechanisms such as the duality of 
family and non-family ownership have a strong significant influence on firm 
performance. Furthermore, Short and Keasey (1999) showed that in the past 
UK firms have been more likely to separate the activities of CEO and Chairman, 
but have been less likely to employ outside directors. Moreover, the Cadbury 
Report (1992) recommends that the activities of CEO and Chairman should not 
be held by the same person.  
With regard to board committees, this question aimed to clarify whether 
board committees are composed of executive and non-executive directors.  
Generally, all Jordanian firms have an audit committee, this can be explained by 
Jordanian Firm Law requiring each Jordanian firm to establish an audit 
committee but not requiring it to establish nomination and remuneration 
committees (Solomon et al., 2003).     
In terms of the selection of audit committee members, the Jordanian CG 
Code of Best Practice for listed firms (2007: para2.1) states that “the 
committees shall be composed of not less than three non-executive members of 
the board of directors”. 
All members of the committee must have knowledge and experience in 
finance and accounting, at least one of them must have worked previously in 
the accounting or finance fields, and that person must have an academic or 
professional certificate in accounting, finance or related fields. Empirical findings 





 In addition, the analysis shows that there are statistically significant 
differences in that older firms and large-size firms are keener to adopt a 
balanced CG system compared to newly formed and small-size firms. The 
results correspond with the findings of Daily and Dalton (1992), Forbes and 
Milliken (1999), Fiegener et al. (2000), Huse (2000), Johannisson and Huse 
(2000), Zahra et al. (2000) and Dey, 2010. They found in their studies that large 
firms with long existence in the stock market have sound practice of CG 
compared to small or newly listed firms in the stock exchange. 
 In order to evaluate the current practices of CG in Jordanian firms, the 
principal component analysis used was a data reduction method to identify the 
pattern of correlations within a set of questions. Specifically, to investigate the 
correlation between respondents’ scores in order to identify dominant factors, if 
any, to determine the constitution critical factors in Jordanian firms. There are 
four main critical factors that can be considered a model for implementing best 
practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. These factors are, “there is a formal and 
transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board”, “the 
roles of the Chair and the CEO are split between different directors”, “directors 
are required to disclose any matters that may affect the firm” and “all board 
committees are composed of executive and non executive directors (NEDs)”. 
These are the critical elements of the first factor, which is labelled “constitution”, 
and indicates a sound CG system in Jordan. 
In short, the critical factors of CG are applicable to Jordanian firms, as all 
participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements measuring good 
application of constitution, since all items recorded average mean scores of 4.7 
as indicated in Chapter Five, Table 5-3. In the Jordanian context, there are four 




Chapter Five, Table 5-15) and which can be considered a model for 
implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. Constitution, as one 
of the critical factors of CG, suggests that an effective corporate constitution 
serves as a mechanism to mitigate or eliminate conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and managers. This is mainly attributable to the fact that the 
practising of constitution critical factors of CG by firms will increase the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of CG, which in turn reduces the agency 
problem and consequently enhances shareholder value.  
7.2.2.2  Control 
The questionnaire results indicated that older firms and large-size firms 
are willing to employ a balanced CG system compared to newly formed and 
small-size firms. A possible explanation for this difference may be that there are 
no provisions in the firm law that particularly require BODs to fulfil any of the key 
functions of the board. Moreover, there is no precise requirement for BODs to 
adopt the CG recommendations.  
With regard to whether there are any significant differences concerning 
the control factors of best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms according to 
sector, the results suggest that there are no differences across the two sectors. 
Moreover, large firms are more likely to have internationalised operations, which 
require them to have clearly defined responsibilities of the BOD. Regarding the 
audit committee, it was obvious from the results that the audit committee plays 
an important role in Jordanian firms. The results align with the findings of 
Fiegener et al. (2000), Huse (2000), Johannisson and Huse (2000), Zahra et al. 
(2000) and Dey, 2010. They found in their studies that large firms with long 




newly listed firms in the stock exchange. 
Principal component analysis was used to identify the control critical 
factors in Jordanian firms. There are seven critical factors that can be 
considered a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian 
firms. The second factor, labelled “control”, includes “the firm identifies in the 
annual report the key risk areas of the business and the strategies to manage 
them”, “the firm links rewards to long term performance”, “the firm reviews the 
effectiveness of the internal control system”, “the firm directors are not involved 
in determining their own remuneration”, “the firm discloses, in the annual report, 
whether the auditor provides non auditing services or not” and “the firm 
describes the work of the audit committee in the annual report”.   
From the above discussion, the critical factors of CG are applicable in 
Jordanian firms, as all participants scored highly, on average, on all the 
elements measuring good practice in control, since all items recorded average 
mean scores of 5.3, as presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-4. In the Jordanian 
context, after the factor analysis was conducted, all seven critical factors were 
considered (see Chapter Five, Table 5-16) as models for implementing best 
practice of good CG in Jordanian firms.  Control, as one of the critical factors of 
CG, suggests that the control tool serves as a mechanism to align the interests 
of owners with those of managers, reducing the costs of agency conflicts of 
interest between them and consequently increasing firm performance, thereby 








7.2.2.3  Competence 
In Jordan, competence factors are effective factors for best CG practice. 
The firms review the proper technology and the systems used in the firms to 
achieve their goals. On the other hand, the Jordanian firms are less interested 
in training new directors to read and analyse financial statements. Furthermore, 
older Jordanian firms and large-size firms are more willing to adopt a balanced 
CG system compared to newly formed and small-size firms. The results align 
with the findings of Fiegener et al. (2000), Huse (2000), Johannisson and Huse 
(2000), Zahra et al. (2000) and Dey, 2010. They found in their studies that large 
firms with long existence in the stock market have sound practice of CG 
compared to small and newly listed firms in the stock exchange. Also, the 
results mentioned above support recommendations and findings made by the 
PWC (1997), Brickley et al. (1994) and Prentice (1993).   Their studies suggest, 
in different ways, that CG is an effective mechanism for determining 
responsibilities of BODs.   
Principal component analysis was used to identify the competence 
critical factors in Jordanian firms. There are four critical factors that can be 
considered a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian 
firms. The fifth factor, labelled “competence”, includes “trains new directors to 
read and analyse the financial statements”, “enlightens new directors about the 
long/short term objectives and mission of the firm”, “updates its directors about 
the trends and new global issues of CG”, “reviews the proper technology and 
the system used in the firm to achieve the firm’s goals” and “evaluates its 





The results show that the critical factors of CG are applicable in Jordanian 
firms, as all participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements 
measuring good practice in competence, since all items recorded average 
mean scores of 5 as presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-5. In the Jordanian 
context, after the factor analysis was conducted, all five critical factors were 
considered (see Chapter Five, Table 5-17) as a model for implementing best 
practices of good CG in Jordanian firms.  Competence, as one of the critical 
factors of CG, suggests that it acts as a mechanism to align the interests of 
owners with those of managers, reducing the costs of agency conflicts of 
interest between them and consequently, increasing the firm’s performance, 
thereby maximising shareholders’ value.   
7.2.2.4  Compliance 
CG has become an important issue in theory and practice in recent 
years. To ensure a competitive position, to attract foreign and local investors, to 
ensure sustainability, and to combat corruption, firms from developing countries 
including Jordan need to take into consideration good governance practices. 
Thus, Jordanian firms, particularly larger ones, reported higher levels of 
agreement with compliance factors as an effective factor for best CG practice. 
Also, older Jordanian firms are able to employ a more balanced CG system 
compared to newly formed firms. The results align with the findings of Fiegener 
et al. (2000), Huse (2000), Johannisson and Huse (2000), Zahra et al. (2000) 
and Dey, 2010.   
Principal component analysis was used to identify the compliance critical 
factors in Jordanian firms. There are four critical factors that can be considered 




factor, labelled “compliance”, includes “trains new directors to read and analyse 
the financial statements”, “enlightens new directors about the long/short term 
objectives and mission of the firm”, “updates its directors about the trends and 
new global issues of CG”, “reviews the proper technology and the system used 
in the firm to achieve the firm’s goals” and “evaluates its process and 
transactions and discloses the result in the annual report”. 
It is clear that the critical factors of CG are applicable to Jordanian firms, 
as all participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements measuring 
good practice in compliance, since all items recorded average mean scores of 
5.2 as presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-6. In the Jordanian context there are 
six main critical factors which remained after the factor analysis was conducted 
(see Chapter Five, Table 5-18) and can be considered a model for 
implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. Thus, compliance as 
one of the critical factors of CG suggests that it serves as a mechanism to align 
the interests of shareholders with those of managers, reducing the costs of 
agency conflict between them and consequently, enhancing the firm’s 
performance and thereby its value.   
7.2.2.5  Competitiveness 
The results suggest that there are no differences across service and 
industry sectors. Moreover, testing for significant differences in terms of age   
and size the results also showed no statically significant differences.  The 
results indicate that the Firm Law and the CG Code do not broadly address the 
rights of minority shareholders in depth. The Jordan Securities Commission 
(JSC) has to be aware of this important issue in order for suitable regulations to 




Principal component analysis was used to identify the competitiveness 
critical factors in Jordanian firms. There are five critical factors that can be 
considered a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian 
firm. The fifth factor labelled “competitiveness” includes “states the firm’s 
objectives and goals in the annual report”, “discloses the ownership of the major 
shareholders within the firm”, “discloses the names of the board and the key 
executive directors in the annual report” and “articulates its role in the economic 
growth”. 
It is clear that the critical factors of CG are applicable to Jordanian firms, 
as all participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements measuring 
good practice in competitiveness, since all items recorded average mean 
scores of 5.2 as presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-7. In the Jordanian context 
there are four main critical factors which remained after the factor analysis was 
conducted (see Chapter Five, Table 5-19) and can be considered a model for 
implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. This result implies 
that competitiveness is an efficient factor to align shareholders’ and managers 
interests, reducing the costs of agency conflict between them and thus 
improving the firm’s financial performance.  
7.2.2.6  Culture 
The sixth critical factor in CG is culture. The findings strongly recommend that 
human rights and violation of the code of ethics do not play an important role in 
the best practice of CG in Jordanian firms.  With regard to whether there were 
any significant differences concerning culture critical factors, according to 
sector, age and size, the results indicated no statistically significant differences 




Principal component analysis was used to identify the culture critical factors in 
Jordanian firms. There are three critical factors that can be considered a model 
for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. The sixth factor 
labelled “culture” includes “in our firm business relationships rules are clearly 
defined and available to all”, “our firm clearly defines corporate responsibilities 
in relation to human rights in the annual report” and “in our firm, there is a 
statement about the consequences of violation of the code of ethics”. 
Clearly, the critical factors of CG are applicable to Jordanian firms, as all 
participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements measuring good 
practice in culture, since all items recorded average mean scores of 3.9 as 
presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-3. In the Jordanian context there are three 
main critical factors which remained after the factor analysis was conducted 
(see Chapter Five, Table 5-20) and can be considered a model for 
implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. Thus, critical factors 
of CG suggests that effective corporate culture serves as a mechanism to align  
the interests of shareholders with those of managers, reducing the costs of 
agency conflict between them and consequently enhancing the firm’s 
performance and thereby maximising shareholders’ value.   
7.2.2.7  Commitment 
The OECD (2004) pointed out that CG should protect the rights of other 
stakeholder such as creditors. Also, corporate governance should support 
positive cooperation between the firm and stakeholders which will improve the 
performance of both CG and the firm. Moreover, the OECD (2004) asserts that 
the rights of stakeholders should be protected through mutual agreements 




In general, stakeholders have a number of rights protected by law, such 
as the right to share in the profits of the firm (Article 191) and the right to vote 
on the firm’s issues (Article 178). Indeed, the rights of stakeholders in Jordanian 
firms are protected by law, however, there needs to be more training and 
development in order to increase awareness of the rights of stakeholders in 
practice. It is worth noting, particularly in emerging markets such as Jordan, that 
creditors are key stakeholders. 
 Principal component analysis was used to identify the commitment critical 
factors in Jordanian firms. There are three critical factors that can be considered 
a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. The 
seventh factor labelled “commitment” includes “the rights of stakeholders are 
respected”, “there is a clear and transparent mechanism for stakeholders to 
obtain redress for violation of their rights” and “institutional investors contact 
senior executives to exchange views and information”. 
In short, the critical factors of CG are applicable to Jordanian firms, as all 
participants scored highly, on average, on all the elements measuring good 
practice in commitment, since all items recorded average mean scores of 4 as 
indicated in Chapter Five, Table 5-9. In the Jordanian context there are three 
critical factors which remained after the factor analysis was conducted (see 
Chapter Five, Table 5-21) and can be considered a model for implementing 
best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms.  This result suggests that 
commitment as one of the main critical factors of CG is an efficient mechanism 
to reduce agency conflict between shareholders and mangers and as a result, 





7.2.2.8  Communication 
The results showed that Jordanian firms disclose, in the annual report, 
the accounting standards adopted and NEDs develop an understanding of the 
views of major shareholders. These findings, in general, are in line with findings 
and recommendations made by the Cadbury Report (1992), Lee (2001) and the 
OECD survey in Canada (2001). Solomon and Solomon (2004) assert that an 
increase in corporate transparency is a key idea of CG reform in any country. 
This is unlikely to satisfy the shareholders’ and other stakeholders’ 
requirements as Jordanian firms disclose limited information about CG structure 
and policies in their annual reports. A possible justification for this difference 
may be that the standards in the Jordanian Firm Act require only limited and 
basic information to be published. The results support those reported by Daily 
and Dalton (1992), Forbes and Milliken (1999), Fiegener et al. (2000), Huse 
(2000), Johannisson and Huse (2000) and Zahra et al. (2000).   
Principal component analysis was used to identify the communication 
critical factors in Jordanian firms. There are four critical factors that can be 
considered a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian 
firms. The eighth factor labelled “communication” includes “our firm includes a 
section on CG practices in the annual report”, “in our firm NEDs develop an 
understanding of the views of major shareholders”, “in our firm we disclose 
information on the compensation for the board members and management 
team in the annual report” and “our firm discloses the number of board meetings 






The results presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-10 show that the critical 
factors of CG are applicable in Jordanian firms, as all participants scored highly, 
on average, on all the elements measuring good practice in communication, 
since all items recorded average mean scores of 5.9. In the Jordanian context 
there are four main critical factors which remained after the factor analysis was 
conducted (see Chapter Five, Table 5-22) and can be considered a model for 
implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. This means that    
the critical factor corporate communication is an effective mechanism to align 
the interests of shareholders with those of managers, reducing the costs of the 
agency problem between them and consequently, enhancing the firm’s 
performance and thereby the wealth of shareholders.   
7.2.2.9  Conduct 
It seems that firms in Jordan attempt to decrease conflicts of interest 
between managers and owners to avoid risk, since conflicts of interest destroy 
firm performance and increase information asymmetry in the stock exchange 
(Laidroo, 2009). This result aligns with the findings of Florackis and Ozkan 
(2009) and Morey et al. (2009). They found a proper CG mechanism will 
effectively reduce the conflicts of interest in a firm. Also, there are adequate 
procedures in place to guard against insider trading in Jordanian firms. 
However, the Amman financial market needs more steps to control insider 
trading activities. One feasible solution to decrease insider trading activities is to 
decrease information leakage. However, illegal insider trading is hard to detect, 
since it is hard to track the pattern of trading (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981).   
Furthermore, the findings indicated no statistically significant differences 




more balanced CG systems compared to small-size firms. The results align with 
the findings of Dey (2010). He found in his study that large firms in the stock 
market have sound practice of CG, compared to smaller ones. 
Principal component analysis was used to identify the conduct critical 
factors in Jordanian firms. There are five critical factors that can be considered 
a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. The 
ninth factor, labelled “conduct”, includes “there are guidelines for serving as a 
director”, “there are guidelines regarding conflicts of interest”, “there are clear 
guidelines on privacy and data protection”, “there are strict guidelines for safety, 
health and the environment” and “there are adequate procedures in place to 
guard against insider trading”.  
The findings show that the critical factors of CG are applicable to 
Jordanian firms, as all participants scored highly, on average, on all the 
elements measuring good practice in conduct, since all items recorded average 
mean scores of 5.2 as indicated in Chapter Five, Table 5-11. In the Jordanian 
context there are five main critical factors which remained after the factor 
analysis was conducted (see Chapter Five, Table 5-23) and can be considered 
a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. 
Therefore, conduct as one of the critical factors of CG serves as a mechanism 
to align the interests of shareholders and managers, reducing the costs of 
agency conflict between them and consequently, maximising the firm 







7.2.2.10  Conscience 
The results indicate that, generally, participants reported strong levels of 
agreement with regard to factors listed about conscience, since all items 
recorded average mean scores of 5.6.  Generally, Jordanian firms maintain an 
independent relationship between their firms and the “recipient” of the charitable 
contribution. The results align with the findings of Dige (2003). He found that the 
board not only prepares for and attends the board and committee meetings, but 
also has time to interact with the chief executive, to meet with other staff and 
directors, and to carry out important external relationships (Doug, 2003). These 
relationships may include participation in community development, sponsoring 
educational programmes and being involved in charitable contributions. 
The results indicate that older firms and large-size firms are more willing 
to apply a balanced CG system compared to newly formed and small-size firms. 
The results correspond with the findings of Dey (2010), Fiegener et al. (2000), 
Huse (2000), Johannisson and Huse (2000) and Zahra et al. (2000). 
Principal component analysis was used to identify the conscience critical 
factors in Jordanian firms. There are five critical factors that can be considered 
a model for implementing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. The 
tenth factor labelled “conscience” includes “our firm participates in community 
development programmes”, “our firm sponsors educational and/or training 
programmes for the community”, “our firm is involved in charitable contribution” 
and “we maintain an independent relationship between our firm and the 
‘recipient’ of the charitable contribution”.  
From the above discussion, the critical factors of CG are applicable to 




elements measuring good practice in control, since all items recorded average 
mean scores of 5.6 as presented in Chapter Five, Table 5-12. In the Jordanian 
context, after the factor analysis was conducted, all five critical factors were 
considered (see Chapter Five, Table 5-4) as models for implementing best 
practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. Clearly the results indicated that 
conscience serves as a mechanism to align the interests of shareholders and 
managers, this is mainly attributable to the fact that practising conscience 
critical factor of CG by the firms will increase the effectiveness and the 
efficiency of CG, which in turn reduces the agency problem and consequently 
enhances shareholder value.  
7.2.3 Corporate Governance and Performance 
 This section reports and discusses the empirical results of the 
regression models which represent the effect of the critical factors of corporate 
governance on firm performance of Jordanian listed firms measured by return 
on asset (ROA). The section is based on a quantitative approach using 
questionnaires to survey perceptions of listed firms' staff (CEOs, financial 
managers, directors of internal control and deputy directors) regarding the 
extent to which the small size of the board, the existence of institutional 
investors, a separation between the position of CEO and Chairman, the 
existence of independent NEDs, the use of subcommittees and a strong 
disclosure regime, contribute to improved firm performance. The results align 
with the many findings presented in Table 7-1. Thus, this section presents an 
analysis of the results derived from the questionnaire survey, which was 
designed to collect the general perceptions of the staff of Jordanian listed firms. 
As presented in Chapter Five, Table 5.13, the main findings indicate that 




mechanisms, namely, small size of the board, existence of institutional 
investors, separation between the position of CEO and Chairman, existence of 
independent NEDs, use of subcommittees and strong disclosure regimes. 
Analysis of the collated data supports, in general, all of the items presented in 
the questionnaire. Participants strongly agreed with these mechanisms for 
contributing to improved firm performance. These findings align with the 
literature. Their strong agreement with the items presented in the questionnaire 
was reflected in the high mean scores.   
Size of the board, previous studies of other developed markets indicate 
that the characteristics of a board of directors will affect firm performance (e.g. 
Jensen, 1993; Mura, 2006; Schmid and Zimmermann, 2008). Board of directors’ 
influence on firm performance is affected by board size. Balasubramanian et al. 
(2010) state that in an emerging market, firm size is a factor that increases the 
quality of CG. Previous studies also indicate that firm size will help firms gain 
innovation advantages in an emerging market (Acs and Audretsch, 1987; 
Vaona and Pianta, 2008; Rochina-Barrachina et al., 2010). Jensen (1993) 
states that board size is an important factor in evaluating the performance of the 
board of directors. Yermack (1996), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Guest 
(2009) point out that a smaller board is associated with better firm performance. 
In western listed firms, such as in the UK or US, board size determines the 
performance of a board of directors and therefore influences the performance of 
firms (Lakhal, 2003). Yermack (1996) and Eisenberg et al. (1998) state that a 
smaller board leads to firms achieving better firm performance in the market. 
The results, presented in Chapter Five, Table 5.13, indicate that Jordanian 
listed firms conform with these results.  Jensen (1993), Lorsch (1992) and 




improve the firm’s performance. However, an agency model suggests that a 
large board eliminates corporate value. 
Institutional investor is a solution to the problem of the free rider, since 
it concentrates ownership and increases the influence of shareholders who can 
drive corporate executives to increase firm performance (Admati et al., 1994; 
Lin et al., 2007). The results in Chapter Five (Table 5.13) support the idea that 
institutional investors are a positive factor in the improvement of firm 
performance of Jordanian listed firms. The majority of Jordanian investors are 
small investors and they lack the power to monitor the managerial activities of 
Jordanian listed firms, which would in turn motivate the managers to increase 
firm performance (Hovey, 2003). As the market develops, institutional investors 
will improve the effectiveness of CG mechanisms, thereby further helping 
Jordanian listed firms to achieve better firm performance (Kini et al., 1995). 
Board subcommittees, the empirical results show that there is a 
positive relationship between subcommittees and firm performance (see 
Chapter Five, Table 5.13). This is consistent with studies in the developed 
market (Bizjak and Anderson, 2000; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Laplante and Tong, 
2007). As the market developed, more Jordanian listed firms began to pay 
attention to the issue of CG. Thus, subcommittees now have more opportunities 
to influence firm performance of Jordanian listed firms. 
Role Duality, empirical results obtained from Chapter Five (Table 5-13) 
indicate that role separation of CEO and Chairman does affect firm performance 
positively, since the separation of the two positions will reduce agency costs in 
firms and improve performance. If a firm separates its CEO from the 
chairmanship of its board of directors, there will be fewer conflicts of interest in 




Jensen, 1983). For instance, Daily and Dalton (1997) showed that the agency 
approach, in separating the position of the CEO and the Chairman, has some 
important outcomes.  
Independent NEDs, furthermore, the results from the same table 
emphasise that the role of NEDs in Jordan does affect firm performance. In the 
UK the Cadbury Report (1992), Hampel’s Report (1998), and the Combined 
Code (2010) emphasise the role of NEDs in bringing an independent judgment 
to bear in issues of strategy, performance, and resources. Fama and Jensen 
(1983) are supporters of boards as a monitoring mechanism, and believe that 
NEDs are central to an effective resolution of agency problems between 
managers and shareholders.  
The results of the current study indicate that NEDs play a role in 
improving corporate performance. This result is in line with many studies 
conducted by Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), they found that clearly identifiable 
announcements of the appointment of an outside director selected by 
management are significantly associated with positive abnormal stock returns, 
as do studies conducted by Baysinger and Butler (1985), Weir and Laing 
(2001), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Laing and Weir (1999), Bhagat and Black 
(2002) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991). 
Corporate Disclosure, empirical findings obtained from Chapter Five 
(Table 5-13) as perceived by participants, indicated that strong regime 
disclosure does affect firm performance positively. Clearly, high quality 
disclosure will help firms achieve a better performance in the market (Koh et al., 
2007; Jia, 2011). Koh et al. (2007) emphasise that a high quality of disclosure 
will help firms achieve a better performance in the market. Corporate 




corporate executives. Improving managerial transparency is one purpose of the 
CG mechanism  et al., 2007a). Nelson (2005) shows that a greater quality 
of CG positively affects firm performance. A good CG mechanism will motivate 
corporate executives to better fulfil their duty. An optimal CG mechanism 
imposes appropriate performance pressure on firm managerial teams, to ensure 
that managerial activities are aligned with the interests of the corporate 
shareholders. If there is an appropriate alignment, executives of the firms will 
have more incentive to increase firm performance. Thus, a high quality of 
corporate disclosure will increase the confidence of market investors, since it 
reduces information asymmetry and market uncertainty. Effective corporate 
internal auditing will detect managerial wrongdoing and deter the executives 
from involving themselves in self-interested activity. For instance, using an 
independent audit committee will enhance firm performance (Koh et al., 2007). 
A high quality of disclosure and an effective managerial team will help firms 
achieve a better performance in the market. The high accuracy and 
transparency of corporate disclosure is one objective of a good CG mechanism, 
as it facilitates corporate shareholders to protect their rights (OECD, 1999; 
OECD, 2004). 
Solomon and Solomon (2004) indicate that “increased and improved 
disclosure is likely to reduce agency costs as better information flows from the 
firm to the shareholders, which in turn reduces information asymmetry” (2004, 
p.120).  CG mechanisms consist of stockholder rights, disclosure and 
transparency, responsibilities of boards of directors (BODs), board committees 
and conflicts of interest, (OECD, 2004; Wong, 2009; Wanyama et al., 2009; 




 Agency theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Healy and Palepu, 2001) 
point out analysts’ roles as external monitors for management and imply a 
negative association between analysts’ monitoring costs and disclosure quality. 
This explanation implies a positive relationship between disclosure rankings and 
firms’ future operating performance, as increased transparency of disclosure will 
help investors to monitor listed firms effectively and protect their rights.  
7-1 Corporate Governance Mechanism and Performance 
Corporate governance 
mechanism 
Firm performance Empirical studies 
Small size of the board Improve firm performance Weisbach (2003), Guest 
(2009) 
Existence of institutional 
investors 
Improve firm performance Admati et al. (1994), Lin et 
al. (2007) 
Separation between the 
position of CEO   
Improve firm performance Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Schmid and Zimmermann 
(2008)  
The existence of 
independent NEDs  
Improve firm performance Weir and Laing (2001), 
Bhagat and Black (2002) 
The use of subcommittees   Improve firm performance  













Regression Techniques have been conducted aimed at identifying the 
most important critical factors affecting firm performance. Using the dependent 
variable market measure of firm performance (ROA), Table 5-26 presents the 
estimation results of the regression model that are used in the current study to 
investigate the impact of critical factor CG on the performance of the firm. The 
diagnostic test suggests that the model facing no multicollinearity problem, 
where the VIF of all factors range between 1.069 and 2.594, with an average of 
1.395, is less than the value suggested by Gujarati (2003) for the present 
multicollinearity problem.  
With respect to the F-statistic, the result shows that the P-value of the F-
statistic is statistically significant; this implies that at least one of the estimated 
coefficients is not zero. As can be seen in Table 5-26 the estimated coefficient 
of constitution, compliance and conscience critical factor of CG were found to 
be statistically significant at 5% level in the regression model. Interestingly, the 
researcher reran the regression with only the significant variables, the results 
confirmed the same estimated coefficient on constitution, compliance and 
conscience critical factor of CG were found to be statistically significant at 5% 
level in the regression model. 
The positive sign of the estimated coefficient suggests that constitution, 
compliance and conscience critical factor of CG have a positive influence on the 
performance of the firm. This implies that applying constitution, compliance and 
conscience critical factor of CG will reduce agency cost and conflict between 
managers and shareholders. This is mainly attributable to the fact that 
practising constitution, compliance and conscience critical factor of CG by the 




reduces the agency problem and consequently enhances shareholder value 
(Ammann et al., 2011). In Jordan more compliant and conscience firms enjoy a 
higher reputation with investors. Thus, there is a clear message from firms to 
investors and regulators. Furthermore, in Jordan, corporate social responsibility 
is considered a marketing tool for firms. Interestingly, Jordan employed many 
reforms to integrate its capital market with international ones, so many steps in 
this direction were taken to increase and attract internal and external 
investment. 
With respect to other critical factors of CG, the results suggested no 
influence of these critical factors (control, competence, competitiveness, culture, 
commitment, communication and conduct) on firm performance, regardless of 
their sign, indicating that they have no effect on firm performance, and the 
estimated coefficients of these variables are found to be statically insignificant. 
At the same time, Table 5-26 shows firm size and age do not affect firm 
performance, which is measured by the return on asset (ROA) in Jordanian 
listed firms, because all estimated coefficients are statically insignificant. 
Finally, regression techniques have been conducted aimed at identifying 
the most important critical factors affecting firm performance. Using the 
dependent variable, market measure of the firms’ performance (ROA), Table 5-
26 presents the estimation results of the regression model that are used in the 
current study to investigate the impact of critical factor corporate governance on 
performance of the firm. The diagnostic test suggests that the model is facing 
no multicollinearity problem, where the VIF of all factors ranges between 1.069 
and 2.594, with an average of 1.395, which is less than the value suggested by 




With respect to the F-statistic, the results show that the P-value of the F-
statistic is statistically significant; this implies that at least one of the estimated 
coefficients is not zero. As can be seen in Table 5-26, the estimated coefficient 
of constitution, compliance and conscience critical factor of corporate 
governance were found to be statistically significant at 5% level on the 
regression model. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient suggests that 
constitution, compliance and conscience critical factors of corporate governance 
have positive influence on performance of the firm. This implies that applying 
constitution, compliance and conscience critical factor of corporate governance 
will reduce agency cost and conflict between managers and shareholders. This 
is mainly attributable to the fact that by practising constitution, compliance and 
conscience critical factors of corporate governance firms will increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance, which in turn will reduce 
the agency problem and consequently enhance shareholders’ value (Ammann 
et al., 2011). In Jordan more compliant and conscience firms enjoy a higher 
reputation with investors. Thus, there is a clear message from firms to investors 
and regulators. Furthermore, in Jordan, corporate social responsibility is 
considered a marketing tool for firms. Interestingly, Jordan employed many 
reforms to integrate its capital market with international ones; so many steps in 
this direction were taken for increasing and attracting internal and external 
investment. 
With respect to other critical factors of corporate governance, the results 
suggest no influence of these critical factors on firm performance, as the 
estimated coefficients of these variables are found to be statically insignificant. 
To improve performance, a company has to reduce the conflicts of interest 




agency cost in a company. A good corporate governance mechanism will 
reduce the conflicts of interest among corporate participants, thereby increasing 
firm performance of the companies (Klapper and Love, 2004). 
At the same time, Table 5-26 shows that firm size and age are found not 
to affect the firm’s performance, which is measured by the return on asset 
(ROA) in Jordanian listed firms, because all estimated coefficients are statically 
insignificant. 
7.2.4 Factors Inhibiting the Best Practice of Good CG in Jordan 
In general, participants showed a strong level of agreement with regard 
to the factors listed. Jordanian firms ranked lack of knowledge of board of 
directors about CG principles as the key item preventing best practice of good 
CG in Jordan. This result is in accordance with those of Dahya et al. (2002). 
Their results reported that most firms in China, in their research, accepted that 
the board can be categorised into one of the following kinds, a board that rarely 
gives advice or a board of directors that does not do anything. This is because 
of lack of motivation, autonomy, legal authority and information.   
On the other hand, the least important factors were “weakness of the 
legal environment for firms” and “government intervention in firms”. This result 
can be clarified due to the Firm Law in Jordan still being undeveloped, therefore 
more concern should be given to the law that governs firms’ activities. In 
addition, Jordanian law does not force all firms to act in accordance with the 
law, but gives them the freedom act in accordance with their internal policy 
which may vary from one firm to another.  
The Man-Whitney and Kruskal Wallis tests indicated that there were no 




which is observed from the reported p-value. This means that small or large 
firms and older or newly issued firms report agreement with the items 
preventing best practice of good CG in Jordanian firms. 
In summary, the questionnaire survey results indicate that, in general, 
respondents agreed that all the items listed inhibited the practice of effective CG 
in Jordan, because most items were strongly agreed with by respondents. In 
addition, the questionnaire survey respondents ranked lack of knowledge of the 
board of directors about CG system as the key item preventing best practice of 
good CG in Jordan, followed by the financial cost of applying it. Also, the 
majority of interviewees agreed that lack of knowledge of the board of directors 
about CG system is the primary factor inhibiting the practice of good CG in 
Jordan, followed by the lack of systems and procedures governing firm 
activities, because there is no system that compels firms to practice the CG 
system, and there are no procedures to monitor the practice.   
The alternative is to overcome these obstacles by employing qualified staff 
to implement and strengthen CG practices. Also, spreading awareness should 
be done by firms to organise training for their board and employees regarding 
the application of CG in Jordan. Furthermore, the government should focus on 
education by developing the curriculum, having specialist institutes and 
launching training courses for members of corporate management. It is clear 
that the interview survey results on balance tended to confirm the results 
obtained from the questionnaire survey. The next chapter is devoted to the 






Chapter seven completes the analysis of the results from the data 
collection of this study. This chapter has presented analysis of the questionnaire 
survey and the qualitative approach. The responding firms belonged to two 
sectors, namely the industry and service sectors. The firms varied in size from 
small to large, though small and medium size firms dominated the sample. 
A number of topics have been discussed. One of the main results is that 
compliance, conscience and constitution factors were significant in the ROA 
regression model. Firms, in the context of Jordan, should give extra attention to 
these critical factors because they are considered the most important success 
factors for good CG; otherwise they will face a series of collapses. Also, the 
chapter provided a broader overview of the current state of corporate 
governance in Jordan. A number of obstacles affecting corporate governance 
were discussed and solutions suggested to overcome these obstacles.  
 Shortly, the results of this study are to be confirmed in other studies 
conducted in developed countries, that the application of a corporate 
governance system will protect shareholders’ rights and increase shareholders 
wealth,  as well as increasing the trust of stakeholders and strengthening links 
between the firm and stakeholders, which means reducing the conflict of 
interest and agency problem between them, which, in turn, will enhance the 
performance of the firm and at the same time maximise shareholders’ value. 
Thus, applying effective CG will encourage firms to create a strong relationship 
between firms, shareholders and other stakeholders. Simple, effective CG is a 
mechanism that may align the interests of managers and shareholders.  
 The findings of this study indicate that most Jordanian firms, especially 




will encourage these firms to possess a strong monitoring and management 
system which will help retain and attract local and external investors. This 
confirms the importance of effective CG in developing countries, including 
Jordan, and indicates that across countries CG is an important factor in financial 
market development and firm value. Thus, the findings of the current study 
extend the application of CG outside developed countries to confirm that 
investment in corporate governance practices increases, and contribute to 
maximising, firm performance, thereby maximising shareholders’ value. Chapter 
Eight will be devoted to conclusions and recommendations. 
In short, the current study will fill the gap in the literature by examining and 
providing a comprehensive view of the current state of CG in Jordan. Such a 
comprehensive view would serve as a basis to identify weaknesses and 
problems of CG in Jordan. In turn, this will help the main regulatory bodies to 
overcome the problems and improve the weaknesses in current practice, to 
ensure the success of their corporate governance improvement initiatives. It 
also provides support for related parties to cooperate in improving the corporate 
governance code in Jordan to meet international requirements. In addition, the 
findings of this study will be useful for developing and improving the current 
corporate governance system in Jordanian companies. Further, the findings of 
the current study will be disseminated at international conferences as well as 
providing training programmes to policy makers and directors of firms in MENA 
countries, including Jordan. 
In addition, it adds on to the effort by the Jordanian government to bring 
Jordan into the worldwide corporate governance reform group and give new 
opportunities for firms to apply international corporate governance best practice. 




concerned with how they ought to practice rather than how they may behave in 
practice, hence, improving CG in Arab countries, including Jordan, will require 
increasing the current engagement in best practice sharing of good corporate 
governance implementation. Therefore, we should ask why and how we should 







8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Summary of Findings 
The recent series of financial scandals and crises have impaired investor 
confidence, as well as the future development of the financial market. Thus, 
many countries have begun to undertake a series of reforms to restore the 
financial system and rebuild investor confidence. One of these aims to improve 
the quality of the corporate governance mechanism of listed firms. Thus, the 
corporate governance mechanism is employed to align the managerial activities 
with the interests of shareholders. The corporate governance mechanism is 
additionally used to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
mangers. A decrease in conflicts of interest will reduce agency cost, thereby 
increasing firm performance.  
As one of the foremost emerging markets in the MENA, the CG 
mechanism of Jordanian listed firms is not as sophisticated as that of firms in 
the developed markets. Although the Jordanian financial market has 
experienced economic reforms for 20 years, the market mechanism is still 
unsophisticated. Investors in the Jordanian market complain that their 
investment cannot be effectively protected by the market’s regulatory system. 
Hence, a good corporate governance mechanism will provide protection to 
shareholders’ investments which, in turn, reduces the conflict of interest among 
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corporate participants, thereby increasing firm performance. One of the 
purposes of this study is to empirically test the effects of the critical factors of 
the corporate governance mechanism on firm performance. 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Jordan opened the door to foreign 
investors to become more global, which brings numerous, international firms to 
invest in Jordan. This means that large Jordanian firms have to compete with 
international firms and expand their activities internationally. This requires them 
to adopt a new policy which is the corporate governance system, to manage 
and control all activities, in order to be able to compete with international firms 
entering the market.  
The present study is extremely important, because it indicates how 
applying a strong corporate governance system may benefit the country through 
attracting more local and foreign investors to the Jordanian market. An effective 
corporate governance system will provide internal and external investors with 
assurance that there is a strong system protecting them and their rights. 
The main objective of this study is to provide a comprehensive study of 
the nature and current practice of corporate governance in Jordanian firms. To 
achieve this objective, the study investigated the current practice of corporate 
governance in Jordanian firms.  Participants in the study, namely managers in 
Jordanian listed firms, were elicited regarding the current practice of corporate 
governance in their firms. In particular, the research objectives mentioned in the 
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 To identify the determinants of critical factors for implementing best 
practice of CG in Jordan. 
 To explore the current practice of the CG system in Jordan. 
 To identify the factors that inhibit best practice of CG in Jordan. 
 To empirically investigate the effects of CG on firm performance 
(financial measures) in Jordan. 
 To explore the participants' perceptions regarding the effect of CG on 
firms’ performance in Jordan. 
 To investigate the relationship between corporate governance practices 
and firm characteristics (firm size, firm age and sector) in Jordan. 
Five research questions were designed to accomplish the above aims and 
objectives. Data were collected via a questionnaire survey and interviews were 
conducted to answer the research questions. 
  The main findings in respect of the research questions were as follows. 
Participants agreed that corporate governance is implemented to protect 
shareholders’ and stakeholders’ rights and determine the responsibilities of 
BODs in Jordanian firms.  The findings suggest that specific variables of best 
practice of corporate governance in the Jordanian firms are critical to the 
implementation of the CG system. The participants of the study ranked, 
‘directors are required to disclose any matters that may affect the firm’ as the 
primary critical contributing factor,  
Regarding the audit committee, results clearly indicate that the audit 
committee plays an important role in Jordanian firms, because it provides useful 
information to shareholders, helping them make informed decisions and 
evaluate a firm’s performance over time as well as ensuring trust and peace of 
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mind. The results also suggested that both non-financial and financial 
information in Jordanian firms need more disclosure, because the financial 
information provided in Jordanian firms does not help participants to make 
comparisons between them. The results indicated that corporate governance 
will improve the quality of disclosure and reduce asymmetric information. 
Hence, there will be fewer conflicts of interest in the firms, helping firms to 
achieve good performance. Concerning factors influencing the appointment of 
NEDs in Jordanian firms, the results revealed that, in general, participants 
ranked, ‘experience’ and ‘possess global business’ as the first factors that might 
influence the appointment of a board’s NEDs.   
The results also indicate that cumulative voting was not employed in 
spite of this safeguarding the rights of minority shareholders by allowing them to 
work as a group to elect a candidate of their choice, who, as a member of the 
board of directors, would represent them. The results also showed that most 
firms have different people in the two positions of Chairman and CEO. With 
regard to the conflict of interest with the BODs, the results indicate that the 
majority of participants stated clearly that their firms have no clear written 
regulations for the directors and staff regarding this issue.  
Finally, there are a number of obstacles affecting the practice of good 
corporate governance. These are: ‘lack of knowledge of board of directors 
about corporate governance principles’; ‘weakness of the organisation’s 
management’; ‘weakness of the legal environment’; ‘absence of training 
programmes for members of the board of directors about the governance 
system’; and ‘the financial cost of applying the governance system’.  On the 
other hand, the overall impression gained from the participants was that while 
substantial progress had been made in those firms attempting to implement the 
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Jordanian corporate governance code, it was not reasonable to expect 
complete compliance in firms, and within a corporate culture, where the rights of 
stakeholders was a new concept and no history of effective corporate 
governance existed. In order to provide a more complete picture of Jordan’s 
attempts to improve the corporate governance code, the findings provided 
valuable insight into obstacles facing the implementation of the code.   
While agreeing with senior managers about the urgent need for an 
effective corporate governance code in Jordan, regulators considered the level 
of implementation of the code as still lower than expected. Regulators regarded 
the main advantages of corporate governance as being protection of 
shareholder rights, oversight of management performance and regulation of the 
relationship between boards of directors and shareholders.  Regulators agreed 
with managers that the code faced many obstacles to its successful 
implementation. Suggested solutions to overcome these obstacles were, 
‘developing corporate governance education programmes’ as well as 
‘organising workshops and training’. In addition, firms were felt to need more 
freedom, empowerment and support from the government in this context. 
Overall, education was perceived to be the key to overcoming obstacles to the 
code. Participants viewed the Jordan Securities Commission as a very 
important authority, and felt it should force all Jordanian firms to practise an 
effective corporate governance system and monitor its implementation. This will 
assist these firms to possess a strong monitoring and management system 
which will help attract local and external investors. 
The findings of this study have confirmed and extended the current 
literature, confirming that most large firms are applying the corporate 
governance system, deriving many benefits from it, and advising others to apply 
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it.  Good corporate governance mechanisms reduce the conflict of interest 
among corporate participants, thereby increasing firm performance.  This study 
empirically investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
performance of Jordanian listed firms. The study found that constitution, 
compliance and conscience are effective critical factors for best corporate 
governance practice which have a positive impact on firms’ performance. Also, 
empirical results of this study are consistent with the following CG mechanisms.  
 Subcommittees increase the quality of the corporate governance 
mechanism of the listed firms to help them reduce the conflict of interest 
between executives and shareholders, which in turn helps improve firm 
performance.  
 Institutional investors will help to improve performance of Jordanian 
listed firms.  
 Small size of the board will help to improve performance of Jordanian 
listed firms.  
 Separation between the position of CEO and Chairman will help to 
improve performance of Jordanian listed firms.  
 Existence of independent NEDs will help to improve performance of 
Jordanian listed firms. 
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Having summarised the study overall and highlighted the main findings, 
the following sections indicate the study’s limitations, make a number of 
recommendations and suggest areas for future research. 
8.2 Recommendations 
The past decade has witnessed the appearance of many local, national and 
international corporations and organisations specialising in the preparation and 
presentation of the ideal criteria for firm management best practices as well as 
effective supervision of them. These corporations and organisations have also 
helped support the procedures and frameworks used to manage and redirect 
firm affairs in order to enhance performance, disclosure and transparency, and 
maximise shareholders’ profits in the long run, thereby protecting their interests. 
In this context, most countries have established their own private rules for the 
corporate governance code to complement their legal, organisational and 
administrative environments. 
It was noted in Chapter Two that countries’ cultures, including their 
political and economic circumstances, play a major role in their adopting and 
preparing their corporate governance systems. As a result, countries’ efforts 
and interests differ with regard to practising the system, in addition to there 
being a difference in the responsible parties supporting its implementation. It is 
very important to point out that there is no single pattern or code for best 
practice, and this is why different frameworks exist for corporate governance in 
different countries governed by their own unique laws and systems controlling 
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Most of the tools of the corporate governance code in Jordanian firms 
exist within a group of systems and laws, most importantly, the Jordanian Firms 
Law for the year 1997 with its modification in 2002 and other systems and laws 
which relate to the corporate governance code in a direct or indirect way. 
However, the practice of the corporate governance system requires support and 
development as well as interaction between external and internal system 
requirements of the firms’ systems and the Jordan Securities Commission.  
 
Thus, in light of the research results, the researcher recommends the 
following: 
 Effective corporate governance practices will remain a major challenge in 
Jordan, and may be achieved by providing training programmes, 
education and workshops to appropriate staff as well as learning from the 
relevant experience of developed countries. This will help policymakers 
significantly. 
 This study advises policymakers in Jordan to adopt and clearly define the 
role of independent NEDs.   
 The laws and systems should be reviewed in order to come in line with 
international standards and best practices of corporate governance.  
 It is important that policymakers keep in mind the size of Jordanian firms 
(small, medium and large). It is not possible to devise different codes for 
firms belonging to these three segments, however the code can be 
adjusted to the needs of all Jordanian firms. It is particularly important to 
bear in mind the problems of small firms.  
 More disclosure and transparency is required in Jordanian firms to 
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protect the interests of investors, and this can be achieved by 
implementing new policy measures on disclosure and transparency for 
an effective corporate governance system.  
 Firms should have clear written regulations for the directors and staff to follow 
regarding conflicts of interest.  
 Jordanian listed firms should increase the proportion of institutional 
ownership in the ownership structure. This recommendation may 
strengthen the internal governance of Jordanian listed firms, thereby 
increasing firm performance. 
 Firms should recognise the critical factors, namely, constitution, 
compliance and conscience that must certainly be considered to ensure 
successful best practice of the corporate governance system in Jordan. 
Firms should be aware that without taking into account these critical 
factors, the corporate governance system will definitely fail. 
8.3 Contribution of the Study 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a general 
understanding how CG is considered in an emerging market and, in particular, 
in Arab countries such as Jordan. The current study contributes to academic 
research by recognising a series of critical factors that must be carefully 
considered to ensure successful best practice in the corporate governance 
system. The results of this study should enhance the current practice of critical 
factors for implementing best practice of corporate governance in Jordan; in 
essence, the results of this research will help management by identifying it. 
 From the academic research perspective, this study has contributed to 
the methodology of research on identifying the determinants of critical factors 
for implementing best practice of corporate governance in Jordan by 
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demonstrating triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods. Study 
based on either a quantitative or qualitative strategy alone will be inadequate to 
get this deeper understanding, even though a single method (quantitative or 
qualitative) has mostly been applied in most previous empirical studies. 
Consequently, this study has contributed to the methodology of research on 
critical factors for implementing best practice of corporate governance in Jordan 
by demonstrating triangulation of qualitative and quantitative methods. 
  As mentioned, there is no research published on critical factors for 
implementing best practice of corporate governance in MENA countries, 
particularly in Jordan. Therefore, without taking into account these critical 
factors, corporate governance systems will definitely fail. Another significant 
contribution is that this study is the first effort to identify the obstacles that inhibit 
the application of good corporate governance. Above all, there is not much 
research done into corporate governance in Jordan. To the extent of the 
knowledge of the researcher, this study is the first of its kind in Jordan. 
Practically, this study will make a contribution to Jordanian CG by helping in the 
establishment of a Jordanian Association of Directors. This institute should be 
independent, responsible for transfer of knowledge and cooperate with 
policymakers who organise CG regulations to protect the interests of all 
stakeholders. Hence, it is expected that the outcomes of this study will provide 
helpful insights in regards to policy recommendations and implications for 
scholars and regulators.  
 This study draws the attention of the Jordan government (the Ministry of 
Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, and the Jordan Securities Commission), 
professional organisations, business employers, investors and firms, to the 
need for and importance of implementing good corporate governance systems 
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in Jordanian firms. It also provides support for related parties to cooperate in 
improving a corporate governance code in Jordan. Furthermore, this study 
provides a foundation for future research on the corporate governance system, 
in order to meet international requirements for developing the current Corporate 
Governance Code in Jordan.    
8.4 Limitations and Scope for Further Research 
The current practices of corporate governance in Jordan have been the main 
concern of this study. In order to achieve the study’s objectives, two instruments 
were used for the collection of data, namely questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews. Using these instruments to collect data, the researcher encountered 
the following limitations: firstly, time and cost constraints. Secondly, the study 
focused on exploring the current practices of corporate governance systems in 
Jordanian firms. It did not contact proprietorships, partnerships or close-held 
firms. Thirdly, the questionnaire and interview survey findings represent only the 
views and experiences of the targeted participants in Jordan, which were 
restricted by the choice of questions used, as well as the participants selected. 
Fourthly, both instruments included questions eliciting the participants’ opinion 
of issues under study, however, participants’ responses may have been 
influenced by some factors which may, in turn, affect the quality and 
generalisability of findings. Finally, the study’s results are restricted to Jordan 
only; cultural, social, accounting and investment environment differences from 
other countries may prevent wider generalisations. 
 Despite the aforementioned limitations, this thesis makes a valuable 
contribution to our knowledge by confirming and extending the usefulness of 
applying an effective corporate governance system not only in developed 
countries but also in developing countries including Jordan. Further research is 
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needed to explore corporate governance practices in specific sectors, for 
example, in firms in the banking sector, due to their importance in Jordanian 
economic development. Also, research is recommended in the context of MENA 
countries to explore the practices of the corporate governance system to fill the 























The attached questionnaire is part of a research project that I am undertaking in partial 
fulfilment of the award of a Ph.D. degree in Accounting and Finance at Bradford University, 
UK.  The objective of the study is to investigate the main critical factors for implementing best 
practice of good corporate governance (CG) in Jordan. 
 
We would be very grateful if you could spend twenty minutes of your time to complete the 
questionnaire. We can assure you that all the information you provide will be treated in the 
strictest confidence and only the summarised data will be used for research purposes. Therefore 
the identity of the participating individuals and firms will not be revealed in any published work 
or to anyone who is not part of the research project. 
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Section 1 – Respondent demographics 
1- Job title 
 Chief Executive Officer    Deputy Director                
  Financial Manager             Director of Internal Audit    
 Other (pleases specify). 
 
2- Business sector                         Industrial                            Services       
    
     
     
SECTION 2 – GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE FIRM 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements using a scale 
from 1 to 7, where  
 













Element 1:Constitution   
Rating 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.  
There is a formal and transparent procedure for the 
appointment of new directors to the board. 
       
2.  
The roles of the Chair and the CEO are split 
between different directors 
       
3.  
Directors are required to disclose any matters that 
may affect the firm. 
       
4.  
All board committees are composed of executive 
and non executive directors (NEDs).   
       
5.  
We specify the maximum duration for directors –
including the chairman-to serve in the board. 
       
6.  
We include information on the duties and 
responsibilities of board committee in our annual 
report. 
       
7.  
We disclose the structure hierarchy/network of the 
firm in the annual report. 
       




8.     
Our firm links rewards to long term performance.        
9.  
In our firms directors and auditors explain their 
reporting responsibilities in the annual report. 
       
10.  
Our firm discloses, in the annual report, whether 
the auditor provides non auditing services or not. 
       
11.  
Our firm frequently changes the corporate auditor.        
12.  
Our firm directors are not involved in determining 
their own remuneration. 
       
13.  
Our firm reviews the effectiveness of the internal 
control system. 
       
14.  
Our firm describes the work of the audit committee 
in the annual report. 
       
15.  
Our firm identifies in the annual report the key risk 
areas of the business and the strategies to manage 
them. 
       
 Element 3:Competence 
16.  
Trains new directors to read and analyze the 
financial statements. 
       
17.  
Enlightens new directors about the long/short term 
objectives and mission of the firm. 
       
18.  
Updates its directors about the trends and new 
global issues of corporate governance. 
       
19.  
Reviews the proper technology and the system used 
in the firm to achieve the firm’s goals.  
       
20.  
Evaluates its process and transactions and discloses 
the result in the annual report. 
       
No Element 4:Compliance 
21.  
 
In our firm, audit committee ensures compliance 
with law and assures an implementation of the 
board’s decisions. 
       
22.  
In our firm, audit committee works independently 
from top management. 
       
23.  
Our firm implements the one share/one vote system 
in terms of directors’ election.  
       
24.  
Our firm reviews and discloses the equality of 
employment opportunities in the annual report. 
       
25.  
Our firm applies a clear mechanism for the board 
of directors’ retirement and resignation. 





Our firm monitors the application of corporate 
governance principles and best practice to its 
particular circumstances. 
       
  Element 5:Competitiveness        
27.  
Evaluates and discloses the performance of the 
board and the management in the annual report. 
       
28.  
States the firm’s objectives and goals in the annual 
report. 
       
29.  
Discloses the ownership of the major shareholders 
within the firm. 
       
30.  
Discloses the names of the board and the key 
executive directors in the annual report. 
       
31.  
Articulates its role in the economic growth.          
32.  
Protects the interests of the minority shareholders.        
 Element 6: Culture 
33.  
In Our firm, the ethical code is well documented 
and understood by employees. 
       
34.  
In our firm business relationships rules are clearly 
defined and available to all. 
       
35.  
Our firm has clear formal and informal polices.        
36.  
Our firm clearly defines corporate   responsibilities 
in relation to the environment in the annual report. 
       
37.  
Our firm clearly defines corporate responsibilities 
in relation to human rights in the annual report. 
       
38.  
In our firm, there is a statement about the 
consequences of violation of the code of ethics. 
       
 Element 7:Commitment 
39.  
The rights of stakeholders are respected.        
40.  
There is a clear and transparent mechanism for 
stakeholders to   obtain redress for violation of their 
rights. 
       
41.  
Employees are represented on the board.        
42.  
Employees are allowed stock ownership or profit-
share. 
       
43.  
There is scope for adopting an executive’s share 
option. 
       
44.  
Institutional investors contact senior executive to 
exchange views and information. 




 Element 8 :Communication 
45.  
Our firm includes a section on corporate 
governance practices in the annual report. 
       
46.  
In our firm NEDs, develop an understanding of the 
views of major shareholders. 
       
47.  
In our firm, We disclose information on the 
compensation for the board members and 
management team in the annual report. 
       
48.  
Our firm discloses any interlocking directorship in 
the annual report. 
       
49.  
Our firm discloses information about affiliated and 
subsidiary firms. 
       
50.  
Our firm discloses, in the annual report , the 
accounting standards adopted 
       
51.  
Our firm discloses the number of board meetings 
held during the year.   
       
52.  
In our firm, there is a clear and transparent 
mechanism for stakeholders to communicate 
effectively with the firm. 
       
 Element 9:Conduct 
53.  
There are guidelines for serving as a Director.        
54.  
There are adequate procedures in place to guard 
against insider trading. 
       
55.  
There are strict guidelines for safety, health and the 
environment. 
       
56.  
There are clear guidelines on privacy and data 
protection. 
       
57.  
There are guidelines regarding conflict of interest.        
58.  













59. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements using a 
scale from 1 to 7, where  
 










Statement  Rating  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Our firm participates in community development 
programs. 
       
In our firm we have a clear policy on implementing 
Corporate Social Responsibility. 
       
Our firm sponsors educational and/or training programs 
for the community. 
       
Our firm is involved in charitable contribution.        
We maintain an independent relationship between our 
firm and the   “recipient” of the charitable contribution. 
       
 
60. Please indicate the extent to which each of the following best practice of corporate 
governance contribute to improving your firm’s performance using a scale from 1 to 7, 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 












To a great 
extent 





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
       
       
       
       
       





61. Please indicate the extent to which you agree  with each of the following factors inhibiting 
the best practice of good corporate governance in Jordan using a scale from 1 to 7, where   










Statements  Rating  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Weakness of the legal environment for firms.        
Lack of knowledge of board of directors about corporate 
governance principles. 
       
Tribal loyalties of the board.         
Government intervention in firms.        
Major shareholders.        
.        
Family ownership.        
Hierarchical structures of the firm.        
 





____   
Thank you very much for taking the time and effort to complete this questionnaire. 
If you would like to receive an executive summary of the findings of the study, please provide 
your details below: 






APPENDIX B KEY ECONOMIC 
INDICAROS  
Key Economic Indicators (1990-2009) (In JD Millions). 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Population 
     
Population (in 000) 3431 3663 3804 3950 4096 
Output and Prices 
     
GDP at current market prices  2668.3 2855.1 3493.0 3882.5 4266.2 
Real Growth rate of GDP at current 











Per Capita Income (JD) at current market 
prices 
778 779 918 983 1042 
Change in cost of living index (%) 16.2 8.2 4.0 3.3 3.6 
Ratio of aggregate consumption to GDP 
(%) 
99.0 97.4 98.4 98.8 95.5 
Ratio of aggregate investment to GDP 
(%) 
31.9 25.9 34.6 31.8 27.6 







1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Public Revenue 938.2 112.0 1358.7 1406.3 1492.3 
Public Expenditure 1032.6 1099.6 1177.7 1336.6 1437.1 
Deficit/Surplus (excluding grants) -258.7 -212.8 -243.6 -93.6 -112.1 
Ratio of GDP (%) -9.7    -7.5 1.2 -2.4 -2.6 
Deficit/Surplus (including grants) -94.4 12.4 181.0 69.7 55.2 
Ratio of GDP (%) -3.5 .04 5.2 1.8 1.3 
Outstanding internal public debt 1037.6 1061.7 1041.5 1143.8 1181 
Ratio of GDP (%) 38.9 37.2 29.8 29.5 27.7 
Outstanding external debt 5064.3 4958.6 4577.6 4229.6 3914.8 
Ratio of GDP (%) 189.8 173.7 131.1 108.9 91.8 
  
 Key Economic Indicators (Cont) (In JD Millions). 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Population 
     
Population (‘000s) 4291 4444 4600 4756 4900 
Output and Prices 
     
GDP at current market prices 4560.8 4982.4 5192.4 5642.9 5758.7 
Real Growth rate of GDP at current 











Per Capita Income (JD) at current market 
prices 
1063 1121 1129 1186 1175 
Change in cost of living index (%) 2.4 6.5 3.0 3.1 0.6 
Ratio of aggregate consumption to GDP 
(%) 
87.8 94.9 96.9 97.9 99.0 
Ratio of aggregate investment to GDP 
(%) 





Ratio of domestic saving to GDP (%) 12.2 5.1 3.4 2.4 3.7 
Public Finance 
     
Public Revenue 1620.6 1677.1 1574.9 1529.1 1617.4 
Public Expenditure 1697.5 1717.9 1906.1 2087.7 2039.4 
Deficit/Surplus (excluding grants) -246.6 -287.8 -536.2 -296.6 -140.4 
Ratio of GDP (%) -5.4 -5.8 -10.3 -5.3 -2.4 
Deficit/Surplus (including grants) -76.6 -40.8 -331.2 -355.6 -223.6 
Ratio of GDP (%) -1.7 -0.8 -6.4 -6.3 -3.9 
Outstanding internal public debt 975.4 1006.4 914.2 1119.0 1024 
Ratio of GDP (%) 21.4 21.4 18.5 19.8 17.9 
Outstanding external debt 4465.9 4722.8 4580.6 5009.8 5186.2 

















Key Economic Indicators (Cont) (In JD Millions). 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Population 
      
Population (‘000s) 5,039 4940 5,070 5,200 5,350 5,473 
Output and 
Prices 
      
GDP at current market 
prices 
6,002.4 6,496.1 6,858.3 7,287.5 8,301.7 9,334.2 
Growth rate of GDP at 





5.7 4.1 8.1 8.1 
Per capita income at current 
market prices (JD) 
1191 1208 1258 1258 1551 1.7 








2.3 2.6 3.5 
Ratio of aggregate 












Ratio of aggregate 










Ratio of domestic saving to 
GDP (%) 
-4.6 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 -2.3 -6.8 
Public Finance 
      
Public Revenue 1610.1 1718.6 1752.1 1698.6 2958.5 3062.1 
Public Expenditure 2054.1 2192.3 2289.1 2441.0 3,180.5 3,538.9 
Deficit/Surplus  (on cash 
basis) 
-119.8 -155.5 -145.4 -97.2 -154.1 -416.8 
Ratio of GDP (%) -2.0 -2.4 -2.1 -1.3 -1.9 -4.6 
Deficit/Surplus (on 
commitment basis) 
-203.8 -224.3 -220.2 -196.8 -222.0 -476.8 
Ratio of GDP (%) -3.4 -3.5 -3.2 -2.7 -2.7 -5.2 
Outstanding internal public 
debt 
1,235.0 1,397.0 1,656.0 1,815.0 2,082.0 2,467.0 
Ratio of GDP (%) 20.6 22.0 24.4 25.2 25.5 27.1 




 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
debt 
Ratio of GDP (%) 79.9 78.1 78.9 74.8 65.5 55.5 
  
 
Key Economic Indicators (Cont) (In JD Millions) 
 20006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Population 
      
Population (‘000s) 5.600  5.723  5.850  5.980 6.113    6.249  
Output and 
Prices 
      
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
at current market prices 
10,932.6  12,293.8  14,864.6  16,699.7 18.762.0  20,476.5 
Growth rate of GDP at 
constant market prices (%) 
8.1 8.8  7.8  2.8 2.3     2.6 
Per capita income at 
current market prices (JD) 
1952 2147 2540     
Change in cost of living 
index (%) 
6.3  4.7  13.9 -0.7   
Ratio of aggregate 
consumption to GDP (%) 
103.3  106.4  101.1  96.9 NA NA 
Ratio of aggregate 










Ratio of domestic saving to 
GDP (%) 
-3.3 -6.4 -1.1 3.1 NA NA 
Public Finance 
      
Public Revenue 3,469.0  3,971.5  5,093.7  4,526.2 4662.8 5413.9 
Public Expenditure 3,912.2  4,586.5  5,431.0  5,976.0 5708.0 6801.8 
Deficit/Surplus  (on cash 
basis) 
-391.4  -568.5  -338.2  -1,449.8 -1045.4 -1387.9 













Ratio of GDP (%) -4.3 -5.1 -2.2 -8.9 -5.6 -6.8 
Outstanding internal public 
debt 
2,961.0 3,695.0 5,754.0 7,086.0 6852.0 8915.5 
Ratio of GDP (%) 28.5 30.6 38.2 43.6 36.5 43.5 
Outstanding external Public 
debt 
5,186.5  5,253.3  3,640.2  3,869.0 4610.8 4486.8 




APPENDIX C TRADING VOLUM AND 
MARKET CAPITALISATION 
    Year  Trading Volume 
 (Million JD) 
Market Capitalisation  
(Million JD) 
1978 5.6 286.1 
1979 15.9 452.3 
1980 41.5 495.6 
1981 75.5 834.6 
1982 128.2 1,034.8 
1983 141.4 1,053.3 
1984 59.3 911.7 
1985 66.8 926.9 
1986 69.5 891.8 
1987 148.2 929.4 
1988 132.7 1,104.7 
1989 367.6 1400.4 
1990 268.9 1293.2 
1991 302.9 1707.1 
1992 887.0 2295.7 
1993 968.7 3,464.0 
1994 430.3 3,409.3 
1995 419.0 3,465.4 
1996 248.6 3,461.2 
1997 255.2 3,862.0 
1998 464.4 4,156.6 
1999 389.5 4137.7 
2000 287.8 3509.6 
2001 662.4 4,476.4 
2002 946.7 5028.9 





2004 3793.3  13033.8 
2005 16871.1 26667 
2006                   14209.9 21078.2 
2007                   12348.1 29214.2 
2008                   20318.1 25406.3 
2009                     9665.3 22526.9 
2010                     6689.9 21858.1 
2011                     2850.2 19272.7 





APPENDIX D TRADING VOLUME BY 
SECTOR 
Year Financial Services Industry Total 
1990 77.6 30.8 158.0 266.4 
1991 80.3 34.3 177.8 292.4 
1992 228.1 123.8 526.9 878.8 
1993 315.5 107.8 510.1 933.4 
1994 194.6 70.0 165.7 430.3 
1995 157 82.0 123.1 362.1 
1996 86.2 51.0 114.4 248.6 
1997 170 55.2 130 355.2 
1998 198.6 47.0 218.8 464.4 
1999 135.6 50.8 203.0 389.4 
2000 132.7 54.1 101.0 287.8 
2001 306.5 92.9 262.9 662.4 
2002 361.2 114.1 471.4 946.7 
2003 564.3 440.9 850.3 1855.2 
2004 1,736.3 1,000.7 1,056.1 3793.3 
2005 6,223.3 8,003.9 2,643.8 16871.0 
2006 2959 9,233.0 2,017.6 14,209.8 
2007 8779 1658 1,911.1 12,348.1 
2008 9,638.9 5,422.2 5,256.8 20,318.0 
2009 6,363.7 2,030.8 1,270.6 9,665.3 
2010 4,174,112,697 1,744,663,490 771,210,968 6,689,987,155 
2011 1,757,351,376 576,006,319 516,894,934 2,850,252,629 
2012 1,189,542,872 403,893,684 385,377,323 1,978,813,879 
 
